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ABSTRACT  
   
Since the 1990s, stop and frisk activities have been a cornerstone of the New York Police 
Department (NYPD). The manner in which the NYPD has carried out stop, question, and 
frisks (SQFs), however, has been a focal point of discussion, resulting in public outrage 
and two major lawsuits. Recently, the Federal District Court Judge ruled that the NYPD 
was engaging in unconstitutional stop-and-frisk practices that targeted predominately 
Black and Latino New Yorkers. Questions surrounding the NYPD’s SQF practices have 
almost exclusively focused on racial and ethnic disproportionality in the rate of stops 
without necessarily considering what transpired during the stop. This study will fill that 
void by examining the prevalence and nature of use of force during those stops, along 
with testing the minority threat hypothesis. By combining micro-level measures from the 
NYPD’s 2012 “Stop, Question, and Frisk” database with macro-level variables collected 
from the United States Census Bureau, the current study examines police use of force in 
the context of SQF activities. The results should help judges, policy makers, police 
officers, and scholars understand the nature of police use of force in the context of SQFs.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Burdened with a “vast and unmanageable social domain” (Manning, 1978, p. 95), police 
officers have taken on multiple roles in society (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994; Eck & 
Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1979, 1990; Greene, 2000; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Manning, 
1978, 1992; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Despite a mission that lacks consistency, there is 
one defining feature of the police: they have the authority to use force (Bittner, 1970, 
1974; Muir, 1977). As a way to fulfilling their amorphous role in society (e.g., law 
enforcement, crime prevention, order maintenance, etc.), police are legally prescribed the 
authority to use force in order to protect themselves and others. Having such authority, 
however, comes with significant scrutiny. Because they are given the discretion to use 
force, there is also the potential for police officers to misuse or abuse their authority 
(Dunham & Alpert, 1997). Considering that law enforcement practices have historically 
been “conditioned by broader social forces and attitudes—including a long history of 
racism” (Williams & Murphy, 1990, p. 28), there may be reason to believe that force is 
used disproportionately against ethnic minority communities. In fact, research tends to 
support the notion that policing practices (i.e., use of force) are racially biased towards 
African Americans and Latinos (Goldkamp, 1976; Reiss, 1980; Sparger & Glacopassi, 
1992; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Walker, Spohn, & Delone, 2012). To date, however, 
most research examining police use of force focuses on the suspect’s race without 
considering the larger ecological context in which he or she is embedded (but see Terrill 
& Reisig, 2003). Such research is critically needed as many police officers dismiss the 
existence of racially biased policing, and instead, promulgate that such racial disparities 
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are nothing more than the artifact of policing high crime areas in which Blacks and 
Latinos committed the majority of crime (Floyd et al. v. The City of New York , 2013).  
Although research and national estimates suggest that police use of force is a rare 
event (Adams, 1999; MacDonald et al., 2003; Westmarland, 2001; Worden & Catlin, 
2002), it still occurs in approximately 1.4 percent of all police-citizen encounters, 
whereby police may use excessive force  (Eith & Durose, 2011). Given the volume of 
encounters between police and citizens, this roughly translates into 560,000 police use of 
force incidents each year, or 1,534 incidents each day (Eith & Durose, 2011). Regardless 
of its “infrequency,” there are still a number of far-reaching consequences associated 
with police use of force. Foremost, police use of force is the most extreme form of police 
authority. In the process of subduing a suspect physically there is the possibility that the 
altercation ends in serious injury or death (e.g., force is used in 20 percent of all arrests; 
see Hickman, Piquero, & Garner, 2008). Such an issue is particularly concerning if police 
officers misuse their authority. As the Human Rights Watch (1998) states, 
Police abuse remains one of the most serious and divisive human rights violations 
in the United States. The excessive use of force by police officers, including 
unjustified shooting, severe beatings, fatal choking, and rough treatment, persists 
because overwhelming barriers to accountability make it possible for officers who 
commit human rights violations to escape due punishment and often to repeat 
their offense. (p. 25)  
 
Even when used judiciously (i.e., the force employed should be proportional to the 
circumstantial threat), police use of force may still cause injury to the citizen, depriving 
him or her of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” As a result, there may be 
community upheaval and a negative public image associated with the police, such as that 
witnessed in the Ferguson incident (Alpert & Dunham, 2010; Fyfe, 1988). Considering 
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the importance of maintaining a positive relationship with the community in order to 
uphold law and order (Sunshine & Tyler, 2002; Tyler, 1990, 2004), force may undermine 
police legitimacy because police-citizen cooperation and perceptions of legitimacy 
requires a “high level of trust between police and citizens” (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994, p. 
18). Hence, employing various forms of force, even if done so judiciously, may serve to 
dissolve the established trust between police and citizens, rendering law enforcement 
efforts to be less than ideal.  
 Given the frequency and serious consequences that accompany police use of 
force, for more than 40 years researchers have sought to examine the various factors 
associated with force in an attempt to better understand the phenomenon and to reduce 
the likelihood that it occurs (Prenzler, Porter, & Alpert, 2013). The research that exists on 
factors related to police use of force tends to center around four different domains: 
suspect characteristics (Engel et al., 2000; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 
2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002), officer characteristics (Kop & Euwema, 2000; 
Lawton, 2007; McElvain & Kposowa, 2008; Paoline & Terrill, 2004), encounter-level 
characteristics (Garner et al., 2002; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Sun & Payne, 2004; 
Terrill et al., 2003), and departmental characteristics (Alpert & MacDonald, 2001; 
Friedrich, 1980; Hickman & Piquero, 2007). Although research on these four areas has 
provided greater insight into police use of force, these factors do not exist in a vacuum. 
Instead, individual- and departmental-level predictors of police use of force are 
influenced by the larger ecological context in which they are embedded. To date, 
however, research examining the effect of macro-level factors on police use of force is 
relatively scarce. In fact, research on the ecology of police use of force is such a new area 
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of focus that fifteen years ago Adam (1999) did not acknowledge it in his review about 
What We Know about Police Use of Force. 
 Since Adam’s (1999) review of police use of force, a few studies have emerged 
examining the ecological, or neighborhood, context in which force is employed. The 
research suggests that communities comprised of racial and ethnic minorities and 
members of lower socioeconomic status experience police use of force at higher rates 
than whites and/or those of higher economic status, including deadly force (Reiss, 1980; 
Smith, 1986; Sparger & Glacopassi, 1992; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). In an attempt to 
explain these differences, various explanations for the disproportionate use of force 
among racial and ethnic minority neighborhoods have been put forth by scholars (e.g., 
Werthman and Piliavin’s (1967) ecological contamination hypothesis, Klinger’s (1997) 
vigor hypothesis). The minority threat hypothesis proposes that crime control efforts and 
the allocation of resources vary by the racial/ethnic composition of places because the 
dominant group (i.e., Whites) seeks to protect their power and privilege from those areas 
considered a “problem population”—ethnic minorities (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971; 
Holmes, 2000; Jackson, 1989; Liska, 1992; Quinney, 1980; Smith & Holmes, 2003; 
Spitzer, 1975; Stultz & Baumer, 2007; Turk, 1966). Under this framework, therefore, 
police use of force is not only a way to ensure compliance with the law, but also a 
mechanism for preserving the social order or current status quo for the political elite. To 
date, numerous studies have documented a relationship between minority representation 
and various policing outcomes (Brandl, Chamlin, & Frank, 1995; Chamlin, 1990; 
Greenberg et al., 1985; Kane, 2003; Liska et al., 1981; Nalla, Lynch, & Leiber, 1997). 
Jackson and Carroll (1981), for example, found that a city’s racial composition, 
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frequency of riots in the 1960s, and level of black mobilization activity were significant 
predictors of police expenditures (see also Jackson, 1986). Whether such ethnic minority-
related predictors are associated with police use of force is still underdeveloped in the 
policing literature. 
 The current study frames police use of force in terms of the minority threat 
perspective. Although police officers are thought to be apolitical, their occupational 
mandate is politically defined and they function in a public political arena (Manning, 
1978). Most notably, Manning (1978) stated the factors that influence the administration 
of law “all reflect the political organization of society. The distribution of power and 
authority, for example, rather than the striving for justice, or equal treatment under the 
law, can all have a direct bearing on enforcement” (Manning, 1978, p. 106). In line with 
the minority threat perspective, the police may be a political mechanism through which 
the majority group in society (i.e., Whites) maintains their power and privilege by 
subjecting minority groups to greater formal social control, such as through police use of 
force. As Croft (1985) states, “questions of how and why police use force, therefore, are 
central…to the broader political issues of the proper role and function of government in a 
modern democratic society” (p. 232). 
        In order to determine the theoretical applicability of the minority threat hypothesis 
while simultaneously investigating the effect of neighborhood-level characteristics on 
police use of force, the current study examines police use of force in the context of stop, 
question, and frisk (SQF) activities using data collected by the New York Police 
Department (NYPD). Although the NYPD has touted the effectiveness of SQFs as 
reducing crime in New York City, it has generated considerable criticism from the 
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community, especially by legal scholars, civil rights activists, and racial/ethnic 
community members. By the end of the 1990s, SQF procedures became a point of 
contention among ethnic minorities because they were being disproportionately stopped 
and frisked by the NYPD.  As Fagan, Geller, Davies, and West (2010) indicated, “[i]n a 
fifteen-month period from January 1998 through March 1999, non-Hispanic Black, 
Hispanic Black, and Hispanic White New Yorkers were three times more likely than their 
White counterparts to be stopped and frisked on suspicion of weapons or violent crimes” 
(p. 310). Consequently, the NYPD’s SQF tactics have been a centerpiece of controversy, 
resulting in multiple lawsuits over the last decade. In the most recent case (Floyd et al. v. 
The City of New York, 2008), the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) challenged the 
NYPD’s use of SQF under the Fourth Amendment and alleged that officers were 
selectively targeting individuals on the basis of their race and national origin without 
reasonable suspicion, a violation under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Ultimately, a federal district court judge ruled that the NYPD was engaging 
in unconstitutional stop and frisk practices that targeted predominately black and Latino 
New Yorkers and ordered a number of changes to be implemented in the near future.  
Questions surrounding the NYPD’s SQF practices have almost exclusively 
focused on racial disproportionality in the rate of stops without necessarily considering 
what transpired during the stop. In Terry v. Ohio (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires police to have reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity before they may 
lawfully conduct a brief, limited, investigatory detention—otherwise known as a stop 
(see Ferdico, Fradella, & Totten, 2015).  The Court also held that officers may “pat 
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down” or frisk a detained person if there is reasonable, articulable suspicion that they 
person may be “armed and dangerous” (Terry v. Ohio, 1968, p. 27).  Reasonable, 
articulable suspicion is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance 
of the evidence” and “is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause” (United 
States v. Sokolow, 1989, p. 7).  On the other hand, mere hunches do not constitute 
reasonable suspicion (Ferdico, et al., 2015).  Officers “must be able to point to specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion” (Terry v. Ohio, 1968, p. 21).  Although a wide variety 
of factors may lawfully be considered under the “totality of the circumstances” that give 
rise to reasonable suspicion, the race, ethnicity, or national origin of a suspect are not 
legitimate factors upon which reasonable suspicion may be formulated (Ferdico, et al., 
2015).   
Terry v. Ohio and other U.S. Supreme Court cases in its progeny (e.g., Sibron v. 
New York, 1968) may have underestimated whether the benefits of the SQF offset the 
potential costs, which may include racial profiling, deprivations of liberty, and the most 
extreme form of police authority—use of force. This study will fill that void by 
examining the prevalence and nature of use of force during those stops. More 
specifically, this dissertation seeks to answer three important questions related to the 
intersection of racial profiling, deprivations of liberty, and police use of force. First, 
which factors predict use of force across suspect, situational, departmental, and 
ecological levels of analysis? Second, after controlling for the appropriate micro- and 
macro-level variables, do police officers use force more often in predominately minority 
neighborhoods? And third, does an individual’s race/ethnicity interact with the 
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racial/ethnic composition of a police precinct to produce disparities in police use of 
force? 
The answers to these research questions are of significant importance in a number 
of spheres.  First and foremost, the results should help judges, policy makers, and 
scholars understand the nature of SQF practices.  This, in turn, can help to clarify the 
permission scope of reasonable, articulable suspicion for law enforcement officers, 
judges, and policy makers.  Second, if the police, judges, and policy makers act on the 
data appropriately, they may be able to formulate practices that increase public safety 
(which was Terry’s intent) while simultaneously increasing respect for suspects’ 
constitutional rights.  Such outcomes could increase citizen perceptions of police 
legitimacy. Lastly, the results will provide empirical evidence that either support or refute 
the theoretical applicability of the minority threat perspective to police use of force in the 
context of SQFs. These findings will broaden current discourse on the theoretical 
implications of the minority threat perspective.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The examination of police use of force is a complex area of study. In order to better 
understand the phenomenon, this chapter consists of six sections. The first two sections 
are dedicated to outlining the many roles that the police occupy, which ultimately 
requires them to develop a coping strategy (i.e., police subculture). Within this context, 
the third section highlights how police use of force is not only a necessary tool to ensure 
police and citizen safety, but also a defining feature that reinforces the “us vs. them” 
mentality amongst police officers. The fourth section then examines prior research on 
police use of force as it relates to suspect, officer, encounter-level, departmental, and 
neighborhood characteristics. Then, the minority threat hypothesis is proposed as a viable 
framework for understanding ecological variations in police use of force. Finally, the 
chapter ends with a brief discussion on Terry stops and the potential for racial profiling 
and use of force to occur during those stops. 
The Role of the Police 
With extensive labor markets, the specialization of individuals to specific tasks 
and roles is often facilitated through the division of labor. For example, whereas a public 
attorney serves his or her clientele in court, a pharmacist distributes medicine to 
individuals on the basis of a doctor’s medical expertise. Despite their differences, both 
professions have an occupational mandate, or a legally defined right, to carry out duties 
upon which no one else may encroach. The scope of an occupational mandate generally 
“reflects the concerns society has with the services it provides, with its organization, and 
with its effectiveness” (Manning, 1978, p. 95). Such concerns are particularly 
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pronounced among the police occupation because they are assigned the difficult task of 
providing society with multiple services, which includes crime fighting (Manning, 1978, 
1992), peacekeeping (Greene, 2000; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Wilson & Kelling, 1982), 
service delivery (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994), problem solving (Eck & Spelman, 1987; 
Goldstein, 1979, 1990), and dispensing force (Bittner, 1970, 1974; Muir, 1977). Given 
the breadth of police work, Manning (1978) concluded that their occupational mandate is 
best characterized as embodying “a vast and unmanageable social domain” (p. 95).  
 Unlike other professions that construct their own occupational roles, the police 
mandate is largely dictated by the public’s image of law enforcement. Although the 
public may be generally unaware of the nature of police work, it is cognizant of the small 
portion of police work that involves elements of danger and excitement: “To much of the 
public, the police are seen as alertly ready to respond to citizen demands, as crime-
fighters, as an efficient, bureaucratic, highly organized force that keeps society from 
falling into chaos” (Manning, 1978, p. 95). In an attempt to fulfill the public’s 
perceptions and maintain their confidence in law enforcement, the police seek to idealize 
their heroic conceptions related to danger and excitement. The consequence of idealizing 
or exaggerating the police role for the sake of appearance, however, is that the public 
continues to demand even more out of the police, meaning their occupational mandate is 
persistently expanding and influencing the police organization. 
 Despite stereotypes and popular images of the police, crime fighting is only a 
small portion of their work (Bittner, 1970; Brown, 1981; Wilson, 1968). Although 
various categorizations exist (Black & Reiss, 1967; Brown, 1981; Manning, 1978), 
Wilson (1968) best captures the true nature of police work using his dichotomy. On one 
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hand, police work revolves around law enforcement. Such work usually includes the 
application of legal sanctions for the violation of law. In many of these scenarios, there is 
a clear culprit and a transparent solution. On the other hand, most of police work is what 
Wilson (1968) calls order maintenance—“the handling of disputes, or behavior which 
threatens to produce disputes, among persons who disagree over what ought to be right” 
(p. 407). In order-maintenance situations, an arrest is usually not made. Instead, police 
officers must act as arbitrators or “street-level bureaucrats,” whereby police officers must 
display tremendous discretion to alleviate tension between the parties and mitigate the 
possibility that the dispute escalates into a legally defined offense, while simultaneously 
abiding by formal and informal organizational pressures (Brown, 1981; Worden, 1989).  
Although their roles vary, there is uniform agreement that police officers are 
supposed to maintain personal and societal safety on a daily basis. In order to secure such 
safety and carry out their boundless occupational mandate, police officers must rely upon 
their authority to resolve problems in society.  
[W]hether it involves protection against an undesired imposition, caring for those 
who cannot care for themselves, attempting to solve a crime, helping to save a 
life, abating a nuisance, or settling an explosive dispute, police intervention means 
above all making the use of capacity and authority to overpower resistance to an 
attempted solution in the native habitat of the problem. (Bittner, 1970, pp. 126-
127) 
 
Specifically, police officers are granted the authority to use force as a means to achieve 
their vast and unmanageable social domain. For this reason, Bittner (1970) suggests that 
“the role of the police is best understood as a mechanism for the distribution of non-
negotiably coercive force employed in accordance with the dictates of an intuitive grasp 
of situation exigencies” (p. 131). Fulfilling their role as force dispensers, however, is not 
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an easy feat as the public expects the police to perform their duties in a responsible, 
reasonable, and professional manner that does not violate the law or abuse the citizenry 
they are sworn to protect. The demanding nature of the police occupation is one of the 
reasons why police officers must establish a culture that separates them from the citizens 
they protect and serve.   
The Development of a Police Subculture 
Similar to doctors, lawyers, and teachers, police officers develop an occupational 
or “working personality” (Skolnick, 1966). Although all police officers are not alike in 
their “working” personality,” research suggests that they share similar and distinctive 
cognitive inclinations as an occupational group (Lefkowitz, 1975; Lundman, 1974; 
Manning, 1977; Paoline, 2004; Thibault et al., 1985; Twersky-Glasner, 2005; Westley, 
1970). These cognitive frameworks and tendencies are often due to job-related dangers, 
the need to exert authority, the pressures associated with upholding the law, and the 
organizational structure. Because police officers are faced with such a unique 
combination of social elements, they tend to hold a distinct perspective or worldview 
through which they see situations and events. As Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1998) 
state, “[t]he concept of worldview refers to the manner in which a culture sees the world 
and its own role and relationship to the world” (p.88). Hence, understanding these 
cognitive predispositions is essential as police officers are required to maintain order in a 
democratic society, whereby their paramilitary training and organizational identity must 
be balanced with the social environment in which citizens’ hold freedoms (Skolnick, 
1966). 
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 The development of a police officer’s occupational personality cannot be 
understood without giving attention to the division of labor in a police department and his 
or her corresponding work assignments. As Skolnick (1966) states, “the uniformed ‘cop’ 
is seen as the foundation for the policeman’s ‘working personality’” (p. 16). Although a 
police officer’s “working personality” evolves and differs (to a certain degree) based on 
his or her position in the police department, all police officers generally begin the 
trajectory of their occupational personality in the academy, which further develops as 
they are mentored by senior officers on the beat. Unlike the military where someone can 
join at the rank of lieutenant with the appropriate educational credentials, police officers 
acquire rank through apprenticeship as patrolmen or women. Consequently, this “ground-
up” approach provides police officers with a universal backdrop of constabulary 
experience that shapes the way that they look at the world and carry out the law (Bittner, 
1970; Westley, 1953).  
 The acquisition of a police officer’s “working personality” on the beat is 
intimately tied to three factors: suspicion, danger, and authority (Skolnick, 1966). The 
suspicious nature of police officers is often a byproduct of the recurrent themes of danger 
found in police “folklore” or “legends” (Balch, 1972). These stories, however, are not 
without merit as there are instances when police officers are shot and killed during 
routine traffic stops (e.g., writing a ticket) and other relatively minor law violations. 
Outside of these anomalies, police work is still a very dangerous occupation. Research 
examining nonfatal-police injuries suggests that police departments report the highest 
rates of injury by form of assault. Specifically, the police are 73.1 times more likely to be 
assaulted in their occupation than the overall industry average (Peek-Asa, Howard, 
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Vargas, & Kraus, 1997). Given the potential for danger, police officers must be acutely 
cognizant and suspicious of their surroundings and exert their authority to protect 
themselves and others in dangerous situations.  
Not only does this heightened sensitivity to danger make police officers overtly 
suspicious in nature, but it also isolates them socially from citizens regarded as 
“symbolically dangerous,” along with those abiding by conventional standards (Hunt, 
1985; Skolnick, 1966; Westley, 1953). Moreover, the element of authority further 
exacerbates the isolation of police officers from citizens because they are “required to 
enforce laws representing puritanical morality, such as prohibiting drunkenness, and also 
laws regulating the flow of public activity, such as traffic laws,” even though they do not 
necessarily subscribe to or abide by such codes  (Skolnick, 1966, p. 16). As a result, the 
general public may garner animosity towards the police, which is displayed through the 
deprecation of police authority and the emphasis citizens place on apprehending 
dangerous or “real” criminals. Altogether, the combination of being placed in dangerous 
situations with the affront that some citizens display towards their authority causes police 
officers to label citizens into various categories (i.e., “suspicious persons,” “assholes,” 
“know nothings”), which further fortifies the element of police isolation and necessitates 
the ideology of police solidarity (Van Maanen, 1978).  
 The joint effect of suspicion, danger, and authority on police isolation has the 
unintended effect of unifying police officers in their everyday work and worldview—an 
esprit de corps (Bittner, 1970; Kappler et al., 1998; Westley, 1953). Because the public 
often lacks support for the police and orients itself in an apathetic manner towards their 
work, police officers find unity along a number of commonalities. First, police officers 
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find solidarity in their authority. Regardless of their personal outlook on certain codes 
and laws, “the fact that a man [(i.e., police officer)] is engaged in enforcing a set of rules 
implies that he also becomes implicated in affirming them” (Skolnick, 1966, p. 26). In 
upholding their responsibilities, therefore, police officers may generate and reinforce the 
perception that the general public is an enemy, which isolates them from the citizens they 
serve and protect. The social isolation from the public is problematic because it 
negatively affects public relations, eroding citizens’ respect, trust, cooperation, and 
understanding of police work—all elements that are integral to maintaining police 
legitimacy (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990, 2004; Tyler & Huo, 2002). In turn, 
police may resent the public for taking them for granted, and therefore, seek out one 
another as a support system both in and out of the work environment.  
Second, officers’ work often involves dangerous situations, which brings them 
together as a group but demarcates them from the general public. On a regular basis, 
police officers are placed in locations within the community where they are required to 
respond to crimes against people and property. Because they are constantly situated in 
potentially threatening environments and exposed to humanity at its worst (Muir, 1977), 
police officers develop a perceptual shorthand that associates certain types of gestures, 
languages, and attire with specific kinds of people that are perceived as “symbolic 
assailants” (Hunt, 1985; Kappler et al., 1998; Skolnick, 1966; Van Maanen, 1978). 
Although such cognitive shortcuts or suspicions may serve as a prelude to identify 
assailants, they only provide a superficial indication of danger that must not be mistaken 
for something that is necessarily predictable. The problem, however, is that “[t]he 
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element of danger is so integral to the policeman’s work that explicit recognition might 
induce emotional barriers to work performance” (Skolnick, 1966, p. 18).  
 The development of a police officer’s working personality through the elements 
of suspicion, danger, and authority, along with the ensuing subculture that revolves 
around the themes of isolation and solidarity, help to shape the worldview embraced by 
many police officers. Due to this unique combination of social elements, police officers 
situate themselves in terms best described as “we/they” or “us/them” (Kappler et al., 
1998). In other words, their world is composed of insiders (i.e., police) and outsiders (i.e., 
citizens). As an insider, the police find comfort in their conforming values and shared 
backgrounds, which provides them with a cognitive filter to determine who is suspicious 
or deviant and in need of state control. Having this outlook on society, however, only 
operates to (1) identify outsiders on the basis of ambiguous cues and stereotypes, and (2) 
reinforce the “cop-as-soldier” mentality whereby police officers perceive their role as 
soldiers in the war against crime (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1994). As a consequence, police 
plunge into an insurmountable war against crime that leads to frustration and 
demoralization. The resulting effect of these conditions is that police officers may seek to 
alleviate such frustration through engaging the “enemy”—often perceived as being young 
men from racial and ethnic minorities—especially those “on inner-city streets late at 
night” (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 114; Van Maanen, 1978).    
Use of Force: The Most Extreme Form of Police Authority 
With nearly 18,000 state and local law-enforcement agencies employing over 
730,000 officers, there is the potential that large segments of society may be subjugated 
to the vast authority of the police (Reaves, 2007). Although research and national 
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estimates suggest that police use of force is a rare event (Adams, 1999; MacDonald et al., 
2003; Westmarland, 2001; Worden & Catlin, 2002), it still occurs in approximately 1.4 
percent of all police-citizen encounters (Eith & Durose, 2011). In a recent interview-
based survey conducted by the United States Department of Justice, it was found that 
approximately 16.9 percent of respondents aged 16 and over (N ≈ 60,000) had contact 
with the police. Moreover, of that 16.9 percent, only 1.4 percent indicated that they had 
force “threatened or used against them during their most recent contact” (Eith & Durose, 
2011, p. 12). Projecting these estimates at the national level, Eith and Durose (2011) 
propose that this amounts to approximately 574,000 police-citizen encounters in which 
police employed force each year. It should be noted that police use of force is much more 
likely to occur when an arrest is made. Combining the Police-Public Contact Survey with 
the Bureau of Justice Statistic’s Survey of Inmates in Local Jails, Hickman and 
colleagues (2008) found that police use force in 20% of all arrests.   
Over the course of performing their duties, police are placed in precarious 
situations where they must secure public safety. Whether the arrestee is suspected of a 
firearm-related crime or drug trafficking, police officers must often make split-second 
judgments about the immediate action necessary to control the situation (Fyfe, 1997). In 
doing so, however, police may take action that is later judged to be excessive. As Alpert 
and Dunham (2004) state, “one of the central problems [for police] is determining the 
level of force that is ‘necessary’ to make an arrest and to take a suspect into custody” (p. 
18; see also Alpert & Smith, 1994). If the force used is deemed excessive or unwarranted, 
it may cause a social rift that undermines the relationship between the police and the 
citizens they serve. Moreover, even if force is legally proscribed given the circumstances 
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and used judiciously, it may still be perceived as excessive because many citizens do not 
understand when force is warranted or what constitutes excessive force. Consequently, 
there may be a loss of trust that threatens the ability of police officers to function 
efficiently and effectively in society. In carrying out their duties, therefore, police officers 
are constantly challenged with a balancing act—determining the appropriate amount of 
force necessary in light of the unpredictable actions of citizens. 
Determining the Appropriate Level of Force 
 In determining the appropriate level of force in a given scenario, it is important to 
delineate the difference between reasonable and excessive force, which is often a point of 
confusion among citizens. Generally, U.S. citizens are not concerned with police use of 
force that is necessary to apprehend a suspect who is physically resisting, but rather, 
those instances when police officers employ an excessive amount of force (Skolnick & 
Fyfe, 1993). Although police officers are granted the right to use reasonable force in 
situations where they either must protect themselves or citizens or make an arrest, there 
are clear limitations to the breadth of force.  
Legal context. Even though it may be difficult to determine the appropriate level 
of force during a police-citizen encounter, the U.S. Supreme Court has offered some 
insight on the amount of force legally proscribed to control and apprehend a suspect. The 
level of force a police officer uses against a suspect is governed by the Reasonableness 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment (Ferdico, et al., 2015). The leading U.S. Supreme Court 
case interpreting this constitutional provision with regard to police use of force is 
Tennessee v. Garner (1985). In Garner, a community resident informed the police of a 
burglary that was taking place at her neighbor’s house. When the officers arrived at the 
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neighbor’s house, they found Edward Garner attempting to flee the scene until his path 
was obstructed by a six-foot-high chain link fence. Upon reaching the fence, Garner 
began to climb over the fence. 
With the aid of a flashlight, [the officer] was able to see Garner’s face and hands.  
He saw no sign of a weapon and, though not certain, was “reasonably sure” and 
“figured” that Garner was unarmed.  He thought that Garner was 17 or 18 years 
old and about 5’5” to 5’7” tall.  While Garner was crouched at the base of the 
fence, [the officer] called out “police, halt” and took a few steps toward him.  
Garner then began to climb over the fence.  Convinced that if Garner made it over 
the fence he would elude capture, [the officer] shot him. The bullet hit Garner in 
the back of the head. Garner was taken by ambulance to a hospital, where he died 
on the operating table. Ten dollars and a purse taken from the house were found 
on his body. (Tennessee v. Garner, 1985, pp. 3-4) 
 
At the time of the incident, both Tennessee state law and applicable police 
department policies permitted law enforcement officers to use deadly force to stop a 
fleeing felon.  Thus, under the so-called fleeing felon rule in effect at the time, the police 
use of deadly force to apprehend Garner was permissible. Garner’s father, however, 
thought otherwise given the facts and circumstances of the case.  The Garner family filed 
a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that Tennessee state law and the 
police department policies violated the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment.  
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that the “use of deadly force to prevent the 
escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally 
unreasonable” (Tennessee v. Garner, 1985, p. 11). In place of the fleeing felony rule, the 
Court ruled that the totality of the circumstances at the scene of the crime must dictate 
whether deadly force is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. Police officers may 
use deadly force in situations in which “the suspect poses a threat of serious physical 
harm, either to the officers or to others” (Tennessee v. Garner, 1985, pp. 11-12).  
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The modern approach for determining a reasonable level of force, even deadly 
force, is grounded in Graham v. Connor (1989).  According to the Court, derivations of 
excessive use of force are best analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective 
reasonableness” standard. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his opinion of the Court,  
Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is “reasonable” 
under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and 
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against 
the countervailing governmental interests at stake. (Graham v. Connor, 1989, p. 
396) 
 
Moreover, since each use-of-force case is unique to a particular set of facts and 
circumstances, the Court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment is not capable of 
establishing a clear-cut definition of “reasonableness.” Instead, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of 
a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on 
the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight” (Graham v. Connor, 1989, p. 
396). In short, each case must be judged upon the totality of its unique circumstances 
(Scott v. Harris, 2007; United States v. Cortez, 1981; United States v. Sokolow, 1989).  
 The holdings of Garner and Graham translate into a few “rules of thumb” for 
police use of force.   
A law enforcement officer . . . has the right to use a reasonable amount of 
nondeadly force to make an arrest…. [O]nly minimal force, such as that necessary 
to apply handcuffs, would be necessary to make an arrest of a cooperative 
suspect.  However, the more a suspect resists, the more nondeadly force could be 
lawful used to make the arrest. . . . 
[Additionally,] deadly force may only be used by law enforcement officers 
in defense of their own lives (i.e., to prevent an imminent, unlawful attack that 
poses a risk of death of serious bodily harm to the officer); in defense of the lives 
of others (i.e., again to prevent an imminent, unlawful attack that poses a risk of 
death of serious bodily harm to a third party); and to stop the escape of a fleeing 
suspect if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a 
crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm. 
(Ferdico, et al., 2015, p. 263-264) 
  21 
 
The constitutional standards set forth in Garner and Graham, however, may operate to 
facilitate the reoccurrence of bad police decisions. As Fyfe (2010) points out, the 
equivocal reasonableness standard may be best understood in terms of a “split-second 
syndrome,” whereby police actions are judged in the moment they decided to use force.  
Because police decision-making is evaluated in moments of crises, it may serve 
“to inhibit the development of greater police diagnostic expertise and to provide after-the-
fact justification for unnecessary police violence” (Fyfe, 2010, p. 475). Fyfe (2010) 
argues that there are three assumptions underlying these shortcomings. First, since each 
circumstance in which police employ force is different, there cannot be a uniform 
principle guiding its application. Second, due to the erratic and stressful nature of police 
work, poor judgment should be expected. Finally, because police conduct is assessed on a 
situational basis, the aftermath of any imprudent decision is deflected from the officer so 
long as it was the product of suspect provocation. Altogether, the consequences of these 
assumptions is that the split-second syndrome “lends approval to unnecessary violence, 
and to failure of the police to meet their highest obligation: the protection of life” (Fyfe, 
2010, p. 477).  
In order to avoid costly split-second decisions, Fyfe (2010) makes two major 
suggestions. First, police officers should survey the geographic area in which they patrol 
on foot in order to gain tactical knowledge (e.g., the environmental settings and the actors 
involved) of their environment. Based on this tactical knowledge, officers are able to 
construct resolutions to an incident prior to their arrival at a crime scene, alleviating the 
inclination for split-second decisions. Put simply, having tactical knowledge reduces the 
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uncertainties that police officers often face. Second, police officers should conceal both 
their intent and physical presence when responding to scenes of potential violence. By 
concealing themselves, police generally have a tactical advantage over the offender and 
can give that individual the opportunity to peacefully surrender. If these precautions are 
not taken and unnecessary violence is the result, police officers “should be condemned 
rather than rewarded with headlines, honors and medals” (Fyfe, 2010, p. 477).          
The social scientific context. The social scientific research examining how 
officers determine the appropriate level of force closely parallels the legal precedent 
outlined in Graham (1989). As Adams (1999) states, “the amount of force used should be 
proportional to the threat and limited to the least amount required to accomplish 
legitimate police action. Any force above and beyond this balance is excessive” (p.1). 
Hence, when evaluating the circumstances in a particular situation, police officers must 
make a determination about the perceived threat with regard to the suspect, which is often 
based on the immediate danger posed to themselves and the tactical situation. It should be 
noted that such judgments about the appropriate amount of force are often subjective, as 
police officers vary in their perceptions of danger (Adams, 1995; Alpert & Smith, 1994). 
Research suggests the type of force employed during an encounter is closely, if 
not directly, related to the level of suspect resistance. When determining the appropriate 
level of force in a given situation involving suspect resistance, police officers generally 
rely upon the concept of a “force continuum” (Garner, Schade, Hepburn, & Buchanan, 
1995; Terrill, 2003, 2005). Built upon Bittner’s (1970) notion that police force must be 
“situationally justified,” the force continuum provides police officers with guidelines on 
the appropriate level of force that corresponds with the degree of resistance exhibited by 
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the suspect. As McLaughlin (1992) states, “[a] force continuum…should provide a means 
for escalating force when the subject shows noncompliance and a means for de-escalating 
force when the subject complies” (p. 65). A central feature of the force continuum is its 
adherence to the concepts of proportionality and incrementalism.
1
 Police officers are only 
expected to apply the amount of force that is proportional to the suspect’s resistance. If 
the level of force does not result in the desired outcome (e.g., situational control), the 
force continuum specifies how to incrementally adjust to the situation. In fact, research 
examining the principles of proportionality and incrementalism has found that police 
officers jump the continuum in nearly 20% of nonresistant encounters with suspects and 
that they de-escalate the situation in approximately 75% of resistant encounters with 
suspects (Terrill, 2005).  
 Generally, departmental policy dictates the appropriate level of force along a 
continuum of encounter-level provocations. As Terril and colleagues (2003) state, “[o]ne 
consistent theme among law, public, and police policy is that the appropriate amount of 
police force is that which is reasonably necessary to achieve citizen compliance” (p. 151; 
see also Smith & Petrocelli, 2002). For example, the NYPD student-guide procedure 
states that “The amount of force [that an officer is] permitted to use must be carefully 
matched to the nature of the situation [that the officer] confronts and the danger it 
presents” (NYPD Police Academy, 2007a, p. 4). In order to ensure that officers use 
reasonable (rather than excessive) force, the NYPD established an “escalating scale of 
force” continuum that matches the appropriate level of force to the provocations of the 
                                                 
1 Compared to early research on force continuums that examined incrementalism as a linear function, 
more recent versions of the force continuum acknowledge the circular or transactional nature of 
police-citizen encounters.  
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circumstance. Although the use-of-force continuum varies by police department, the 
NYPD’s escalating scale of force in Table 1 provides an example of how officers are 
supposed to respond under certain conditions.  
Table 1 
 
Escalating Scale of Force 
Provocation or Condition Appropriate Force Response 
Imminent threat of death or serious 
physical injury 
Use of deadly force, usually the firearm 
Threat or potential of lethal assault Draw or display firearm 
Physical assault likely to cause physical 
injury 
Use impact techniques (e.g., batons, fists, 
feet) 
Threatened or potential physical assault 
that is likely to cause physical injury 
Use oleoresin capsicum (OC), or pepper 
spray (less-than-lethal weapon) 
Minor physical resistance, such as 
grappling, going limp, or pulling or 
pushing away 
Use compliance techniques, such as 
wrestling holds and grips designed to 
physically overpower subjects or to inflict 
physical pain, which end when the 
technique is stopped and cause no lasting 
injury 
Verbal resistance, such as failure to comply 
with directions 
Use a firm grip, for example, arm or 
shoulder that causes no pain but it meant to 
guide someone (e.g., away from a fight, 
toward a police car) 
Refusal to comply with requests or 
attempts at persuasion 
Use a command voice: Firmly giving 
directions (e.g., “I asked for your license, 
registration, and proof of insurance, sir. 
Now I am telling you that, if you don’t give 
them to me, I will have to arrest you.”) 
Minor violation or disorderly conditions 
involving no apparent threats to officers or 
others 
Use spoken persuasion: Requests for 
compliance (e.g., “May I see your license, 
registration, and proof of insurance, sir?”) 
Orderly behavior in public places Maintain a professional presence (e.g., the 
officer on post deters crime and disorder; 
the highway unit deters speeding) 
SOURCE: NYPD Police academy (2007a, p. 7). 
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Factors Influencing Police Decisions to Use Force 
Despite its infrequency, police use of force has far-reaching consequences, 
including serious injury or death, the deprivation of liberty, and the loss of police 
legitimacy. These concerns are particularly pronounced in disadvantaged communities 
because of the historically contentious relations between the police and ethnic minorities 
(Walker, 1997). Given the frequency and serious consequences that accompany police 
use of force, researchers have sought to identify the various factors associated with force 
in an attempt to better understand the phenomenon and to reduce the likelihood that it 
occurs (Prenzler, Porter, & Alpert, 2013). In general, these factors involve characteristics 
related to the suspect, officer, situation, organization, and ecological location. 
Suspect Characteristics 
Race/ethnicity. Early research examining racial disparities in police use of force 
primarily focused on police shootings or deadly force (Reiss, 1980). In the 1970s, for 
instance, the police were eight times more likely to fatally shoot African-Americans 
compared to Whites—a ratio that reduced to 4:1 by 1998 with the implementation of new 
policies (Walker, Spohn, & Delone, 2012). A significant portion of these deadly 
shootings were related to the old fleeing felon rule that was eventually abandoned with 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Tennessee v. Garner (1985). In a study that examined 
police shootings in Memphis, Sparger and Glacopassi (1992) found that more than half of 
all African-Americans shot and killed fell under the category of “unarmed and not 
assaultive,” whereas only one White person fell under the same category (see also Fyfe, 
1982). Undoubtedly, prejudices and stereotypes influence these disparities, whereby 
officers were more likely to feel threatened by African American suspects compared to 
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their white counterparts (Walker, Spohn, & Delone, 2012). Such disparities have led 
some scholars to conclude that the “police have one trigger finger for [B]lacks and 
another for [W]hites” (Takagi, 1979, p. 52; see also Goldkamp, 1976).  
Research has similarly explored the relationship between suspect characteristics 
(race/ethnicity, gender, age, demeanor, and the use of drugs/alcohol) and less than lethal 
forms of force. Of these attributes, a significant amount of research has been dedicated to 
the impact of race on police use of force. Although the empirical evidence is mixed on 
the topic, numerous studies have reported that the suspect’s race/ethnicity has an effect 
on an officer’s decision to use force during the encounter. Using ordered probit models, 
Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) found that non-White citizens had a higher probability of 
having force used against them by the police, which included a greater chance of verbal 
commands and impact weapons. Similarly, Garner and colleagues (2002) found that 
Blacks were more likely to have force used against them than Whites in situations where 
there was no resistance. Although the effect of race/ethnicity has been demonstrated in 
studies, its magnitude or significance sometimes dissipates after controlling for certain 
variables (Kaminski et al., 2004; Mulvey & White, 2014; Paoline & Terrill, 2004, 2007; 
Terrill et al., 2008). In a methodologically rigorous study by Terrill and Reisig (2003), for 
example, the effect of race on police use of force vanished once neighborhood contextual 
factors were introduced into the model. Both concentrated disadvantage and homicide 
rates were significant predictors of police use of force, whereas race at the individual 
level was not. Lastly, considering the intersectionality between race/ethnicity and social 
class, research must be cautious about the true effect of race/ethnicity, which may be 
confounded by social class (Friedrich, 1980; Lersch et al., 2008; Worden & Catlin, 2002). 
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Contrary to research findings that indicate race/ethnicity affects police use of 
force, other studies report that a suspect’s race/ethnicity is not a significant predictor of 
police use of force (Engel et al., 2000; Lawton, 2007; McCluskey et al., 2005; 
McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Mulvey & White, 2014; Phillips 
& Smith, 2000; Sun & Payne, 2004). Not only was race/ethnicity insignificant in these 
studies, but some of these findings were consistent across multiple models (Phillips & 
Smith, 2000; Sun & Payne, 2004). Through the examination of behavioral sequences 
between suspects and officers, Terrill (2005), for instance, found that race/ethnicity did 
not influence an officer’s likelihood to increase or decrease the level of force used against 
a suspect.  
Sex. Research has also documented that male suspects are more likely to have 
force used against them than females during police-citizen encounters (Garner et al., 
2002; McCluskey et al., 2005; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Phillips & Smith, 2000; Sun 
& Payne, 2004; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Terrill, Paoline, & 
Manning, 2003). Terrill and Mastrofski (2002), for example, found that police were more 
likely to use various forms of force against men than women, such as physical restraint 
(19 percent versus 13 percent), verbal force (44 percent versus 40 percent), and impact 
force (.5 percent versus .3 percent). Other studies, however, suggest the effect of sex on 
police use of force is still uncertain (Crawford & Burns, 1998; Paoline & Terrill, 2004, 
2007; Schuck, 2004; Terrill, 2005). In a study by Kaminski and colleagues (2004), they 
found no difference between male and female suspects when police officers employed a 
firm grip. In cases that involved a higher level of force, however, males were more likely 
to be the recipient of force compared to their female counterparts. It should be noted that 
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a few studies documented no significant association between sex and police use of force 
(Engel et al., 2000; Lawton, 2007; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Mulvey & White, 2014). 
Age. Along with race/ethnicity and sex, scholars have also analyzed the nexus (or 
lack thereof) between age and the use of force. The available research that exists on age 
generally examines the likelihood that force is used against older suspects. Although the 
empirical evidence suggests that police are less likely to use force against older suspects 
compared to their younger counterparts (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 
2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Phillips & Smith, 2000; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill 
& Reisig, 2003; Terrill et al., 2003), the findings are not entirely consistent. Paoline and 
Terrill’s (2004) research indicates that verbal and physical force against older suspects 
was contingent upon the officer’s sex. They found that male officers were less likely to 
use verbal and physical force against older suspects. In comparison, female officers were 
only less likely to use physical force against older suspects. At the other end of the age 
spectrum, Crawford and Burns (1998) found that officers were more likely to use less-
than-lethal force against younger citizens (see also Terrill, 2005). In the same study, they 
also noted that age did not affect the likelihood that officers employed verbal commands, 
chemical spray, or a firearm. As with the research on race/ethnicity and sex, there are also 
studies that document non-significant findings between age and use of force (Engel et al., 
2000; Garner et al., 2002; Kaminski et al., 2004; Terrill et al., 2008).  
Mental Health and Substance Abuse. The effects of impairment (i.e., 
intoxicated, under the influence of drugs, or mentally ill) on the likelihood that police use 
force is an area of study best characterized by contradictory findings. Although some 
research has found that police use of force is more likely to be used against impaired 
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suspects, they did not delineate the type of impairment, meaning an individual could have 
been under the influence of drugs, intoxicated, mentally ill, or some combination of those 
attributes (Crawford and Burns, 1998; Engel et al., 2000; Garner & Maxwell, 2000; 
Garner et al., 2002; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). For those studies that specified the type 
of impairment, the general finding was that citizens under the influence of alcohol were 
more likely to have force used against them, whereas drug impairment was not associated 
with increased levels of force (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Garner et al., 1996; Friedrich, 
1980). It should be noted, however, that Kaminski and colleagues (2004) found the exact 
opposite. 
 Inferences about the relationship between mental illness and police use of force 
are limited in scope due to the paucity of research. The limited research examining 
mental illness and police use of force generally indicates that mental illness is not a 
significant predictor of police use of force (Johnson, 2011; Terrill & Matrofski, 2002). 
Conversely, Kaminski and colleagues (2004) found that a combined measure of 
impairment that included drugs, alcohol, and mental illness was related to police use of 
force. The driving force behind this finding, however, was almost entirely explained by 
drug impairment. In one of the most recent studies examining the nexus between mental 
illness and police use of force, Mulvey and White (2014) found that police officers were 
more likely to use higher forms of force (i.e., baton, OC spray, TASER, firearm, or other 
weapon) against mentally ill persons compared to suspects who were not mentally ill.  
Officer Characteristics 
 
 Race/ethnicity. Research examining police use of force has also focused attention 
on police officer characteristics. Whereas early research was relatively devoid of such 
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analyses (Riksheim & Chermak, 1993; Sherman, 1980), recent research has renewed this 
avenue of study. One of the attributes that has received empirical testing is the police 
officers’ race/ethnicity. Research has generally found that an officer’s race/ethnicity is 
not significantly associated with the likelihood that police use force (Friedrich, 1980; 
Geller & Karales, 1981; Lawton, 2007; McElvain & Kposowa, 2004; McCluskey et al., 
2005; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Paoline & Terrill, 2004, 
2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). In fact, Crawford and Burns (1998) found that this 
null result extended to most types of force, including verbal command, physical restraint, 
chemical spray, non-lethal weapon, and firearm. Nevertheless, a few studies have found 
an association between officer race/ethnicity and use of force. Sun and Payne’s (2004) 
models revealed that black officers were more likely than white officers to resolve 
interpersonal citizen conflict through coercion (see also Fyfe, 1982); however, this effect 
disappeared after controlling for neighborhood characteristics and various interaction 
terms. As Fyfe (1988) suggests, differences in NYPD shooting rates may be largely 
attributable to where an officer lives and is assigned to patrol, noting that Black officers 
were more likely than White officers to frequent New York City’s high-crime areas. 
Branching outside of Black-White dichotomy, Garner and colleagues (2002) included 
Hispanic officers in their study. The results suggested that although race/ethnicity did not 
affect the severity of force being used, Hispanic officers were more likely than White 
officers to use force. 
Sex. Akin to race/ethnicity, studies investigating the effect of an officer’s sex on 
use of force have revealed negligible results. After controlling for number and type of 
complaint against the police officer, McClusky and Terrill (2005) found no relationship 
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between an officer’s sex and use of force, which has been documented elsewhere in the 
literature (Crawford & Burns, 1998; Kaminski et al., 2004; Lawton, 2007; McCluskey et 
al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Phillips & Smith, 2000; Sun & Payne, 2004; Terrill & 
Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2008). Albeit the null results that suggest the prevalence 
and type of force are generally unrelated to an officer’s gender, a few studies have 
produced anomalous findings. Garner and associates (2002) found that female officers 
were less likely to use force, including severe forms of force, compared to male officers. 
Furthermore, Kop and Euwema (2001) found that male officers were more likely than 
female officers to resort to force against a suspect, even though there was no difference 
between male and female officers in their attitudes toward use of force (see also Morabito 
& Doerner, 1997). Lastly, in one of the more methodologically and statistically rigorous 
studies examining gender, Paoline and Terrill (2004) found that male officers were more 
likely than their female counterparts to use greater forms of force against male suspects. 
In general, though, their research suggested that “the predictors of coercion are relatively 
indistinguishable across males and females” (Paoline & Terrill, 2004, p. 114)  
  Experience and age. Research examining the relationship between an officer’s 
level of experience and use of force has produced mixed results. Several studies 
document a negative association between the two variables, meaning officers are less 
likely to use force if they have more experience (Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Terrill & 
Mastrofski, 2002). In fact, Kop and Euwema (2001) found that when compared to 
officers with less experience, seasoned officers held less favorable attitudes toward the 
use of force, meaning they perceived force as a last resort that should not be relied upon 
in their daily activities. Moreover, McElvain and Kposowa’s (2004) research indicates 
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that experienced officers were less likely to be investigated by internal affairs for 
incidents involving use of force. Conversely, several other studies found that experience 
was not a significant predictor of police use of force (Lawton, 2007; McCluskey et al., 
2005; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Sun & Payne, 2004; Terrill et al., 2008). It should be 
noted that the mixed findings may be the product of how police use of force was 
operationalized. Crawford and Burns (1997), for instance, suggest that while experienced 
police officers were less likely than inexperienced colleagues to use a firearm or 
restraining hold, such differences did not exist for verbal commands, chemical spray, and 
nonlethal weapons (see also Kaminski et al., 2004; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Paoline & 
Terrill, 2004).  
 Relative to experience, research examining the effect of an officer’s age on use of 
force is infrequent in the literature. This is somewhat surprising given that “violence…is 
a young man’s game. Thus we should expect that young, male police officers should use 
force more than their…older officers” (Adams, 1999, p. 503). While speculative, the 
absence of such research may be due to the strong correlation between age and 
experience. The limited research and mixed results that exist on the topic makes it 
difficult to draw any type of generalizations. Whereas Crawford and Burn’s (1998) study 
found null results, Garner and colleagues’ (2002) research suggested that not only were 
older officers less likely to use force, but when they did, the form of force was less severe 
compared to their younger counterparts. Similarly, McElvain and Kposowa (2004) found 
that younger officers were more likely than their older counterparts to be investigated by 
internal affairs for use of force incidents.  
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Education. The importance of education for police officers can be traced back to 
August Vollmer and the Professional Movement in the early 20
th
 century. At the end of 
World War 1, Vollmer introduced a general intelligence test to the Berkeley Police 
Department in order “to eliminate intellectually inferior candidates” (Wilson, 1953, p. 
99). In addition to general testing, Vollmer also promoted the idea that police 
departments need training facilities in order to ensure officers attain professional 
standing. In conjunction with faculty members at the University of California, Berkeley, 
Vollmer developed a policing school in the Berkeley Police Department. The notion to 
educate police officers was later expanded upon by the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), who encouraged police departments 
around the country to hire college-educated personnel. The basis for this recommendation 
was that higher levels of education were thought to provide police officers with a better 
foundation in which to make decisions (Worden, 1990).  
Paoline and Terrill (2007) found support for the Commission’s recommendation, 
as their analysis suggests that police officers with higher levels of educational attainment 
were less likely to use force than officers with less education (see also Rydberg & Terrill, 
2010; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). In fact, McElvain and Kposowa (2008) found that 
officers with a college degree were 41 percent less likely than officers with a high school 
diploma or “some college” to fire their gun. Worden (1997) found that police officers 
with higher levels of educational attainment were more likely to use reasonable force 
during suspect encounters (see also Milton, Halleck, Lardner, & Abrecht, 1977; Kane & 
White, 2009). Still, other studies report that education does not make a difference in the 
likelihood of deploying force (Hayden, 1981; Sherman & Blumberg, 1981). Finally, 
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some research has found that education has an effect on police use of force but it depends 
on the type of force being employed during the police-citizen encounter or departmental 
policy changes (Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Paoline & Terrill, 2004). 
Situational/Encounter-Level Characteristics 
Weapons. In explaining variations among police use of force, research has 
examined the influence of encounter-level factors, which are not directly related to the 
suspect but specific to the police-citizen situation. One of the most prominent encounter-
level factors examined by researchers is whether the suspect possessed a weapon. Due to 
the inherent danger posed to the officer and/or public, it seems intuitive that the officer 
would be more likely to use force in order to subdue the suspect and maintain control of 
the situation. Early research on police use of deadly force has found that officers are more 
likely to shoot or shoot at suspects who pose an imminent threat (Binder & Fridell, 1984; 
Binder & Scharf; 1982; Fyfe 1980, 1982, 2010). In situations involving an armed suspect, 
Kobler (1975) found that police officers employed deadly force approximately 75 percent 
of the time to protect themselves or prevent the suspect from fleeing (see also Fyfe 1977, 
Horvath, 1987). In fact, the effect of an armed suspect (especially if it involved a gun) on 
a police officer’s decision to use deadly force is so robust that internal and external 
working factors (e.g., administrative policy, police subculture norms, directives from the 
chief, etc.) have little influence on a police officer decision making in situations posing 
an immediate danger (see White, 2000, 2001, 2002). Furthermore, research examining 
less-than-lethal forms of police force has also found that police officers are more likely to 
use force in situations involving a weapon (McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 
2007; Sun & Payne, 2004; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002); however, nuances exist in the 
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empirical evidence (Crawford & Burns, 1998; Kaminski et al., 2004; Morabito & 
Doerner, 1997; Terrill et al., 2003). Paoline and Terrill’s (2004) research, for example, 
suggests that while male officers were more likely to use physical force in circumstances 
involving a weapon, female officers were neither more nor less likely to rely on force 
(verbal or physical) in the same scenario. To date, only a single study has found that 
possession of a weapon was not significantly related to police use of force (McCluskey & 
Terrill, 2005). 
Demeanor. Since the 1960s, research has been concerned with the factors that 
affect various outcomes during the police-citizen encounter. For example, early research 
found that a suspect’s demeanor, specifically increased levels of suspect hostility, 
increased the likelihood that the police-citizen encounter ends in an arrest (Black, 1970, 
1980; Black & Reiss, 1970; Lundman, 1974; Lundman et al., 1978; Piliavin and Briar, 
1964; Smith, 1984, 1987). In an attempt to provide an explanation for such findings, Van 
Maanen (1978) argued that police officers often categorize citizens into three groups: 
“assholes,” “know nothings,” and “suspicious persons.” Whereas “suspicious persons” 
are recognized on the basis of their appearance and “know nothings” are just your 
average citizens, the “asshole” is disrespectful, confrontational, and poses an affront to 
the police officer’s authority. In other words, “assholes” are the individuals that display 
“flagrant disregard for the sentiments of the police” (Van Maanen, 1978, p. 316). As a 
result of the “asshole’s” demeanor, police officers remedy the situation by delegating 
“street justice” in the form of force and/or arrest.        
Research continues to highlight the role that suspect demeanor plays in police-
citizen encounters and the use of force. Even though the research is mixed, there are a 
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few noteworthy studies. Engel and colleages (2000), for instance, found that disrespectful 
citizens were more likely to be the recipients of police force than those who were 
respectful (across nine different models). When interaction terms were created between 
demeanor and other variables, however, the effect was not significant: “It appears that 
police officers expect their authority to be observed equally by all suspects, and do not 
make distinctions based on race, sex, location, and the seriousness of the situation” 
(Engel et al., 2000, p. 256). Similarly, Sun and Payne’s (2004) findings suggest that 
police were more likely to resolve a quarrel through coercive means in cases involving 
disrespectful citizens (see also Garner et al., 2002; Kaminski et al., 2004).  
In contrast to the aforementioned findings, other research indicates that demeanor 
is either inconsistent or inconsequential. Whereas Crawford and Burns (1998) found that 
suspect demeanor did not affect the use of a verbal command or firearm, aggressive 
demeanor did impact the likelihood that police officers used chemical spray and nonlethal 
weapons against the suspect. Moreover, a host of studies failed to find a significant 
relationship between suspect demeanor and police use of force (McCluskey et al., 2005; 
McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2004, 2007; Phillips & Smith, 2000; 
Terrill et al., 2003). Critics often attribute these disparities to the inconsistent nature in 
which demeanor is operationalized and measured in research (Engel, Klahm, & Tillyer, 
2010). As Klinger (1994, 1996) indicated, research prior to 1981 would often consider 
many illegal acts to be a form of demeanor. The issue with operationalizing demeanor in 
this manner is that it is defined as legally permissive behavior by citizens. After 
delineating between the two concepts, operationalizing them correctly, and including 
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criminal conduct as a control variable, Klinger (1994, 1996) found that demeanor (i.e., 
legally permissible behavior) did not increase the likelihood of arrest.  
Resistance. Research in the past 10 to 15 years has highlighted the dynamic 
nature of police-citizen encounters. A reoccurring theme in the literature is that citizen 
resistance during an encounter with the police increases the likelihood that force is 
employed (Adams, 1999).  Intuitively, this seems logical given that the police are 
mandated to protect themselves and others from harm. Furthermore, considering that 
police officers are instructed to use force along a continuum of encounter-level 
provocations, it would be expected that resistance would increase the probability that the 
police will use force. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests that police are more likely 
to use force in instances where the suspect is resisting compared to those who comply 
with the officer’s requests (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Mulvey 
& White, 2014; Paoline & Terrill, 2004, 2007; Schuck, 2004; Terrill et al., 2003; Terrill 
et al., 2008). Alpert and Dunham (1999), for instance, found that police officers used 
force in 97 percent of the cases involving some type of suspect resistance. Similarly, after 
controlling for more than 50 suspect, officer, and encounter-level characteristics, Garner 
and colleagues (1996) found that resistance was still the most influential predictor of 
police use of force (see also Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Moreover, as Terrill and 
Mastrofski (2002) report, such resistance may include passive, verbal, defensive, and/or 
active resistance. As Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) found, police officers use more severe 
forms of force against suspects that display greater resistance. Although the general 
pattern suggests resistance is a significant predictor of police use of force, Lawton (2007) 
did not find a significant association. Importantly, Lawton (2007) was able to control for 
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contextual-level variables, which included racial heterogeneity and district violent crime 
rates.  
Arrest. Whereas early assessments of police use of force rarely considered the 
impact of arrest (Riksheim & Chermak, 1993; Sherman, 1980), more contemporary 
studies have begun to examine this factor in relation to police use of force. The general 
trend among research indicates that police officers are more likely to employ force in 
situations involving an arrest (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; 
Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2003). In a national 
review of police use of force, Hickman and colleagues (2008) found that police officers 
employ less-than-lethal forms of force approximately 20 percent of the time in incidents 
involving an arrest. Even though police use of force is more common in scenarios 
involving an arrest, there are slight differences among male and female officers. Paoline 
and Terrill (2004), for instance, found that while both male and female officers were 
more likely to use physical force during an arrest, female officers’ reliance on verbal 
force was not influenced by an arrest compared to male officers. Research examining the 
effect of arrest on police use of force must be viewed with skepticism, however, because 
most studies are unable to establish temporal precedence, meaning it is difficult to 
determine if force was used prior to the initiation of the arrest. Such a concern is further 
compounded by the fact that some police departments require that a suspect is handcuffed 
during the arrest as a safety precaution, which requires police officers to use that level of 
force. For this reason, some researchers suggest that the use of handcuffs should not be 
included in measures of police use of force because it may overestimate the occurrence 
that police employ force. Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) suggest this limitation is best 
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rectified by including an arrest variable “to control for the level of physical force required 
by a departmental procedure to accomplish the arrest” (p. 231).  
The presence of other officers/bystanders. Prior to 1993, research examining 
the nexus between the presences of additional police officers and police use of force is 
relatively nonexistent (Rikscheim & Chermak, 1993). More recent research has explored 
this situational dynamic. The effect of additional officers varies from increasing the 
likelihood (Garner et al., 2002; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; and Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002) 
to decreasing the likelihood (Lawton, 2007) of police use of force, although a few studies 
report null findings (Engel et al., 2000; McCluskey, et al., 2005). Other studies have 
found that the impact of additional officers varies by the location of the encounter (Terrill 
et al., 2003) and the number of police officers present during the encounter. Phillips and 
Smith (2000), for instance, discovered a negative association between additional officers 
and police use of force, but only when there were more than three officers present during 
the police-citizen encounter (see also Terrill, 2005). Moreover, White and Klinger (2012) 
found that the “contagious fire” effect (i.e., where officer initiated gunfire triggers a 
cascade of gunfire from fellow officers) was unrelated to the average number of shots 
fired by each officer, meaning the presence of additional officers neither increased nor 
decreased the likelihood that police use deadly force.      
 Along with the presence of additional officers, research has also documented that 
the company of other bystanders (i.e., citizens) during the police-citizen encounter can 
influence an officer’s decision to employ force. Despite the dearth of research prior to 
1993 (Riksheim & Chermak, 1993), current studies have given attention to the impact of 
additional bystanders, with several studies indicating that they do not have an effect on 
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police use of force (McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2004, 2007; Schuck, 2004; 
Terrill, 2005; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2003; Terrill et al., 2008). 
Alternatively, some research has found that police were more likely to use force as the 
number of bystanders increased during a police-citizen encounter (Engel et al., 2000), 
while others noted that the association between additional bystanders and police use of 
force depended on the type of force being used to control the suspect (Crawford & Burns, 
1998; Garner et al., 2002; Phillip & Smith, 2000). 
Organizational/Department-Level Characteristics 
 Although police officers are granted a tremendous amount of freedom to carry out 
their occupational mandate, research suggests that police use of force is influenced by 
formal and informal organizational characteristics. Precipitated by the President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice’s (1967) concern 
over the lack of administrative protocols guiding deadly force, policies were implemented 
to provide directives as to when and where deadly force was appropriate (i.e., restrictive 
policies). The implementation of such policies enabled social scientists to evaluate their 
effectiveness. Using data from the New York City Police Department, Fyfe (1979) found 
that the implementation of restrictive policies was followed by a significant decrease in 
deadly force incidents, officer injury, and officer deaths. Analogous effects following the 
implementation of restrictive policies have also been documented in Oakland, Omaha, 
Kansas City, Los Angeles, Dallas, Philadelphia, and Memphis (Fyfe, 1988; Geller & 
Scott, 1992).
2
 In a similar vein, research has also demonstrated that the abolishment of 
                                                 
2 Administrative policies have also been effective at controlling other types of critical incidents, such 
as high-speed pursuits and use of K-9s (Walker, 1993). 
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restrictive policies led to an increase in the number of police shootings (White, 2001). 
Such findings led Walker (1993) to conclude that “administrative rules have successfully 
limited police shooting discretion, with positive results in terms of social policy. Fewer 
people are being shot and killed, racial disparities in shootings have been reduced, and 
police officers are in no greater danger because of these restrictions” (p. 32). 
 Police use of force is not only influenced by formal policies, but also by the 
informal organizational culture in which police are embedded (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). 
Although conceptual differences exist in how police culture is defined (see Reuss-Ianni, 
1983; Sparrow et al., 1990; Herbert, 1998), common cultural themes emerge as a function 
of police officers’ working environment. As Brown (1981) states, 
What must be recognized is that patrolmen lead something of a schizophrenic 
existence: they must cope not only with the terror of an often hostile and 
unpredictable citizenry, but also with a hostile—even tyrannical—and 
unpredictable bureaucracy. (p. 9)   
 
Due to the strain accompanying these circumstances, police officers often develop 
an “us vs. them” attitude (i.e., subculture) toward citizens that is oriented around 
“covering your ass” (Van Maanen, 1974) and “showing balls” (Reuss-Ianni, 1983). 
Nevertheless, variation does exist in the extent to which police officers conform to the 
stereotypical (i.e., traditional) police culture. As Muir (1977) highlighted in his 
qualitative typology study, the degree to which police officers believed using high levels 
of coercion was acceptable was associated with the concomitance to their role as 
“enforcers” or crime-fighters. Supporting Muir’s (1977) observation, Terrill et al. (2003) 
found that police coercion is the result of differences in cultural based attitudes. 
Specifically, officers that embraced the traditional police culture (i.e., the crime-fighter 
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mentality) were more likely to use coercion than those with nontraditional cultural 
attitudes.  
The informal organizational culture that arises within a police department is also 
impacted by those holding positions of power. As Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) highlight, the 
actions of a police department reflect the philosophy or tone set by the police chief. In 
Los Angeles, for instance, aggressive policing became the dominate enforcement style 
under William Parker, which was perpetuated by Chief Gates when he took over the 
LAPD. Under both police chiefs, police officers were expected to participate in 
combative, proactive police work (i.e., “The LAPD Mentality”). As a result, the 
department condoned brutality and the unwritten rule became “Teach them a lesson” 
(Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 13). When the LAPD’s philosophy was finally exposed with 
the King beating, individual blame was placed on a few people directly involved in the 
incident, but as Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) indicate, “there may be some rotten apples, but 
usually the barrel itself is rotten” (p. 13). In other words, most of the police officers 
embodied a subculture embracing the LAPD mentality created by their police chief. The 
LAPD is not an isolated incident as similar cases have existed under Chief Brier in 
Milwaukee and Chief Rizzo in Philadelphia.  
Ecological Characteristics 
Despite the evidence suggesting that context matters, research examining the 
effect of ecological factors on police behavior is relatively underdeveloped. Highlighting 
this point, Klinger (1997, 2004) noted that most research examining police behavior 
focuses on situational characteristics while neglecting the environment. As Klinger 
(1997) states, “A few studies have considered the possibility that police action might vary 
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across urban neighborhoods…but none contains any systematic theory linking police 
activity to the ecological context in which it occurs” (p. 278). Based on Herbert (1997) 
and Rubinstein’s (1973) work, Klinger (1997, 2004) contends that research must 
investigate the geographic space in which policing is organized (e.g., “police districts” 
and “police beats”) because it provides the cognitive schemas through which police 
officers understand crime and the citizens contained therein. Understanding these 
ecological contexts, therefore, is paramount because it advances the theoretical breadth 
on policing behavior and offers a “systematic theory on how and why police behavior 
varies across space” (Klinger, 2004, p. 278)     
 Variation in police behaviors across localities are expected to be influenced by 
community and neighborhood characteristics (Herbert, 1997; Klinger, 1997; Rubinstein, 
1973). Klinger (1997) highlighted this point by suggesting that the perceived levels of 
deviance in a particular area may provide police with a way to gauge the appropriate 
action to take, or the “going rate” of violence in a given area. Even after controlling for 
situational and temporal variables, police behavior is still affected by characteristics of 
the place in which the crime occurred. As Herbert (1997) states, 
 
The location of the incident is also recognized as crucial, because it may shape 
how officers view situations; officers may understand an area to be characterized 
by a certain way of life that must be taken into consideration…. [P]olice officers 
are acutely aware of the prevailing moral order in the areas they patrol and act in 
accordance more with that than with the law. (pp. 35-36) 
 
Herbert’s (1997) observation closely resembles Werthman and Piliavin’s (1967) 
contention of “ecological contamination,” which proposes that individuals located in 
“bad” neighborhoods assume moral liability. In other words, individuals located in areas 
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with high crime rates are viewed by police as being more suspicious, dangerous, and 
guilty on the basis of their locale, regardless of personal characteristics or behavioral 
manifestations.  
Research supporting the ecological contamination hypothesis has found that 
higher rates of police use of force exist in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Terrill, 2003; 
Terrill & Reisig, 2003). Terrill and Reisig (2003) found that suspect’s race/ethnicity 
significantly influenced the level of force used by the police. When concentrated 
disadvantage and homicide rates were introduced into their models, however, the 
suspect’s race/ethnicity fell below statistical significance while the aforementioned 
macro-level factors maintained their robustness. Thus, 
[P]olice are significantly more likely to use higher levels of force when 
encountering criminal suspects in high-crime areas and neighborhoods with high 
levels of concentrated disadvantage independent of suspect behavior, officer 
characteristics, and other statistical controls. (p. 306)  
 
These results suggest that ethnic minority suspects are more likely to have higher levels 
of force used against them because police encounter them disproportionately in high-
crime and disadvantaged neighborhoods (see also Barlow & Barlow, 2000; Mastrofski et 
al., 2002; Terrill, 2001, 2003).  
 Further delineating the association between ecological factors and police 
behavior, studies have recognized the impact of an area’s socioeconomic makeup and 
level of crime. Through observational research and interviews with Oakland and San 
Francisco, California, patrol officers, Werthman and Piliavin (1967) identified that 
officers not only rely on suspect-level characteristics to define suspiciousness, but also 
the neighborhood context:  
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past experience leads them to conclude that more crimes are committed in the 
poorer sections of town than in the wealthier areas, that Negroes are more likely 
to cause public disturbances than Whites, and that adolescents in certain areas are 
a greater source of trouble than other categories of the citizenry” (p. 75). 
 
Smith (1986) conducted one of the most rigorous studies on neighborhood context and 
police behavior using data from the Police Services Study. Based on the findings from 
this study, Smith concluded that while officers were more likely to use force on blacks, 
the effect was mediated after controlling for the neighborhood context, suggesting that 
racial composition, socioeconomic factors, and crime rate were more robust predictors 
than the suspect’s race (see also Terrill & Reisig, 2003). Similarly, Kane (2002) also 
found that increases in the Latino population across precincts significantly influenced 
police misconduct over time. Such findings are consistent with the wealth of research that 
indicates police use of force is more likely to occur in predominantly racial and ethnic 
minority neighborhoods (Barlow & Barlow, 2000; Georges-Abeyie, 1991; Jacobs & 
O’Brien, 1998; Smith, 1986; Worden, 1995). 
Ecological Variation and the Minority Threat Perspective 
Since the early 1990s, research began to focus attention on how levels of formal 
social control vary across places (Liska, 1992). Although several theories have been 
proposed to account for such variation, the role of social threat continues to be a focal 
point among contemporary accounts. This framework suggest that the quantity and 
quality of crime control efforts and infrastructures reflect an oppressive system that 
protects the power and privilege of dominant groups of society by delegating greater 
formal social control to areas considered a “problem population” (Chambliss & Seidman, 
1971; Jackson, 1989; Liska, 1992; Quinney, 1980; Spitzer, 1975; Turk, 1966;). Whereas 
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traditional theories emphasized the role of economic inequality as a source of threat, 
more recent research has begun examining the influence of race/ethnicity within the 
context of ecological variation.  
Premised on the broader group threat and race relations sociological literature 
(Blalock, 1967; Blauner, 1972; Blumer, 1958), modern-day studies hypothesize that the 
level of social threat fluctuates with the racial and ethnic composition of certain places 
(Eitle, D’Alessio, & Stolzenberg, 2002; Holmes, 2000; Jackson, 1989; Liska, 1992; 
Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998; Kent & Jacobs, 2005). Making the transition from dangerous 
class to minority class, Blumer (1958) argued that the relative size and geographic 
concentration of ethnic minorities in a particular area will shape the political and 
economic threat perceptions among majority (i.e., White) group members, which 
subsequently results in a greater degree of formal social control to maintain the status quo 
of the dominant class. As a result of this formal social control, intergroup conflict arises 
because the minority group seeks to overcome social, economic, and political 
marginalization.        
 Elaborating on the minority threat process, Blalock (1967) suggests that the 
majority group’s level of perceived threat will reciprocate the growing size of the 
minority population, which threatens the economic and political interests and status quo 
of the majority group. In order to mitigate the concern that the minority group may 
establish itself politically and economically, Blalock (1967) argues that the majority (i.e., 
White) group will increase formal social control to maintain their dominance. Although 
Blalock (1967) speculates that the relationship between both forms of threat and social 
control will be curvilinear, the types of nonlinearity are different. Specifically, as the 
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level of economic threat increases, there will be an initial counter effect in the form of 
formal social control; however, this effect will eventually level off or decelerate at a 
certain point. Conversely, as ethnic minorities gain recognition politically, there will be a 
modest association between threat and social control at lower levels and then a 
disproportionately greater or accelerated effect at increased levels of threat. Thus, under 
minority threat perspective, it would be expected that the police would exert more 
coercive authority, or force, in areas where ethnic minorities are concentrated as a way to 
control the “dangerous class” and promote the dominant class (Blalock, 1967; Jackson; 
1989).     
 Past and present research examining various aspects of the minority threat 
perspective suggests that the criminal justice system may be one mechanism through 
which the majority group maintains control of culturally dissimilar minority groups. 
Although research supporting the minority threat perspective is mixed, numerous studies 
have documented a relationship between minority representation and various policing 
outcomes (Brandl, Chamlin, & Frank, 1995; Chamlin, 1990; Greenberg et al., 1985; 
Kane, 2003; Liska et al., 1981; Nalla, Lynch, & Leiber, 1997). Supporting the minority 
threat framework, Jackson and Carroll (1981) found that a city’s racial composition, 
frequency of riots in the 1960s, and level of black mobilization activity were significant 
predictors of police expenditures (see also Jackson, 1986). Similarly, Jackson (1985) 
found that the relationship between percent Hispanic and policing expenditures was 
curvilinear, with policing expenditures increasing until a city’s Hispanic composition, or 
percentage, reached approximately 40 percent. In some of the more recent research, 
however, there has only been moderate to minimal support for the minority threat 
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hypothesis (Holmes, Smith, Freng, & Munoz, 2008; Stults & Baumer, 2007). 
 The minority threat perspective has also been operationalized in terms of the 
nexus between racial/ethnic composition and the outcome of arrest. Using 175 large cities 
across the United States in 2001, Parker, Stults, and Rice (2005) found that black 
structural disadvantage was positively associated with police arrests. Furthermore, Eitle 
and Monahan’s (2009) research found that racial inequalities significantly predicted drug 
arrest rates for both white and black suspects, meaning that macro-level factors may have 
a stronger impact on police decision making than the people residing in these localities. 
Advancing research on the minority threat framework, Kane, Gustafson, and Bruell 
(2013) better conceptualized the threat triggers (e.g., racial/ethnic composition was 
measured as percent change between 1990 and 2000; change in racial/ethnic composition 
was relative to the historical white population representation) and used misdemeanor 
arrest as their outcome—a measure that captures police discretion. Whereas increases in 
Black representation tended to increase Black misdemeanor arrests in historically White 
areas, “surges in the Latino population were associated with increased minority 
misdemeanor arrests across all tracks generally” (Kane et al., 2013, p. 976).        
SQF, Police Use of Force, and the Minority Threat Perspective  
 Although the application of the minority threat hypothesis is relatively limited in 
policing scholarship, it has the capacity to explain race/ethnicity differentials in police 
use of force during SQFs.
3
 Specifically, police officers may use race/ethnicity as a way to 
describe, identify, and control a typical offender or offender population in order to 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that the NYPD refers to Terry stops as stop, question, and frisk encounters, or 
SQF. 
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preserve the status quo for the political elite (Harris, 2002). Although police officers are 
thought to be apolitical, their occupational mandate is politically defined and they 
function in a public political arena. As Manning (1978) states, the factors that influence 
the administration of law “all reflect the political organization of society. The distribution 
of power and authority, for example, rather than the striving for justice, or equal 
treatment under the law, can all have a direct bearing on enforcement” (Manning, 1978, 
p. 106). Considering that law enforcement practices have historically been “conditioned 
by broader social forces and attitudes—including a long history of racism” (Williams & 
Murphy, 1990, p. 28), there may be reason to believe that police force during SQFs is 
used disproportionately against ethnic minority communities. In line with the minority 
threat perspective, the police may be a political mechanism through which the majority 
group in society (i.e., Whites) maintains their power and privilege by subjecting the 
minority group (i.e., ethnic minorities) to greater formal social control (i.e., police use of 
force). 
The Legal Precedent on SQF 
The legal precedent dictating an investigative stop and police conduct during a 
SQF stems from Terry v. Ohio (1968). In this case, Officer McFadden’s attention was 
attracted to two men standing on the street corner. The two individuals, Chilton and 
Terry, were walking back and forth in front of a store while simultaneously staring 
through the store window. Occasionally, the two individuals would stop, confer with each 
other briefly, and then continue walking back and forth in front of the store while staring 
through the window. After 10 to 12 minutes of this behavior, Chilton and Terry 
eventually left the store’s location at which point Officer McFadden followed them 
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(Terry v. Ohio, 1968). Shortly after following the two individuals, McFadden noticed 
them stop in front of another store but this time they were accompanied by a third man. 
Fearing these individuals had a gun, Officer McFadden stopped the three men, asked 
them their names, and conducted a pat-down search of Terry and Chilton outside of their 
clothing. During the pat down, Officer McFadden found pistols on both men. Although 
Terry and Chilton would later appeal their convictions for carrying a concealed weapon 
on the grounds that the weapons were obtained through an unreasonable search and 
seizure, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed their convictions as being constitutionally 
permissible (Terry v. Ohio, 1968).  
 Compared to other more invasive searches, a “stop” is less than a full seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The justification for the initial stop is 
premised on reasonable suspicion—an evidentiary standard—that criminal activity may 
be occurring. Instead of applying the probable cause standard, which governs full arrests 
and searches, the “Court applied the fundamental test of the Fourth Amendment: the 
reasonableness under all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a 
citizens personal security” (Ferdico et al., 2015, p. 309). Hence, police officers may stop 
a person if they reasonably suspect crime is afoot in light of the totality of the 
circumstances, which means the whole picture must be taken into account, and 
importantly, it is determined on a case-by-case basis. In other words, law enforcement 
must derive reasonable suspicion based upon objective observations and available 
information (United States v. Cortez, 1981). Furthermore, officers may also use their own 
experience and specialized training to deduce reasonable suspicion (United States v. 
Arvizu, 2002).  
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To determine whether a person has been seized (i.e., stopped because of 
reasonable suspicion) within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
established several criterions. First, in United States v. Mendenhall (1980), the Court 
determined that “[A] person has been ‘seized’…only if, in view of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he 
was not free to leave” (pp. 554-555). If, for instance, officers displayed their weapons or 
used certain language to make a reasonable person believe he or she is not free to leave, it 
is considered an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment unless there is reasonable 
suspicion. Importantly, the free-to-leave test devised in Mendenhall (1980) is objective: it 
is “not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, 
but whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable 
person” (California v. Hodari D., 1999, p. 628).  
The second criterion for determining a seizure is the “free to decline requests or 
terminate encounter” test (Ferdico et al., 2015). If the stop is not grounded in reasonable 
suspicion, the citizen may decline requests or terminate the encounter. Because of the 
investigative nature of police work, police officers may ask for identification or to search 
luggage as long as they “do not convey the message that compliance with their requests is 
required” (Florida v. Bostick, 1991, p. 435). Thus, if a citizen voluntarily stops and shows 
their identification in such circumstances, it is not considered a stop and search within the 
parameters of the Fourth Amendment so long as compliance is not implicitly or explicitly 
mandated by the officer. 
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After a person is stopped for reasonable suspicion, the Court recognized that 
officers should be able to investigate whether a suspected person is armed. The Court 
concluded that:   
 [W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably 
 conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the 
 persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in 
 the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and 
 makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the 
 encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or other’s safety, he is 
 entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully 
 limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover 
 weapons which might be used to assault him. (Terry v. Ohio, 1968, p. 30).    
    
In determining the reasonableness of a frisk (i.e., pat-down of the person’s outer clothing) 
during a SQF or Terry stop, the Court identified that it involves a balancing act of 
competing interests. On one hand, a person has the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. On the other hand, the government has an interest in preventing 
and detecting crime and protecting law enforcement from dangerous persons. Generally, 
the determination of these two competing interests involves the “weighing of the gravity 
of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the 
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual interest” (Brown v. 
Texas, 1979, p. 51).  
 The scope of reasonable investigative methods during SQFs is the product of an 
officer’s interactions with the stopped person. The initiation of a stop based on reasonable 
suspicion does not enable an officer to frisk everyone he or she stops. Instead, the officer 
must have “reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual” 
(Terry v. Ohio, 1968, p. 24). Such inferences that an individual is armed and dangerous 
must be justified through specific facts (e.g., outline in pants the shape of a pistol) and the 
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police officer’s experience in the field. Although not exhaustive, a frisk may be executed 
for one or more of the following reasons: suspected crime involves a weapon, suspect is 
edgy about the stop, bulge in suspect’s clothing, furtive behaviors/movements, and/or 
suspect exhibits belligerent behavior during stop (for full review see Ferdico et al., 2015).      
As mentioned earlier in this section, the justification for the initial stop is 
premised on reasonable suspicion
4—an evidentiary standard—that criminal activity may 
be occurring. The reasonable suspicion standard was later expanded upon to included 
location and the individual’s behavior (Adams v. Williams, 1972; Illinois v. Wardlow, 
2000), which enables police officers to justify a lower “suspicion” standard in certain 
neighborhood contexts (Ferguson & Bernache, 2008). The Court stated in Wardlow 
(2000) that although high crime areas are not enough to support the reasonable suspicion 
standard, “officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in 
determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further 
investigation” (Illinois v. Wardlow, 2000, p. 124). Considering that social disadvantage 
and “high-crime areas” are perceptually and statistically associated with ethnic minorities 
(Alpert et al., 2005; Fagan, 2008; Ferguson & Bernache, 2008; Loury, 2002), police may 
have elevated levels of suspiciousness in minority neighborhoods (Fagan et al., 2010). To 
the extent that the police have elevated levels of suspicion in these neighborhoods, it may 
                                                 
4 Information the officer sees, hears, or otherwise experiences first-hand; information from known 
informants; information from anonymous informants that is partially corroborated; information 
from police flyers, bulletins, or radio dispatches; behavioral cues by the suspect (e.g., flight and 
furtive gestures); suspect’s association with known criminals or a prior criminal record; admissions 
of guilt; evidentiary cues (e.g., bulge in the suspect’s pocket); and/or suspect matches description in 
report of a violent crime (Ferdico et al, 2015). 
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exacerbate and reinforce racial/ethnic inequalities in the practice of law enforcement, or 
as the minority threat perspective highlights, the subjugation ethnic minorities.  
Racial Profiling and SQF  
The way in which police officers use force during SQFs may be an artifact of 
profiling individuals. Profiling generally refers to the creation and action taken on behalf 
of some set of characteristics. While there are a multitude of physical and social attributes 
that police may use to profile individuals, none received more attention in the field of 
policing than racial profiling, which is likely due to the historically oppressive nature of 
law enforcement (Williams & Murphy, 1990). Such tactics serve as a demonstrable effort 
to control ethnic minorities who are perceived as being a threat. Research on the topic has 
identified two forms of racial profiling as potential organizational practices.  
The first type of profiling links specific races with various kinds of offenses 
(Smith et al., 2003). During the 1990s, for instance, the U.S. Department of Justice 
developed and disseminated profiling practices to police forces across the United States 
to intervene in interstate drug trafficking (Harris, 2002). These practices became part of 
the criteria for stopping motorists. Consequently, in 1998, there were more than 25,000 
police officers who were trained to identify drug couriers, which encouraged police 
officers to either implicitly or explicitly target individuals on the basis of ethnicity or race 
(ACLU, 1999; Allen-Bell, 1997). The Department of Justice believed that racially-based 
profiling was more efficient than random stops as a means to control crime (Engel, 
Calnon, & Bernard, 2002). As opponents of such practices have pointed out, however, 
racial profiling has not led to more drug seizures than traffic stops and searches among 
White drivers (Antonelli, 1996; Kociewiewski, 2002; Lamberth, 1996). The second form 
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of racial profiling is known as out-of-place profiling (Fagan, Dumanovsky, & Galman, 
1999). Under this type of profiling, ethnic minorities are at a greater risk of being stopped 
by the police as they travel through white, especially upper-class, neighborhoods because 
their race does not “fit” the racial composition of the neighborhood (Meehan & Ponder, 
2002). Such increased investigation and stops may reflect police officers’ viewpoint of 
ethnic minorities as symbols of danger in majority communities.  
 Research examining racial profiling demonstrates its existence through 
observational studies, official police records, and self-report surveys. In an early study 
that came in response to New Jersey litigation, Lambert (1998) examined whether 
highway patrols racially profiled African Americans. While observing cars on the New 
Jersey turnpike and controlling for motor vehicle violations, he found that African 
Americans were 4.85 times more likely to be stopped and 16.5 times more like to be 
arrested than non-blacks. Similar findings have also been documented in Ohio with 
African-Americans being three times as likely to receive a ticket in comparison to non-
Blacks (Harris, 1999; see also Browning et al., 1994; Cole, 1999; Veneiro & Zoubeck, 
1999). More recent research continues to suggest that police disproportionately stop and 
search ethnic minorities at a rate that does not align with their baseline population, 
especially if they are Hispanic and African-American motorists (Ayres, 2008; Gross & 
Barnes, 2002; Langan et al., 2001; Parker, 2001; Smith et al., 2003; Smith & Pettrocelli, 
2001; Weitzer & Tuch, 2006; Zingraf et al., 2000). Although extant research tends to find 
racial differences that reinforce the notion of profiling, the magnitudes of such disparities 
vary across studies. In a study by Berejarano (2001), for instance, African-American 
motorists were 50 percent more likely to be stopped than any other race. Conversely, in a 
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study by Smith and colleagues (2003), they found that African-American drivers were 17 
percent more likely than White drivers to be stopped by North Carolina Highway Patrol.  
As Ridgeway and MacDonald (2010) point out, these differences in racial 
profiling may be due to external and internal benchmarks used in studies. Studies using 
U.S. Census data to form an external benchmark, for instance, may underestimate or 
overestimate the effect of racial profiling on motor vehicle violations because it does not 
accurately “isolate racial bias from differential exposure and differential offending” 
(Ridgeway & MacDonald, 2010, p. 182). Other external benchmarks based on violent 
arrestee data may also pose methodological issues. Police departments claiming they do 
not engage in racial profiling because violent crime percentages by race/ethnicity match 
their corresponding stop rates fail to recognize that most stops are not premised on 
violence but minor infractions and suspected drug transactions. In other words, “[t]he 
group of individuals stopped by the police in most large cities, therefore, far exceeds the 
group comprising the arrestee population” (Ridgeway & MacDonald, 2010, p. 185). 
Similarly, there may be shortcomings associated with internal benchmarks. Some police 
departments, for example, have early warning systems that are premised on peer-to-peer 
comparisons. Although useful for identifying potentially problematic officers, there may 
be drawbacks if the department as a whole is corrupt because officers will not snitch on 
their partners.   
Because there are a number methodological limitations associated with using 
official data,
5
 scholars have also examined racial profiling through self-reports surveys. 
                                                 
5 A few of these limitations include the lack of information on the driver’s behavior; there is no way 
to compare those stopped against those who were not; verbal warnings are often not recorded in 
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Similar to studies based on official records, self-report survey research highlights racial 
discrepancies. Using data from the Contacts between Police and the Public component of 
the 1999 National Crime Victimization Survey, Lundman and Kaufman (2003) found that 
police officers were more likely to make traffic stops for Black males, even after 
controlling for sample selection bias and demographic variables (i.e., social class, city 
size, and age). Furthermore, African-Americans and Latinos were also less likely to 
report being stopped for legitimate reasons and more likely to indicate being improperly 
treated by the police compared to whites. In a more recent study, Warren and colleagues. 
(2010) built upon prior self-report research by modeling nonbias mechanisms that may 
produce racial disparities in stops, which included self-report driving behavior, previous 
law convictions, and a spatial control for variation in police stop intensity. Whereas the 
multivariate analyses found that race, age, and vehicle age were all significant predictors 
for local police, driving behaviors had a larger effect on patrol officers’ stop decision. 
Overall, empirically sound and generalizable research from nationwide probability 
samples and official police records indicate that compared to other races, ethnic 
minorities are more likely to be stopped, ticketed, arrested, handcuffed, or searched by 
police on the highways.  
Summary 
Few studies have examined the potential for racial profiling to occur in SQFs, let 
alone police use of force during these encounters. Research that has investigated 
disproportionate minority contact (DMC) during SQFs generally suggests that both an 
                                                                                                                                                 
official records; and official data may be biased if the officer’s write-up is inaccurate or incomplete 
(Donohue, 2000; Smith et al., 2003; Verniero & Zoubuck, 1999). 
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individual’s race and the racial breakdown of a neighborhood affect police officers’ 
decision to stop and frisk suspects (Bittner, 1970; Fagan & Davies, 2000; Fagan et al., 
2010; Gelman, Fagan, & Kiss, 2007; Harris, 1993; Jones-Brown, Gill, & Trone, 2010; 
Reiss, 1971). When developing cognitive frameworks of suspicion, police officers may 
be using the racial composition of the neighborhood to establish their reasonable 
suspicion standard at the individual level. Quillian and Pager (2001), for instance, found 
that the prevalence of young black men affected urban residents’ perceptions of crime in 
their neighborhood, even after controlling for neighborhood characteristics and crime 
rates. Extrapolating on Quillian and Pager’s (2001) research, police may have distorted 
perceptions of ethnic minorities in neighborhoods where they are heavily concentrated, 
leading to a disproportionate amount of SQFs. As Alpert et al. (2005) found, the 
suspicious behavior of ethnic minorities is generally premised on nonbehavioral cues 
(i.e., race and neighborhood), whereas the same suspicion necessary for a SQF of a white 
citizen was based on behavioral cues (e.g., activity that may indicate a drug transaction). 
In a study by Smith (1986), suspects were more likely to be arrested in poor 
neighborhoods, regardless of their behavior and crime type. Such results suggest that the 
structural features of a neighborhood may interact with the social psychological 
mechanisms through which police determine patterns of behavior and produce 
perceptions of disorder (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). Consequently, various forms of 
urban inequality may be perpetuated through discriminative policing tactics and intensity 
(Fagan & Davies, 2000). 
Given the far-reaching consequences of police use of force, the prevalence of 
racial profiling, and the theoretical predictions of the minority threat perspective, this 
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dissertation seeks to explore the potential for racial and ethnic disparities in police use of 
force during stop and frisk activities. More specifically, this dissertation seeks to answer 
three important questions related to the intersection of racial profiling, deprivations of 
liberty, and police use of force. First, which factors predict use of force in SQFs across 
suspect, situational, departmental, and ecological levels of analysis? Second, after 
controlling for the appropriate micro- and macro-level variables, do police officers use 
force more often in predominately minority neighborhoods? Lastly, does an individual’s 
race/ethnicity interact with the racial/ethnic composition of a police precinct to produce 
disparities in police use of force? To date, nearly all attention on SQF activities (in NYC 
and elsewhere) has focused on race/ethnicity in relation to the initial stop. As a 
consequence, research has not sufficiently explored the substance of these stops, 
especially whether force is used, and whether there were racial and/or ethnic disparities in 
use of force during those Terry stops. By answering the research questions above, this 
dissertation seeks to fill that void.    
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CHAPTER 3 
THE STUDY SITE 
From the early 1990s until present day, New York City has experienced a major 
recession in crime. Although various explanations have been put forth to account for this 
trend, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) continues to be a focal point of 
controversy. Central to this debate are the changes that Commissioner William Bratton 
adopted under his tenure—most notably the adoption of order maintenance policing 
(OMP), stop-question-frisk (SQF) tactics, and Compstat. These changes, however, did 
not occur independently of events in the city and the department. In an effort to better 
understand the NYPD’s current state of affairs regarding SQF tactics, it is critical to 
examine the landmark events that reshaped the NYPD’s organization, philosophy, 
structure, and operations. Such a foundation will not only provide a backdrop for the 
current state of SQF, but it will also illuminate the collateral consequences of deploying 
SQF tactics, particularly as they relate to police-minority community relations. Combined 
with a discussion of Daniels et al. v. the City of New York (2003) and Floyd et al. v. The 
City of New York (2008), this chapter will provide the framework for how New York City 
provides fertile ground to explore the intersection of SQF and racial disparities in police 
use of force through the lens of the minority threat perspective.
6
  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Terry stops have been controversial and led to litigation in other cities as well, including 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit. But NYC has received, by far, the most attention, 
scholarly and otherwise. 
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Contextualizing SQF Tactics, 1994-Present 
 Akin to many cities across the United States in the 1980s, New York City faced a 
major spike in violence, crime, and disorder.
7
  Not only was New York City dealing with 
the emergence of crack cocaine, but the number of homicides grew exponentially from 
1,392 in 1985 to 2,262 in 1990. Simultaneously, the streets of New York City, along with 
the subway system, were being flooded with social and physical disorder. Drug dealers 
became a widespread problem on various street corners, blocks, and city parks, where 
they were selling marijuana, heroin, cocaine, and/or crack cocaine. Drug use and 
transactions were readily observable by individuals in the communities. The crack-
cocaine endemic in New York City was of particular concern because selling crews relied 
on guns and violence to maintain their clientele and territory (Johnson, Golub, & 
McCabe, 2010, p. 18). In addition to the flourishing drug market, New York City was 
also rife with beggars and panhandlers. While some were passive and peaceful, others 
were aggressively approaching subway users for money. The beggar and panhandler 
problem became so pronounced that “[a]pproximately 1,200 to 2,000 persons a night 
were sleeping in the subway…. Following on the heels of disorder and petty crimes, 
robbery and felonies started a steep increase in 1987” (Kelling & Coles, 1996, pp. 117-
118). 
 With the beggar and panhandler population negatively affecting the subway 
system and the city as a whole, the New York Transit Authority appointed Chief William 
Bratton as Chief of the transit police, and Bratton (along with George Kelling) were 
tasked with addressing the “underworld’s” disorderly behavior and crime predicament. 
                                                 
7 For a full discussion on the NYPD prior to 1994, see White (2014) and Lardner and Repetto (2001). 
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Through the use of a broken windows-based enforcement strategy, officers began 
remedying social and physical disorder by arresting and ejecting “miscreants” in the 
subway system. In the subsequent two years, there was a 30 percent reduction in felony 
crimes and individuals began feeling a sense of safety in their subway system (Joanes, 
2000). Given the success of Chief Bratton’s enforcement strategy, Mayor Rudy Giuliani 
eventually named him as the Commissioner of the NYPD in 1993. 
 Beginning in 1994, the NYPD altered its policing tactics to reflect the theoretical 
underpinnings of Broken Windows theory.
8
 Under this perspective, it was argued that 
minor forms of disorder had a contagious effect that exacerbated more serious crime 
problems. If the police did not address various forms of social and physical disorder, law-
abiding citizens would refrain from exercising informal social control and community 
regulation, which would ultimately invite more serious offenders to the neighborhood 
(See Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Consequently, the more serious offenders would engender 
a cycle that bred more disorder whereby community standards broke down and crime 
would begin to flourish. In order to restore the neighborhood back to normalcy, the police 
were supposed to aggressively focus efforts on minor forms of social and physical 
disorder so that law-abiding citizens could strengthen the dynamics of social regulation 
and social control (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). While early research tended to support the 
use of broken windows tactics (Skogan, 1990; Kelling & Coles, 1996; Sampson & 
Cohen, 1988), Harcourt (1998) and Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) would later 
question the relationship between crime and disorder. In Harcourt’s (1998) reanalysis of 
                                                 
8 COMPSTAT was adopted at the same time as the OM policing strategy and SQF. A full discussion of 
COMPSTAT is outside the scope of this dissertation, and readers should refer to McDonald (2002) 
and White (2014) for more detail on COMPSTAT in NYC.  
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Skogan’s (1990) data, he found numerous inconsistencies and errors in measurement, and 
as a result, he failed to replicate Skogan’s (1990) support for Broken Windows theory. 
Similarly, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) found that crime was not related to disorder, 
but rather, the relationship is confounded by social interactions and social controls among 
neighbors (i.e., collective efficacy). 
 Despite the empirical doubts, Broken Windows theory continued to influence 
American policing, which would eventually be translated into a policing strategy known 
as “order-maintenance policing” or OMP (Livingston, 1997). Similar to Broken Windows 
theory, OMP took a zero tolerance stance against social disorder (e.g., public 
drunkenness, vandalism, loitering, panhandling, prostitution, etc.), but also embraced 
tenets derived from early movements toward community policing. In theory, this meant 
that OMP would combat disorder while avoiding coercive encounters with citizens on the 
street. Essentially, police should not only focus on protecting communities from criminal 
invasions but also the individuals residing in them. The problem, however, is that “New 
York moved in a very different direction, exchanging amelioration of physical disorder 
for interdiction of social disorder” (Fagan & Davies, 2000, p. 468). Hence, instead of 
adhering to a new set of standards premised on social interactions with law-abiding 
citizens, the NYPD encouraged the aggressive pursuit of disorderly people through 
indicators of stops and arrests (Waldeck, 1999). 
 Even though Kelling and Cole (1996) perceived OMP as being jointly defined by 
citizen and police efforts, there was a tactical shift amongst the NYPD to focus primarily 
on social disorder with the implementation of two policies. First, the Reclaiming the 
Public Spaces of New York initiative reconstructed the Broken Window theory such that 
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streets were targeted through systematic and aggressive enforcement strategies aimed at 
low-level social disorder. The second policy implemented was the Getting Guns off the 
Streets of New York (NYPD, 1994b). This proposal aimed at reducing gun violence 
through means of seizing illegal firearms by thoroughly investigating incidents and 
arrests involving guns and following-up on leads (Smith & Bratton, 2001). The 
combination of OMP with “gun-oriented policing” was thought to act as a potential 
deterrence against gun-related crimes because “[s]topping people on minor infractions 
also made it riskier for criminals to carry guns in public” (Davis & Mateu-Gelabert, 1999, 
p. 1). In the subsequent three years, the NYPD was able to confiscate more than 50,000 
guns, resulting in 40,000 gun-related arrests (Wintemute, 2006). 
 The two aforementioned policies resulted in policing tactics that strayed from the 
original contentions of Broken Windows theory. First, the NYPD’s version of policing 
social disorder emphasized arresting and prosecuting individuals who committed disorder 
offenses. During police stops, individuals were often questioned and checked for 
outstanding police warrants (Fagan & Davies, 2000). In short, rather than preventing 
disorder from snowballing into more serious crime, policing disorder offenses became a 
way to remove weapons and wanted criminals from the community. Second, community-
oriented policing was reinvented such that it no longer emphasized interactions between 
police and community leaders. Instead, Bratton embraced a management style from the 
private sector (Hammer & Champy, 1993) that stressed innovative approaches on 
management accountability, prioritization, and information based decision-making 
(Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2007). The outcome of such changes included various 
structural modifications and the development and implementation of Compstat, a 
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computer management system “defined by timely and accurate information, rapid 
deployment of resources, effective tactics, follow-up, and assessment” (White, 2014, p. 
8). Essentially, the NYPD relied upon its data-driven accountability system (i.e., 
Compstat) to identify community needs rather than engaging the citizens residing in 
them.  
 In a more recent effort to combat crime, the NYPD initiated Operation Impact to 
focus police resources within precinct localities where crime is concentrated (i.e., 
“Impact Zones”). Based on data from crime analysts, commanders identified 24 Impact 
Zones to deploy police resources (Golden & Almo, 2004). As Weisburd, Telep, and 
Lawton (2014) state, “The goal is to use saturation foot patrol in combination with 
resources from a variety of departmental divisions to target these high crimes areas” (p. 
137). Although SQFs were first adopted under William Bratton in the 1990s, it is 
important to note that SQFs were an integral part of Operation Impact. Once the program 
started, the number of SQFs grew exponentially over the next decade (Ridgeway, 2007; 
Smith & Purtell, 2007). Evaluation research examining Operation Impact suggests that it 
was one of the main factors contributing to the crime reduction within targeted precincts 
(Smith & Purtell, 2007).  
OMP, Street Stops, and Race 
Although stop and frisk interventions were never formally acknowledged in 
official documents, they became an integral component of OMP in order to inspect low-
level disorder (Kelling & Cole, 1990). As critics have pointed out, OMP tactics created 
opportunities (i.e., the stop) that led to searches and arrests (Waldeck, 1999). As Fagan 
and Davies (2000) state, “Stops for minor crimes or infractions were easier to justify 
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under a lower constitutional standard (i.e., ‘reasonable suspicion’) than stops for more 
serious offenses” (p. 476). Under OMP, therefore, many of the stops that focused on 
social disorder would grant police the opportunity to search suspects for contraband and 
weapons and make arrests. In fact, the number of misdemeanor arrests increased from 
129,404 in 1993 (the year before OMP was implemented) to 215,158 in 1998 (Fagan & 
Davies, 2000). As Figure 1 demonstrates below, the number of stop and frisks continued 
to increase until 2011, where it reached its pinnacle at 685,724 SQFs.  
 
Figure 1. Total number of SQFs from 2003 through 2013. 
Source: 2003-2013, NYPD Website 
 
Crime Control and SQF Tactics in New York City. Whether stop-question-
frisk (SQF) tactics have been effective at reducing crime in New York City is a hotly 
contested debate among many individuals. On the one hand, the NYPD is adamant that 
the implementation of SQF tactics is one of the primary driving forces behind the crime 
decline in New York City. Proponents of stop and frisk tactics generally highlight 
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evidence from several different sources. First, in the years following the implementation 
of SQFs, the NYPD was able to confiscate more than 50,000 guns, resulting in 40,000 
gun-related arrests (Wintemute, 2006). Second, in the 20 years since the NYPD began 
relying on SQFs, there has been a 75% decline in street crimes in New York City. As 
Zimring (2007, 2012) points out, New York City’s crime decline was substantially 
greater, roughly twice the national decline. Moreover, Kelling and Sousa (2001) 
concluded that policing reforms, which included SQFs, had a large effect on crime in 
New York City. Specifically, there was an inverse relationship between violent crime 
rates and misdemeanor arrests across police precincts.  
 On the other hand, there are a number of studies indicating that the relationship 
between SQFs and the crime decline in New York City is modest to negligible at best. 
Those modest findings suggest that reductions in the crack-cocaine market, through 
order-maintenance policing and SQF tactics, had a small effect on overall crime trends in 
New York City (Cerda et al., 2009; Cerda et al., 2010; Messner et al., 2007; Rosenfeld et 
al., 2007). Similarly, Weisburd and colleagues (2014) found that the concentration of 
SQFs in particular areas was one of the ways in which the NYPD was able to maintain its 
low crime rates over the years despite having less resources. In contrast to these studies, 
others have highlighted the ineffective nature of SQFs in reducing crime. Rosenfeld and 
Fornango (2014), for instance, found that police stops did not decrease robbery and 
burglary rates. Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) also failed to find a significant relationship 
between policing minor disorder offenses and New York City’s crime decline. Such 
findings have led Fagan and colleagues (2010) to conclude that there appears to be a 
declining return in crime detection from marginal increases SQF enforcement strategies.  
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Street Stops and Race. The NYPD’s implemented OMP (in conjunction with 
SQFs) in a manner that disproportionately affected ethnic minorities. According to a 
report by the Civil Rights Bureau (1999), stops were primarily focused in poor 
neighborhoods with high concentrations of Blacks and Hispanics. Even in neighborhoods 
with low ethnic minority concentrations, Black and Hispanic stop rates were still well 
above their population percentage. By the end of the 1990s, SQF procedures became a 
point of contention among ethnic minorities. As Fagan, Geller, Davies, and West (2010) 
indicated, “[i]n a fifteen-month period from January 1998 through March 1999, non-
Hispanic Black, Hispanic Black, and Hispanic White New Yorkers were three times more 
likely than their White counterparts to be stopped and frisked on suspicion of weapons or 
violent crimes” (p. 310). While the NYPD claimed that such disparities reflected the 
higher participation of Blacks and Hispanics in crime, these assertions were later 
disproved when Blacks and Hispanics were still significantly more likely to be stopped 
than whites even after controlling for the population composition of the precinct and 
various crime types. Moreover, Black and Hispanics were also more likely than Whites to 
be stopped without constitutional justification (Civil Rights Bureau, 1999). SQFs are still 
concentrated in the police precincts (i.e., Brownsville, East New York, Central Harlem, 
East Harlem, Bedford Stuyvesant, and Mott Haven) where residents are predominately 
Black or Hispanic. 
Research continues to document the disparate treatment of ethnic minorities in 
SQF procedures in New York City. In a recent study by Fagan and colleagues (2010) on 
SQF in New York City, they identified three noteworthy findings.  
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First, stops within neighborhoods take place at rates in excess of what would be 
predicted from the separate and combined effects of population demography, 
physical and social conditions, and the crime rate. This excess seems to be 
concentrated in predominately Black neighborhoods. Second, the excess stops in 
these neighborhoods persist over time, even as the Black population declines, 
crime rates remain low and effectively unchanged, the City’s overall social and 
economic health improves, and housing and other investments increase across the 
City’s neighborhoods, including its poorest and most segregated neighborhoods. 
Third, there appears to be a declining return in crime detection from marginal 
increases in enforcement, and this efficiency gap seems to grow over time. (p. 
337) 
 
For all of these reasons, ethnic minority citizens generally perceived OMP and SQF 
tactics by the NYPD as a form racial profiling. As Fagan et al. (2010) conclude, SQF 
tactics lack any type of tangible return and marginalizes people by race and place. 
Specifically, even as stop rates have increased drastically for Blacks from 2003 to 2006, 
hit rates (i.e., the rate at which stops results in arrest) have steadily declined for Blacks. 
Furthermore, despite a 300 percent increase in SQFs from 2003 to 2006, the number of 
stops that uncovered firearms decreased from a rate of 3.9 firearms per 1,000 stops to 1.4 
firearms seized per 1,000 stops. Such findings are of particular concern considering that 
hit rates are more effective in mixed or White neighborhoods (Fagan et al., 2010, see also 
Jones-Brown et al., 2010). The totality of these findings suggest that SQFs may not only 
be limited in its capacity as a policing strategy, but also a mechanism that undermines the 
social good associated with the NYPD and their legitimacy (Fagan et al., 2010). It should 
be noted, however, that research examining the NYPD’s use of SQF has found mixed 
results regarding DMC. In collaboration with the NYPD, the RAND Corporation found 
that significant racial disparities existed in more than 500,000 stops. Specifically, in 
2006, Blacks and Hispanics were involved in SQF 53% and 29% of the time, 
respectively. Although the RAND Corporation found significant results, they concluded 
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that the findings were not robust enough to incite immediate change, indicating “a large-
scale restructuring of the NYPD SQF policies and procedures is unwarranted” 
(Ridgeway, 2007, p. xiv).  
Ethnic Minority Tension: The Collateral Consequences of OMP & SQF 
 The NYPD’s aggressive application of Broken Windows theory through OMP 
strategies and SQF tactics has evolved in a way that most closely resembles an 
enforcement strategy that focuses on specific races in poor places—a theme commonly 
found in research on the minority threat perspective. As Harcourt states (1998), these 
policing strategies “have little to do with fixing broken windows and much more to do 
with arresting window breakers—or persons who look like they might break windows” 
(p. 342). Undoubtedly, such policing tactics have impeded the reconstruction of social 
control and community regulation (i.e., collective efficacy) in ethnic minority 
communities because they are unable and unwilling to engage with police in efforts to 
combat physical and social disorder—a scenario that falls far from Wilson and Kelling’s 
(1982) original Broken Windows essay. 
 Focused policing tactics in predominately Black and Hispanic communities has 
not only obstructed efforts to manufacture collective efficacy, but it also may have 
implications related to the legitimacy of law. In ethnic minority neighborhoods where the 
NYPD carries out aggressive policing strategies, citizens may view the police as being 
less legitimate because they perceive treatment by the police as being unfair and racially 
biased. In a recent study carried out by the Vera Institute of Justice, Fratello, Rengifo, 
and Trone (2013) examined whether being stopped by the NYPD had an effect on 474 
young peoples’ perceptions of the police. Through in-depth interviews with some of the 
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residents in New York City (n = 42), Fratello et al. (2013) found a number of noteworthy 
findings.  
Table 2.  
 
Summary of Results 
1) 44 percent of young people surveyed indicated they had been stopped 
repeatedly—9 times or more. 
2) Less than a third—29 percent—reported ever being informed of the reason for a 
stop. 
3) 71 percent of young people surveyed reported being frisked at least once, and 64 
percent said they had been searched. 
4) 45 percent reported encountering an officer who threatened them, and 46 percent 
said they had experienced physical force at the hands of an officer. 
5) One out of four said they were involved in a stop in which the officer displayed 
his or her weapon. 
6) 61 percent stated that the way police acted towards them was influenced by their 
age. 
7) 57 percent indicated that they were treated worse than others because of their race 
and/or ethnicity. 
Source: Fratello et al. (2013) 
 
In light of these findings, it is not surprising that “88 percent of young people surveyed 
believe that residents of their neighborhood do not trust the police” (Fratello et al., 2013, 
p. 2). Extrapolating on these results, ethnic minorities may refrain from complying with 
the police because they lack trust and confidence in their work (Tyler, 1990). The social 
costs of diminished legitimacy are far reaching as the police depend on the voluntary 
cooperation of citizens to prevent and fight crime, which includes reporting crimes and 
criminals, informally policing their neighborhood, and aiding the court system as 
witnesses and jurors (Fagan & Davies, 2000). Without these cooperative acts, the police 
risk being further isolated from the citizens they serve and protect. 
 The isolation and demarcation of police through perceptions of illegitimacy may 
work to reinforce the occupational culture and social norms related to race-specific 
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policing. In addition to the dynamic structure of the police workplace (Bouza, 1990; 
Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993), the insularity of the police may compound the “us-versus-them” 
mentality whereby actions by fellow officers are rarely questioned and “matter of fact 
prejudices” are developed and buttressed through social norms, beliefs, and perceptions 
(Manning & Van Maanen, 1978, p. 267-270). Consequently, this may “give rise to broad 
suspicion of criminal activity and intensified enforcement in minority neighborhoods” 
(Fagan & Davies, 2000, 501). Within the context of the NYPD, this may translate into 
SQF procedures that perpetuate the disparate stop rates of ethnic minorities and place 
them in a position where they are more likely to encounter police use of force. 
The NYPD and Legal Troubles 
 Premised in the general deterrence literature, the implementation of SQFs by the 
NYPD was a strategy meant to prevent, investigate, detect, and solve crime. As 
previously discussed, there was a general sense of fear among New Yorkers in the 1980s 
because crime was perceived as plaguing New York City. In an effort to combat this 
growing crime trend, the NYPD adopted a number of crime-fighting philosophies, 
strategies, and management techniques. In the subsequent years, New York City 
experienced one of the largest crime declines in the nation. For example, compared to the 
50 percent reduction nationwide, New York City experienced a 66 percent decline in 
homicides from 1990 to 1997 (Davis, 1999; see also Weisburd et al., 2014). The NYPD 
touted that this decline was the culmination of OMP, SQFs, and Compstat (White, 2013). 
Even today, in light of the controversy, the NYPD continues to boast its ability to 
prevent, investigate, detect, and solve crime through SQFs. Former New York Police 
Commissioner Ray Kelly was recently quoted saying, “It’s [SQFs] a practice that’s 
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essential. You can’t police without doing it” (Timm, 2013). In the same interview, he 
would later go on to claim that the NYPD’s policing style has saved approximately 7,383 
lives. Moreover, according to former Commissioner Kelly, the excessive stop rates of 
ethnic minorities has less to do with discrimination and more to do with the fact that 
“New York’s minority communities experience a disproportionate share of violent crime” 
(Timm, 2013).       
The widespread deployment SQF has resulted in two major lawsuits on racial 
profiling. In Daniels et al. v. the City of New York (2003), the Center for Constitutional 
Rights (CCR) challenged the NYPD’s use of SQF without reasonable suspicion under the 
Fourth Amendment and alleged that officers were selectively targeting individuals on the 
basis of their race and national origin in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Of particular concern was the NYPD’s 
Street Crime Unit (SCU). When the lawsuit was filed, the SCU was an elite commando 
unit comprised of more than 300 officers who patrolled the streets of New York City in 
unmarked cars and plain clothes. On one night in February 1999, a team of SCU officers 
shot and killed Amadou Diallo, an unarmed African immigrant, by firing 41 bullets at 
him while he was standing at the entrance of his Bronx apartment building. The death of 
Diallo not only ignited citywide demonstrations against police brutality, but it also 
invited close scrutiny of the SCU. Upon inspection, the New York State Attorney 
General found that the SCU stopped 16 African-Americans for every arrest made. Upon 
settling the civil suit, the NYPD was required to maintain a written anti-racial profiling 
policy, whereby officers and their supervisors were audited to make sure that SQFs were 
properly documented and based on reasonable suspicion.  
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 Despite efforts to eliminate racial profiling, the CCR filed a second lawsuit 
against the NYPD in Floyd v. City of New York (2008), alleging that the majority of the 
NYPD’s SQFs transpired in communities of color and lacked reasonable suspicion. 
While the named plaintiffs in the litigation were David Floyd, Lalit Clarkson, David 
Ourlicht, and Deon Dennis, they represented hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers who 
were stopped primarily because of their race or ethnicity. The allegations against the 
NYPD were supported by the CCR (2009) and Fagan’s (2010, 2012) expert opinion. In 
the CCR’s (2009) report, they revealed that 80 percent of the stops made by the NYPD 
involved Blacks and Latinos, who only represented 25 percent and 28 percent of the 
City’s population respectively. Moreover, between 2005 and 2008, Blacks and Latinos 
were also more likely to be frisked and have physical force used against them during their 
stops compared to Whites.
 9
 Specifically, Blacks and Latinos comprised 85 percent of the 
individuals frisked by the NYPD, whereas Whites were only frisked 8 percent of the time 
after the initial stops. Furthermore, force was used 24 percent of the time against Blacks 
and Latinos and only 17 percent of the time against Whites during the stop. This is 
particularly concerning given that stops only result in arrests 4 to 6 percent of the time 
and rarely yielded the discovery of weapons or contraband across all races, suggesting 
that SQFs are both racially biased and ineffective at controlling crime.        
 Supplementing the CCR’s (2009) report, Jeffery Fagan (2010, 2012) analyzed the 
NYPD’s SQF data from 2004-2009 and then the remaining data from January 2010 
through June 2012. Working with the plaintiff, Fagan found support for the CCR’s 
                                                 
9 This study will expand on the CCR’s and Fagan’s (2010, 2012) results by examining cross-level 
interactions between individual and ecological predictors of police use of force. 
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contention that the NYPD was engaging in unconstitutional stop-and-frisk practices that 
targeted predominately Black and Latino New Yorkers. After controlling for crime, 
neighborhood context, and the concentration of police officers in specific areas, Blacks 
and Latinos were still more likely to be disproportionately affected by SQFs in a number 
of ways. Table 3 highlights Fagan’s (2010, 2012) major findings with regard to the 
Floyd’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. 
Table 3.  
 
Summary of Evidence 
Fourth Amendment Claim 
 Nearly 150,000, or 6.71% of all discretionary stops lack legal justification. An 
additional 544,252, or 24.37% of all discretionary stops lack sufficiently detailed 
documentation to assess their legality. 
 Officers rely heavily on two constitutionally problematic stop justifications for 
nearly half of all stops: furtive movements and proximity to a high crime area. 
 Documented stop justifications do little to explain overall variations in stop 
patterns and do not substantially influence the racial disparities that characterize 
stop practices between police precincts. 
 The rate of gun seizure is .15 percent, or nearly zero, and arrests take place in less 
than six percent of all stops. 
 Black and Hispanic suspects are treated more harshly once the decision is made 
that a crime has occurred. Black and Hispanic suspects are more likely to be 
arrested than issued a summons when compared to White suspects. They are more 
likely to be subjected to use of force.    
Fourteenth Amendment Claim 
 NYPD stop activity is concentrated in precincts with high concentrations of black 
and Hispanic residents even after controlling for the influences of crime, social 
conditions, and the allocation of police resources. 
 NYPD stops are significantly more frequent for black and Hispanic citizens than 
for white citizens, even after adjusting for precinct crime rates, the racial 
composition, and other social and economic factors predictive of police activity. 
 Black and Hispanics are more likely to be stopped than whites even in areas 
where there are low crime rates and where residential populations are racially 
heterogeneous or predominantly white.   
 SOURCE: Fagan, 2010, pp. 3-4 
  
 Based on the CCR’s (2009) report and Fagan’s (2010, 2012) expert opinion, the 
Federal District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that the NYPD was engaging in 
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unconstitutional stop-and-frisk practices that targeted predominately Black and Latino 
New Yorkers. To remedy this problem, the court made several orders. The judge 
appointed a monitor, Peter L. Zimroth, to “serve the interests of all stakeholders, 
including the City, by facilitating the early and unbiased detection of non-compliance or 
barriers to compliance” (Floyd v. The City of New York, 2008, p. 676). Such compliance 
was supposed to be accomplished through the reformation of policies, training, 
supervision, documentation, and disciplinary action, along with the publication of SQF 
reports that detail the NYPD’s compliance with the ordered reforms. Second, Judge 
Scheindlin agreed that the individuals most affected by SQF should be the ones working 
with the NYPD to establish immediate reforms, which will be guided by a facilitator that 
works with the community and at least one liaison from the NYPD:  
The communities most affected by the NYPD’s use of stop and frisk have a 
distinct perspective that is highly relevant to crafting effective reforms. No 
amount of legal or policing expertise can replace a community’s understanding of 
the likely practical consequences of reforms in terms of both liberty and safety. 
(Floyd v. City of New York, 2008, p. 686) 
 
The last major reform would involve a one-year pilot study whereby police officers in the 
75
th
 precinct were supposed to wear body cameras. The purpose of these cameras was to 
create a permanent, objective record of stops and frisks conducted by NYPD officers, 
which should make it easier to determine if a SQF was constitutional. 
 In the months following the CCR’s landmark victory, a number of proceedings 
occurred that affected the case’s outcome. Foremost, the City appealed to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in order to freeze the reform process. Around the same 
time, the police unions filed motions to intervene in Floyd v. City of New York (2008) 
because they believed that the district court’s opinion that the NYPD employed SQFs in a 
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manner that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments was incorrect. As stated in 
the proposed Intervenor/Appellant Mem. In Opp’n to Defendant/Appellant Mtn for 
Limited Remand (2014), “The [d]istrict [c]ourt misconstrued applicable burdens of proof, 
misapplied Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, applied Fourteenth Amendment theory that 
[p]laintiffs never even presented, and accepted evidence that was insufficient as a matter 
of fact and law to prove [p]laintiffs’ claims” (pp. 2-3). Upon review of the City’s appeal, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit halted the reform process and 
removed the district court judge for displaying partiality, although it should be noted that 
the decision by the Second Circuit did not overturn the substance of the district court’s 
rulings. Despite its original decision, the Second Circuit issued an order lifting the stay 
and remanding the case to the district court in February 2014 so that the City and the 
plaintiffs could come to a resolution (Floyd v. City of New York, 2014).  
 The national spotlight surrounding the Floyd case not only highlighted the 
NYPD’s use of SQFs, but it also became a defining feature of the NYC mayoral election, 
with candidates both for and against the NYPD’s use of the practice. As a result, the 
mayoral election became a referendum on SQF in which Bill de Blasio won on an anti-
stop-question-frisk political platform. Following his election, de Blasio eventually 
replaced Commissioner Ray Kelly with former Commissioner Bill Bratton, a move that 
many New Yorkers opposed because Bratton was one of the original pioneers and 
supporters of SQFs. Despite their differences in the utility of SQF, the two did find 
common ground in mending the tumultuous relationship between New Yorkers, 
especially young men of color, and the NYPD. As de Blasio stated, “The idea here is to 
have real reform, to only use stop and frisk when it’s constitutionally warranted and 
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constitutionally applied, and to show communities that we are respecting law abiding 
citizens” (Russo, Dienst, & Siff, 2013). Embracing the mayor’s viewpoint, Commissioner 
Bratton pledged to address NYPD reform through the inclusion of “more oversight, more 
guidance, [and] more training; it’s all for the good” (Paybarah, 2013). In an effort to 
incite police-citizen reclamation in NYC, de Blasio had the city drop its appeal in the 
Second Circuit and focus on implementing some of the original reforms devised in 
Federal District Court. Since de Blasio’s election and the abatement of litigation, the use 
of SQFs dropped off precipitously in 2013 (n = 191,851) and 2014 (n = 45,788), marking 
a 64% and 91% decrease from 2012 (n = 532,911).   
Summary 
 
Considering prior research on SQFs, the NYPD’s organizational and operational 
changes over the past two decades (i.e., the adoption of OMP, SQF, and Compstat), and 
the recent legal troubles involving racial and ethnic profiling, the NYPD provides fertile 
ground for exploring the intersection of SQF and racial/ethnic disparities in police use of 
force through the lens of the minority threat perspective. Although Fagan’s (2010, 2012) 
supplemental report identified that Blacks and Hispanics were disparately targeted during 
stop-and-frisk practices, it did not delineate about the extent to which they may also be 
disproportionately affected by police use of force. While Fagan’s (2010, 2012) 
supplemental report did not focus exclusively on police use of force, he did find that 
force occurred in 21.3 percent of SQFs when the category of “Hands on Suspect” was 
excluded from analysis. Furthermore, police used force occurred against Whites, Blacks, 
and Hispanics in approximately 15.5, 21.3, and 23.8 percent of SQFs, respectively. 
Building on Fagan’s initial reports, this dissertation seeks to broaden research on the 
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intersection of racial profiling, deprivations of liberty, and police use of force, along with 
the theoretical breadth of the minority threat perspective.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA SOURCES AND METHODS 
Collectively, the literature review on police use of force and the theoretical arguments 
associated with the minority threat perspective suggest that ethnic minorities are 
disproportionately impacted by formal social control. With this literature as a framework, 
there are several research questions guiding this study of use of force during Terry stop of 
citizens by NYPD officers. First, which factors predict use of force across suspect, 
situational, departmental, and ecological levels of analysis? Second, after controlling for 
the appropriate micro- and macro-level variables, do police officers use force more often 
in predominately minority neighborhoods? Lastly, does an individual’s race/ethnicity 
interact with the racial/ethnic composition of a police precinct to produce disparities in 
police use of force? The following chapter describes the data sources and key variables of 
interest, along with the analytic methods that will be employed to examine whether police 
use force during SQF varies by individual, encounter-level, and ecological 
characteristics.     
Sample and Data 
The current study investigates the aforementioned research questions by 
combining the NYPD’s 2012 Stop, Question, and Frisk database, which is publicly 
available online, with data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
10
 The NYPD’s SQF (2012) 
dataset contains information on each stop-and-frisk encounter documented by the NYPD 
                                                 
10 For a summary of the dependent and independent variables, please refer to Table 1. For the descriptive 
statistics related to these variables, please refer to Table 2 in Appendix C. 
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(N = 519,948).
 11
  During each encounter, police officers are required to record 
information on a UF-250 form, which is later entered into a digital database. The UF-250 
forms provide an account of each stop and frisk incident and contain information about 
the suspect’s demographic characteristics (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, age, etc.), the location 
of the stop, the date and time of the stop, the outcome of the stop, and whether force was 
used by the police officer. For a full description of all information recorded, a copy of the 
UF-250 form is attached in Appendix A.  
In addition to the individual-level and encounter-encounter level characteristics, I 
also investigated the macro-level characteristics of the location of the stop. To do this, I 
used U.S. Census Bureau data (2010) from the American Community Survey to construct 
a data-set at the precinct level (N = 75). While researchers examining the effect of 
ecological variation on various outcomes strive to meaningfully define “neighborhoods” 
(Reiss, 1986; Taylor & Covington, 1988, 1993), prior research indicates that 
administratively defined geographical units (i.e., census tracts) are sufficient and often 
necessary because of the manner in which many public agencies collect and archive their 
data (Sampson, 1997; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Veysey & Messner, 1999).  
 The U.S. Census Bureau data were aggregated to the police precinct for several 
reasons. First, the NYPD records data at the precinct level. In order to maintain congruity 
among the measures included in the models, all variables were aggregated to the precinct 
                                                 
11 The original 2012 dataset on SQF contained 532,912 cases. Missing data was addressed through listwise 
deletion, which reduced the sample size by 2.4 percent. Although listwise deletion may lead to wider and/or 
biased confidence intervals, the small percentage of missing cases suggests this is not an issue (Cheema, 
2014; Young, Weckman, & Holland, 2011). Raymond and Roberts (1997) recommend using an alternative 
to listwise deletion anytime the missing data exceeds 5 percent (see also Young et al., 2011). Importantly, 
listwise deletion did not remove many cases involving non-weapon (1.6 percent reduction) or weapon force 
(1.8 percent reduction).  
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level. Second, from a theoretical standpoint, police precincts may be the most appropriate 
unit of analysis because they organize, constrain, and define an officer’s understanding of 
the city and their relationships with other police officers (Herbert, 1997; Klinger, 1997; 
Kane, 2005). Klinger (1997, 2004) contends that research must investigate the geographic 
space in which policing is organized (e.g., “police districts” and “police beats”) because it 
provides the cognitive schemas through which police officers understand crime and the 
citizens contained therein. Since police officers are faced with such a unique combination 
of social elements in their precinct, they tend to hold a distinct perspective or worldview 
through which they see situations and events (Kappeler et al., 1998). Consequently, these 
perceptual lenses shape the development of police officers’ “working personality” such 
that they find unity through the elements of suspicion, danger, and authority (Skolnick, 
1966; Muir, 1977; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1994). In short, police precincts may be the most 
applicable unit of analysis because “police officers generally develop their enforcement 
norms within the context of workgroups assigned to precincts” (Kane, 2005, p. 476).   
Dependent Variable 
 In the SQF database, force was recorded by the NYPD to include “hands,” 
“suspect on ground,” “suspect against wall,” “weapon drawn,” “weapon pointed,” 
“baton,” “handcuffs,” “pepper spray,” and “other.” These nine variables were then 
recoded into a single factor variable with three outcomes, where 0 = no force (N = 
445,928), 1 = non-weapon force (i.e., hands, suspect on ground, suspect against wall, and 
handcuffs) (N = 73,416), and 2 = weapon force (i.e., weapon drawn, weapon pointed, 
baton, and pepper spray) (N = 604). If an officer indicated that he or she used multiple 
forms of force, the highest level of force was coded as the type of force employed during 
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the encounter (see Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Unlike prior research (Mulvey & White, 
2014), the current study could not rank order the outcome variable to create a force 
continuum because the category “other” was ambiguous and did not provide sufficient 
detail about the type of force falling under this category. Furthermore, police use of force 
was not operationalized using a dichotomous variable because the degree of force 
employed has tremendous variation. As previous researchers have demonstrated, if force 
is employed, police officers generally use numerous forms, ranging from physical to non-
physical force (Klinger, 1995; McLaughlin, 1992; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill, 
2005; Mulvey & White, 2014). By operationalizing police use of force as a dichotomous 
variable, researchers are not only holding disparate forms of force to be similar, but they 
also are failing to identify the kinds of force used in specific contexts.   
Independent Variables 
Suspect’s race. The suspect’s race/ethnicity was constructed using the NYPD’s 
data on SQF. Race/ethnicity was documented on the UF-250 form as Asian/Pacific 
Islander, Black, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Black-Hispanic, White-Hispanic, 
White, Unknown, or other. To maintain consistency in the categorization of race/ethnicity 
between data from the UF-250 forms and the U.S. Census Bureau, race/ethnicity was 
recoded in the following manner: 0 = White, 1 = Black, 2 = Hispanic (i.e., White-
Hispanic & Black-Hispanic), 3 = Asian/Pacific Islander, and 4 = American 
Indian/Alaskan native, unknown, or other. The inclusion of race/ethnicity not only helps 
to answer the primary research questions outlined in this dissertation but also corresponds 
with a robust body of research that highlights the importance of race and ethnicity in the 
use of both lethal and non-lethal forms of police force (Garner et al., 2002; Reiss, 1980; 
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Sparger & Glacopassi, 1992; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Walker et al., 2012). For a full 
summary of the dependent and independent variables refer to Table 4, which is located in 
Appendix B. 
Minority threat. To test the effect of the minority threat perspective on police 
use of force, tract-level data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau for 2010, which 
were aggregated to the precinct level. Because some of the census tracts overlapped with 
multiple precincts, data from the U.S. Census Bureau were apportioned to the precinct in 
which it resided. Apportionment was accomplished by creating a weight variable that 
reflected the percentage of a census tract that resided in a precinct. The weight variable, 
therefore, is proportionate to the area of the census tract residing in the precinct. If, for 
instance, a census tract containing a population of 1,000 individuals was split evenly 
between two precincts, 500 individuals would be allocated to each precinct. Although the 
apportionment procedure assumes that the distribution of data is evenly distributed across 
the census tract (Hipp, 2011), it is advantageous to the centroid procedure, which has 
been used in previous research (Kane, 2005). Researchers have suggested that the 
centroid procedure is inaccurate because census-tract data are aggregated to the precinct 
so long as the census tract’s centroid is located within the precinct’s boundary line. Using 
the example from above, this would mean that a census tract’s population of 1,000 
individuals would be distributed to only one precinct, even though 50 percent of the 
census tract may reside in another precinct. When aggregating to the precinct, such 
procedures may skew the results. To avoid the potential for aggregation bias, all census-
tract data underwent apportionment (Hipp, 2011).  
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The racial/ethnic composition variables were created from the U.S. Census 
Bureau (2010) to reflect the percentage of Blacks and Hispanics in each precinct. Using 
these percentages, two minority threat variables were created that corresponded to the 
percent Black and percent Hispanic within each precinct. Although recent research 
suggests using dynamic measures of the minority threat perspective (Kane et al., 2013), 
which captures racial and ethnic changes across time, static measures of the minority 
threat perspective were adequate for analysis because New York City’s racial and ethnic 
composition has not changed drastically over the past ten years. Whereas the Hispanic 
population increased by eight percent, the Black population decreased by approximately 
five percent (Department of City Planning, 2010). Furthermore, the static measures still 
accurately capture the minority threat perspective as outlined by Blalock (1967), and are 
still used by those testing the theory (Holmes, 2000; Lersch et al., 2008; Kane, 2002; 
McCarty, Ren, & Zhao, 2012; Parker et al., 2005; Sever, 2001; Smith & Holmes, 2014; 
Stolzenberg, D’Alessio, & Eitle, 2004; Stults & Baumer, 2007). Also, while previous 
research tends to include percent black and/or percent Hispanic as part of the 
concentrated disadvantage index, these variables were excluded from the composite 
index because it is hypothesized that racial/ethnic composition will predict police use of 
force independent of concentrated disadvantage. Also, concentrated disadvantage should 
not be race based. Despite excluding race/ethnicity from the index, multicollinearity was 
not an issue based on the statistical diagnostics from the variance inflation factor.  
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Control Variables 
Ecological controls. Controls for  violent crime rate, concentrated disadvantage, 
and residential instability were included in the final models.
12
 According to consensus 
theory, the criminal justice system is a mechanism to control and punish those who 
violate the law (Liska, Lawrence, & Benson, 1981). Placed in the context of the current 
study, variations in police use of force may simply parallel the level of infractions against 
legal order. In line with previous research (Kane et al., 2013), the current study includes 
precinct-level crime rates. Additionally, composite indexes for concentrated disadvantage 
and residential instability were created that included measures of both social and 
economic structure (Kane, 2002, 2005; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999). The index for 
concentrated disadvantage included percent persons in poverty, percent households 
receiving public assistance, percent adult unemployment, percent young men (ages 18-
25), percent under eighteen years of age, percent without high school diploma, and 
percent of female-headed households with dependents. To combat multicollinearity and 
stay consistent with past research (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003), 
principal component analysis was employed. As reported in Table 6, the component for 
concentrated disadvantage was strongly associated with all measures included in its 
column (Eigenvalue = 5.21) and had factor loadings above .69. Furthermore, an index for 
residential instability was also created using principal component analysis, which 
included measures for percent of individuals residing in same household for one year, 
                                                 
12 Before finalizing the ecological controls, a stop-rate variable per 10,000 people was created and included 
in the models to examine whether increases in stops impacted the odds of force occurring in a precinct. The 
stop-rate variable was neither significant nor confounded other variables. For sake of parsimony, the stop-
rate variable was not included in the final models. Appendix D provides a full breakdown of total number 
of stops by precinct, along with the number of times police used force.  
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percent foreign born, and percent vacant houses. These measures were included in the 
index because prior research suggests that residential instability attenuates social ties, 
thereby increasing opportunities for crime (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Kane, 2005; 
Sampson & Groves, 1989; Taylor, 1997). The aforementioned measures all loaded highly 
on the residential instability component (Eigenvalue = 1.62) and had factor loadings 
above .71.  
Table 6.  
 
Principal Component Analysis of NYC Census Tract Variables (2010) 
 Components 
Variable Concentrated Disadvantage Residential Instability 
 EV = 5.21 EV =1.62  
Percent persons in poverty .938 -- 
Percent households 
receiving public assistance 
.938 -- 
Percent adult unemployment .691 -- 
Percent young men (18-25) .825 -- 
Percent under eighteen .831 -- 
Percent without high school 
diploma 
.892 -- 
Percent of female-headed 
households with dependents 
.901 -- 
Percent of individuals 
residing in same household 
for one year 
 
-- 
 
.711 
Percent foreign born -- .725 
Percent vacant houses -- -.776 
 
Lastly, it should be noted that precincts were tested for spatial interdependence, or 
the extent to which precinct-level variables may exert some influence over one another 
(see Anselin, Cohen, Cook, Gorr, & Tita, 2000; Bernasco & Block, 2011; Kane, 2005, 
2006; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; Pfeiffer, Wallace, & Chamberlain, 2014). According to 
the Moran’s I, which reflects the spillover effects of adjoining precincts, interdependence 
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was not an issue among precincts for all relevant independent variables at the precinct 
level (i.e., race/ethnicity, concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, and violent 
crime rates).  Because research suggests that offenders do not travel far to engage in 
crime (Rossmo, 2000), spatial lags were created and examined for interdependence. 
Whereas prior research suggests that the average distance decay for offenders to travel is 
between 1 and 2.5 miles (Pyle, 1974; Hipp, 2007; Pfeiffer et al., 2014), the current study 
used a distance decay of 7 miles around the precinct’s centroid. Compared to past 
research that focused on smaller units of analysis, precincts are much larger areal units in 
comparison to census tracts, meaning that the spatial lag must be adjusted to the size 
difference in order to account for the potential of spatial autocorrelation.  
Organizational controls. Data at the organizational level was sparse. The only 
control included at the organizational level was the precinct’s commanding officer’s rank. 
This variable serves as a proxy for “activity” level, or crime. Generally, Inspectors lead 
the busiest precincts, followed by Deputy Inspectors, and then Captains lead the slowest 
precincts.  
Encounter-level controls. A number of controls were included in the final 
models to account for aspects of the encounter between police and citizens. The suspect’s 
demeanor towards the officer was measured using two variables: noncompliance (0 = No, 
1 = Yes) and whether he or she was verbally threatening (0 = No, 1 = Yes). The empirical 
evidence suggests that police are more likely to use force in instances where the suspect 
is resisting compared to those who comply with the officer’s requests (Garner et al., 
1996; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2004, 2007; 
Schuck, 2004; Terrill et al., 2003; Terrill et al., 2008). In addition to these suspect’s 
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characteristics, controls were included to identify if the suspect was frisked (0 = No, 1 = 
Yes), searched (0 = No, 1 = Yes), or arrested (0 = No, 1 = Yes). The variable measuring 
whether an arrest was made is particularly salient because research indicates that police 
officers are more likely to employ force in situations involving an arrest (Hickman et al., 
2008; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; 
Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2003). Furthermore, a host of variables were 
included to delineate why a suspect was frisked and/or stopped, which consisted of 
violent crime suspected (0 = No, 1 = Yes), weapon suspected (0 = No, 1 = Yes), and 
engaged in violent crime (0 = No, 1 = Yes). Additionally, measures were included to 
account for whether weapons (0 = No, 1 = Yes) or contraband (0 = No, 1 = Yes) were 
found on the suspect. Police officers are more likely to employ force in situations where 
the suspect is armed and dangerous (McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Sun 
& Payne, 2004; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). Finally, encounter-level variables were 
included to indicate whether a suspect was in proximity to the offense at the time he or 
she was stopped (0 = No, 1 = Yes), the officer was in a high crime area (0 = No, 1 = 
Yes), or the SQF was initiated by dispatch (0 = No, 1 = Yes).  
Suspect controls. The suspect controls included in the models consisted of an 
individual’s sex (0 = female, 1 = male), age (continuous variable), height, and weight. 
For ease of interpretation, age, height, and weight were all centered for analysis. These 
are necessary controls as prior research has documented that the police are more likely to 
use force against male suspects than females during police-citizen encounters (Garner et 
al., 2002; McCluskey et al., 2005; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Phillips & Smith, 2000; 
Sun & Payne, 2004; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Terrill, Paoline, 
  90 
& Manning, 2003), and younger suspects are more likely to have forced used against 
them in comparison to their older counterparts (McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey 
et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Phillips & Smith, 2000; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; 
Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Terrill et al., 2003). 
Analytical Strategy 
 As stated in the beginning of chapter 4, there are three research questions 
directing this dissertation.  First, which factors predict use of force across suspect, 
situational, departmental, and ecological levels of analysis? Second, after controlling for 
the appropriate micro- and macro-level variables, do police officers use force more often 
in predominately minority neighborhoods? Lastly, does an individual’s race/ethnicity 
interact with the racial/ethnic composition of a police precinct to produce disparities in 
police use of force?  
In order to examine the three questions above, this dissertation employed two-
level hierarchical multinomial logistic regression (HMLR) models because of the 
structure of the dependent variable and the nested nature of the dataset (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). Since there were more than two discrete outcomes (i.e., 0 = no force, 1 = 
non-weapon force, and 2 = weapon force), multinomial logistic regression was deemed as 
most appropriate, with no force being the baseline reference category. Multinomial 
logistic regression was also selected because the relationship between each pair of 
outcome groups was not the same, meaning it did not meet the assumption of 
proportional odds as is the case when using ordinal logistic regression. Using multiple 
HMLR models in the following chapter, each research question will be answered as it 
pertains to non-weapon and weapon force. Furthermore, because data on SQF practices 
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(i.e., level-1 covariates) occurred across the contexts of 75 precincts (i.e., level-2 
covariates), there was the potential that individual cases may violate the assumption of 
independence and produce biased estimates. In other words, it is highly improbable that 
police use of force and SQF practices are independent of grouping characteristics at the 
precinct level. That being said, multinomial logistic regression was coupled with a 
hierarchical modeling strategy to capture the complex error structure of level-1 and level-
2 covariates (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).
13
  
 The equations below describe how hierarchical multinomial logistic regression 
will help answer the research questions posed in this dissertation. The first equation 
corresponds to Tables 8 and 9 in chapter 5, which report results relevant to the first two 
research questions. 
Level-1 Model 
 
Prob[Y(1) = 1|B] = P(1) 
Prob[Y(2) = 1|B] = P(2) 
Prob[Y(3) = 1|B] = P(3) = 1 - P(1) - P(2) 
 
log[P(1)/P(3)] = B0(1) + B1(1)*(ARREST_M) + B2(1)*(FRISKED) + 
B3(1)*(SEARCHED) + B4(1)*(CONTRABA) + B5(1)*(RADIORUN) + 
B6(1)*(FRISK_VI) + B7(1)*(FRISK_SU) + B8(1)*(PROXIMIT) + B9(1)*(STOP_FIT) 
+ B10(1)*(FRISK_NO) + B11(1)*(FRISK_VE) + B12(1)*(STOP_ENG) + 
B13(1)*(HIGHCRIM) + B14(1)*(GENDER) + B15(1)*(AGE) + B16(1)*(WEIGHT) + 
B17(1)*(ASIAN_IN) + B18(1)*(BLACK_IN) + B19(1)*(HISPANIC) + 
B20(1)*(OTHER2_I) + B21(1)*(WEAPON_F) + B22(1)*(HEIGHT_I) + 
B23(1)*(AGE2)  
 
 
log[P(2)/P(3)] = B0(2) + B1(2)*(ARREST_M) + B2(2)*(FRISKED) + 
B3(2)*(SEARCHED) + B4(2)*(CONTRABA) + B5(2)*(RADIORUN) + 
B6(2)*(FRISK_VI) + B7(2)*(FRISK_SU) + B8(2)*(PROXIMIT) + B9(2)*(STOP_FIT) 
                                                 
13 Prior to employing HMLR, diagnostics were run to make sure clustering was not an issue. Although 
there were some precincts with higher and lower counts of force, they did not pose a problem. Leverage 
diagnostics indicate that the results were not affected by outliers.    
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+ B10(2)*(FRISK_NO) + B11(2)*(FRISK_VE) + B12(2)*(STOP_ENG) + 
B13(2)*(HIGHCRIM) + B14(2)*(GENDER) + B15(2)*(AGE) + B16(2)*(WEIGHT) + 
B17(2)*(ASIAN_IN) + B18(2)*(BLACK_IN) + B19(2)*(HISPANIC) + 
B20(2)*(OTHER2_I) + B21(2)*(WEAPON_F) + B22(2)*(HEIGHT_I) + 
B23(2)*(AGE2)  
 
Level-2 Model 
 
B0(1) = G00(1) + G01(1)*(BLACK) + G02(1)*(HISPANIC) + G03(1)*(CONCENTR) + 
G04(1)*(RESIDENT) + G05(1)*(VIOLENT) + G06(1)*(CAPTAIN) + 
G07(1)*(DEPUTYI) + U0(1) 
 B1(1) = G10(1)  
 B2(1) = G20(1)  
 B3(1) = G30(1)  
 B4(1) = G40(1)  
 B5(1) = G50(1)  
 B6(1) = G60(1)  
 B7(1) = G70(1)  
 B8(1) = G80(1)  
 B9(1) = G90(1)  
 B10(1) = G100(1)  
 B11(1) = G110(1)  
 B12(1) = G120(1)  
 B13(1) = G130(1)  
 B14(1) = G140(1)  
 B15(1) = G150(1)  
 B16(1) = G160(1)  
 B17(1) = G170(1)  
 B18(1) = G180(1) + U18(1) 
 B19(1) = G190(1) + U19(1) 
 B20(1) = G200(1)  
 B21(1) = G210(1)  
 B22(1) = G220(1)  
 B23(1) = G230(1)  
 
B0(2) = G00(2) + G01(2)*(BLACK) + G02(2)*(HISPANIC) + G03(2)*(CONCENTR) + 
G04(2)*(RESIDENT) + G05(2)*(VIOLENT) + G06(2)*(CAPTAIN) + 
G07(2)*(DEPUTYI) + U0(2) 
 B1(2) = G10(2)  
 B2(2) = G20(2)  
 B3(2) = G30(2)  
 B4(2) = G40(2)  
 B5(2) = G50(2)  
 B6(2) = G60(2)  
 B7(2) = G70(2)  
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 B8(2) = G80(2)  
 B9(2) = G90(2)  
 B10(2) = G100(2)  
 B11(2) = G110(2)  
 B12(2) = G120(2)  
 B13(2) = G130(2)  
 B14(2) = G140(2)  
 B15(2) = G150(2)  
 B16(2) = G160(2)  
 B17(2) = G170(2)  
 B18(2) = G180(2) + U18(2) 
 B19(2) = G190(2) + U19(2) 
 B20(2) = G200(2)  
 B21(2) = G210(2)  
 B22(2) = G220(2)  
 B23(2) = G230(2) 
The second equation corresponds to Tables 10 and 11 in chapter 5, which report results 
relevant to the last research questions involving the cross-level interaction. In summation, 
HMLR is not only advantageous given the structure of the dependent variable and the 
nested nature of the dataset, but it also provides a modeling technique for “proper 
estimation of cross-level interaction effects” (Johnson et al., 2008, p. 765, see also Wang 
& Mears, 2010; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). 
Level-1 Model 
 
Prob[Y(1) = 1|B] = P(1) 
Prob[Y(2) = 1|B] = P(2) 
Prob[Y(3) = 1|B] = P(3) = 1 - P(1) - P(2) 
 
log[P(1)/P(3)] = B0(1) + B1(1)*(ARREST_M) + B2(1)*(FRISKED) + 
B3(1)*(SEARCHED) + B4(1)*(CONTRABA) + B5(1)*(RADIORUN) + 
B6(1)*(FRISK_VI) + B7(1)*(FRISK_SU) + B8(1)*(PROXIMIT) + B9(1)*(STOP_FIT) 
+ B10(1)*(FRISK_NO) + B11(1)*(FRISK_VE) + B12(1)*(STOP_ENG) + 
B13(1)*(HIGHCRIM) + B14(1)*(GENDER) + B15(1)*(AGE) + B16(1)*(WEIGHT) + 
B17(1)*(ASIAN_IN) + B18(1)*(BLACK_IN) + B19(1)*(HISPANIC) + 
B20(1)*(OTHER2_I) + B21(1)*(WEAPON_F) + B22(1)*(HEIGHT_I) + 
B23(1)*(AGE2)  
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log[P(2)/P(3)] = B0(2) + B1(2)*(ARREST_M) + B2(2)*(FRISKED) + 
B3(2)*(SEARCHED) + B4(2)*(CONTRABA) + B5(2)*(RADIORUN) + 
B6(2)*(FRISK_VI) + B7(2)*(FRISK_SU) + B8(2)*(PROXIMIT) + B9(2)*(STOP_FIT) 
+ B10(2)*(FRISK_NO) + B11(2)*(FRISK_VE) + B12(2)*(STOP_ENG) + 
B13(2)*(HIGHCRIM) + B14(2)*(GENDER) + B15(2)*(AGE) + B16(2)*(WEIGHT) + 
B17(2)*(ASIAN_IN) + B18(2)*(BLACK_IN) + B19(2)*(HISPANIC) + 
B20(2)*(OTHER2_I) + B21(2)*(WEAPON_F) + B22(2)*(HEIGHT_I) + 
B23(2)*(AGE2)  
 
Level-2 Model 
 
B0(1) = G00(1) + G01(1)*(BLACK) + G02(1)*(HISPANIC) + G03(1)*(CONCENTR) + 
G04(1)*(RESIDENT) + G05(1)*(VIOLENT) + G06(1)*(CAPTAIN) + 
G07(1)*(DEPUTYI) + U0(1) 
 B1(1) = G10(1)  
 B2(1) = G20(1)  
 B3(1) = G30(1)  
 B4(1) = G40(1)  
 B5(1) = G50(1)  
 B6(1) = G60(1)  
 B7(1) = G70(1)  
 B8(1) = G80(1)  
 B9(1) = G90(1)  
 B10(1) = G100(1)  
 B11(1) = G110(1)  
 B12(1) = G120(1)  
 B13(1) = G130(1)  
 B14(1) = G140(1)  
 B15(1) = G150(1)  
 B16(1) = G160(1)  
 B17(1) = G170(1)  
 B18(1) = G180(1) + G181(1)*(BLACK) + U18(1) 
 B19(1) = G190(1) + G191(1)*(HISPANIC) + U19(1) 
 B20(1) = G200(1)  
 B21(1) = G210(1)  
 B22(1) = G220(1)  
 B23(1) = G230(1)  
 
B0(2) = G00(2) + G01(2)*(BLACK) + G02(2)*(HISPANIC) + G03(2)*(CONCENTR) + 
G04(2)*(RESIDENT) + G05(2)*(VIOLENT) + G06(2)*(CAPTAIN) + 
G07(2)*(DEPUTYI) + U0(2) 
 B1(2) = G10(2)  
 B2(2) = G20(2)  
 B3(2) = G30(2)  
 B4(2) = G40(2)  
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 B5(2) = G50(2)  
 B6(2) = G60(2)  
 B7(2) = G70(2)  
 B8(2) = G80(2)  
 B9(2) = G90(2)  
 B10(2) = G100(2)  
 B11(2) = G110(2)  
 B12(2) = G120(2)  
 B13(2) = G130(2)  
 B14(2) = G140(2)  
 B15(2) = G150(2)  
 B16(2) = G160(2)  
 B17(2) = G170(2)  
 B18(2) = G180(2) + G181(2)*(BLACK) + U18(2) 
 B19(2) = G190(2) + G191(2)*(HISPANIC) + U19(2) 
 B20(2) = G200(2)  
 B21(2) = G210(2)  
 B22(2) = G220(2)  
 B23(2) = G230(2) 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
The following chapter is separated into three sections. First, the findings will be 
presented to determine which variables predict use of force across suspect, situational, 
departmental, and ecological levels of analysis. Then, the results will be used to establish 
if police officers use force more often in predominately minority neighborhoods. In other 
words, this section will help to ascertain whether the minority threat perspective provides 
a viable explanation for police use of force during NYPD stop and frisk practices. Lastly, 
the analysis will tease out a more nuanced aspect of the minority threat perspective by 
examining whether an individual’s race/ethnicity interacts with the racial/ethnic 
composition of a police precinct to produce disparities in police use of force. 
 As stated in Chapter 4, this dissertation employs hierarchical multinomial logistic 
regression (HMLR) to answer all three research questions. Before running these models, 
however, it is critical to determine how much the dependent variable randomly varies at 
the precinct level. If there is no variation, HMLR may not be the most appropriate 
statistical technique. To capture this variation, a variance component model was 
calculated to gage variation of the dependent variable at the precinct level, which is 
reported in Table 7. 
Table 7 
 
Variance Component Model 
Random Effect 
(df = 74) 
St. Dev Variance 
Component 
Chi-Square 
Intercept 1(0) 1.041 1.0841 3273.740*** 
Intercept 1(1) 0.657 0.431 30,853.876*** 
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The significant chi-square results indicate that there is variation in the dependent variable 
at the precinct level, meaning that HMLR is an appropriate modeling strategy. 
Furthermore, the intra-class correlation is equal to .284 (i.e., 0.431/(1.084+0.431)), which 
suggests police use of force incidents are not independent of each other but rather are 
partially related to one another because they are nested within precincts. 
Research Question 1: Which factors predict use of force across suspect, situational, 
departmental, and ecological levels of analysis? 
Suspect Characteristics 
 
 Several suspect characteristics were significant in both the non-weapon and 
weapon force models. As presented in Table 7, Black and Hispanic individuals had 
higher log odds of having non-weapon force used against them by the NYPD compared 
to their White counterparts. Specifically, the odds of Blacks and Hispanics having non-
weapon force used against them were approximately 12% and 8% greater than Whites. 
These findings not only reinforce prior literature that continue to document racial and 
ethnic disparities in police use of force (Walker et al., 2012), but they also confirm the 
ruling of the Federal District Court judge that the NYPD is engaging in racially and 
ethnically biased policing practices. The other suspect characteristics were not significant 
(i.e., Asian, Other, sex, age, age
2
, height and weight) for non-weapon force. Similarly, 
few suspect characteristics were significant in the weapon-force model. One noticeable 
difference between Table 8 and Table 9 is that Blacks and Hispanics did not have higher 
log odds of having weapon force used against them by the police. Such differences may 
be due to the amount of discretion police officer have when using non-weapon force, 
whereas departments may have policies in place for weapon force. The only suspect 
  98 
characteristic that was significant in the Table 8 was weight, indicating that heavier 
individuals had higher odds of having weapon force used against them in comparison to 
those that were lighter in weight. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  99 
Table 8.  
 
Final Model: Non-weapon force vs. No force 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio T-Ratio 
Independent Variables     
Precinct Level (N = 75)    
Intercept -3.319 0.036*** -10.391 
Percent Black 0.003 1.003 0.650 
Percent Hispanic 0.011 1.011 1.933 
Concentrated Disadvantage -0.043 0.957 -0.303 
Residential Instability -0.102 0.903 -1.466 
Violent Crime Rate -0.000 1.000 -0.781 
Captain -0.596 0.551** -3.361 
Deputy Inspector -0.352 0.704 -1.825 
Individual Level (N = 519,948)    
Black 0.110 1.116** 3.074 
Hispanic 0.073 1.076** 2.704 
Asian 0.027 1.027 0.514 
Other 0.010 1.010 0.200 
Sex 0.034 1.035 0.911 
Age 0.003 1.003 0.818 
Age
2 
-0.000 1.000 -1.238 
Height -0.001 0.999 -0.237 
Weight 0.000 1.000 1.263 
High Crime Area -0.049 0.952 -1.397 
Proximity to Offense 0.120 1.127* 2.399 
Radio Run 0.094 1.098 1.670 
Arrested 0.288 1.333*** 4.554 
Frisked 2.476 11.892*** 36.192 
Searched 0.490 1.634*** 8.343 
Contraband Found -0.038 0.962 -0.553 
Weapon Found -0.112 0.894* -2.012 
S: Fits Description 0.150 1.162*** 4.170 
S: Engaged in Violence 0.148 1.159** 2.893 
F: Suspected Weapon -0.046 0.955 -0.942 
F: Suspected Violent Crime 0.042 1.042 0.869 
F: Noncompliance 0.148 1.160* 2.502 
F: Verbal Threats -0.306 0.736* -2.507 
References: Inspector, white, male, & R: not listed 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
 
 
 
 
  100 
Situational Characteristics 
 
 In line with previous research (Hickman et al., 2008; McCluskey et al., 2005; 
McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; Mulvey & White, 2014; Paoline & Terrill, 2004, 2007), the 
most robust predictors of police use of force were at the situational, or encounter, level. 
As indicated in Table 8, a significant positive relationship exists between non-weapon 
force and numerous situational control variables including proximity to offense, arrested, 
frisked, searched, s: fits description, s: engaged in violence, and f: noncompliance.
14
 
These positive associations are likely due to several factors. In the process of arresting, 
frisking, or searching a suspect, police officers must use some kind of force, specifically 
force involving their hands. This may explain why individuals who were arrested, 
frisked, or searched had log odds of having non-weapon force used against them that 
were approximately 33%, 1089%, and 63% greater than their respective counterparts. 
Furthermore, individual who engage in violence or do not comply with an officer’s orders 
may be viewed as threatening, meaning they are more inclined to use force. Their log 
odds of having non-weapons force used against them by the NYPD were approximately 
16% higher compared to their references categories. Lastly, individuals found within 
proximity of the offense had log odds of having non-weapon force used against them that 
were about 13% higher than those that were not in proximity. Due to their proximity to 
the offense, the NYPD may have thought they were the perpetrator or an accomplice.  
Conversely, lower log odds that police officers used non-weapon force were 
associated with weapon found and whether a suspect was verbally threatening. 
Specifically, the log odds that police officers used non-weapon force against suspects 
                                                 
14 For details about the variables, refer to Table 4 in Appendix B. 
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who were frisked and then later found to be carrying a weapon were about 11% lower 
than when a weapon was not found. Although this findings runs contrary to the literature 
on police use of force and encounters involving a weapon, there may be an explanation. 
The manner in which the NYPD uncovered these weapons was through the process of 
SQF, meaning that the suspect did not pull out a weapon unexpectedly and try to use it on 
the officer. The weapon was found while the suspect was under the control of officers. 
Lastly, the log odds that police officers used non-weapon force against verbally 
threatening suspects were roughly 26% lower than those who were not verbally 
threatening. These verbal threats also occurred in the process of frisking the suspect. 
Despite the threats, the officers likely new there was no real threat as the suspect was 
already under their control as part of the SQF process. 
 Similar patterns of statistical significance emerged in Table 9. Although the 
situational control variables were still strong predictors of police use of weapon force, 
their robustness was weaker than the relationships in Table 8 (as suggested by the t-ratio). 
As suggested in Table 8, a significant positive relationship exists between weapon force 
and numerous situational control variables including proximity to offense, frisked, 
searched, s: fits description, f: suspected weapon, f: suspected violent crime, and f: 
noncompliance. Individuals found within proximity of the offense had log odds of having 
weapon force used against them that were about 55% higher than those that were not in 
proximity. Additionally, individuals who were frisked or searched had log odds of having 
weapon force used against them that were approximately 90% and 124% greater than 
their respective counterparts. Furthermore, if suspects fit a description, were suspected of 
carrying a weapon, were suspected of engaging in violent crime, or were noncompliant, 
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their log odds of having weapons force used against them by the NYPD were 
approximately 90%, 94%, 149%, and 136% higher compared to their references 
categories. The explanations for these findings should be place in the same context as 
non-weapon force. For that reason, refer to the explanations to frame these findings.  
Contrarily, lower log odds that police officers used weapon force were associated with 
high crime areas. Specifically, individuals had approximately 50% lower log odds of 
having weapon force used against them in areas police officers perceived as being high 
crime. Although these findings are counterintuitive, Klinger (1997) suggests that the 
perceived level of deviance in a particular area may provide police with a way to gauge 
the appropriate action to take. Accordingly, police officers in high crimes areas may 
develop a higher threshold for those instances that require weapon force. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  103 
Table 9.  
 
Final Model: Weapon force vs. No force 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio T-Ratio 
Independent Variables     
Precinct Level (N = 75)    
Intercept -7.749 0.001*** -14.851 
Percent Black 0.006 1.006 1.350 
Percent Hispanic 0.001 1.001 0.083 
Concentrated Disadvantage 0.136 1.146 0.750 
Residential Instability -0.200 0.819** -2.891 
Violent Crime Rate -0.001 0.999 -1.977 
Captain -0.541 0.582 -1.778 
Deputy Inspector -0.316 0.729 -1.054 
Individual Level (N = 519,948)    
Black 0.074 1.077 0.395 
Hispanic 0.039 1.040 0.206 
Asian 0.242 1.274 0.938 
Other -0.136 0.872 -0.368 
Sex 0.257 1.282 1.282 
Age -0.003 0.997 -0.150 
Age
2 
0.000 1.000 0.298 
Height 0.029 1.029 1.775 
Weight 0.004 1.003** 2.615 
High Crime Area -0.685 0.504*** -6.630 
Proximity to Offense 0.436 1.547** 3.420 
Radio Run 0.818 2.266*** 5.636 
Arrested -0.284 0.753 -1.761 
Frisked 0.640 1.896*** 4.622 
Searched 0.806 2.240*** 4.925 
Contraband Found -0.329 0.720 -1.069 
Weapon Found 0.347 1.414 1.431 
S: Fits Description 0.643 1.903*** 4.930 
S: Engaged in Violence 0.288 1.334 1.902 
F: Suspected Weapon 0.661 1.937*** 3.684 
F: Suspected Violent Crime 0.914 2.493*** 8.883 
F: Noncompliance 0.857 2.357*** 6.308 
F: Verbal Threats -1.118 0.327 -1.810 
References: Inspector, white, male, & R: not listed 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
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Departmental Characteristics 
 
The only control included at the organizational level was the precinct’s 
commanding officer’s rank. This variable serves as a proxy for “activity” level, or crime. 
Generally, Inspectors lead the busiest precincts, followed by Deputy Inspectors, and then 
Captains lead the slowest precincts. That being said, there was a significant negative 
association between non-weapon force and Captain-led precincts, with Deputy Inspectors 
as the reference category. Specifically, the log odds that police officers employed non-
weapons force in Captain-led precincts was approximately 45% lower than precincts ran 
by Deputy Inspectors. These findings suggest that police officers are less likely to use 
force in precincts with a lower activity or crime level, which is not surprising.  
Ecological Characteristics 
The composite indexes for concentrated disadvantage and residential instability 
generally revealed null findings with one exception. Residential instability was 
significant in the weapon-force model (Table 9). Specifically, precincts that had higher 
levels of residential instability (i.e., percent of individuals residing in same household for 
one year, percent foreign born, and percent vacant houses) had lower log odds that police 
officers used force. This findings may be related to the benign neglect hypothesis, 
whereby officers careless about patrolling precincts with higher rates of residential 
instability, and as a result, they are also less likely to use weapon force. Lastly, violent 
crime rate was not significantly associated with either non-weapon or weapon force. 
These null findings are likely due to the geographic size of precincts, which diffuses the 
concentration of crime at smaller units of analysis. 
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Research Question 2: After controlling for the appropriate micro- and macro-level 
variables, do police officers use force more often in predominately minority 
neighborhoods? 
 The second research question guiding this dissertation is premised in the minority 
threat literature. Using the minority threat perspective as a framework, it was predicted 
that police officers may be a political mechanism through which the majority group in 
society (i.e., Whites) maintains their power and privilege by subjecting the minority 
group (i.e., ethnic minorities) to greater formal social control (i.e., police use of force). 
Despite the theoretical underpinnings of the minority threat perspective, percent Black 
and percent Hispanic did not significantly predict higher or lower log odds that police 
officers used non-weapon or weapon force in a precinct (see Tables 8 & 9). In the context 
of stop and frisk activities, therefore, the minority threat perspective did not predict the 
likelihood that police officers use either types of force. Put simply, the racial and ethnic 
composition (as measured by percent Black and percent Hispanic) of a neighborhood did 
not influence the general likelihood that police officers employed force against New 
Yorkers.   
Research Question 3: Does an individual’s race/ethnicity interact with the 
racial/ethnic composition of a police precinct to produce disparities in police use of 
force? 
 Moving beyond prior research on the minority threat perspective, this dissertation 
examined whether an individual’s race/ethnicity interacted with the racial/ethnic 
composition of a precinct to influence police use of force. As indicated in Table 10, 
Black individuals had lower log odds of having non-weapon force used against them than 
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Whites in primarily Black precincts. In short, a one unit increase in percent Black 
decreased a Black individual’s log odds of having force used against them by 0.003 
compared to Whites. Moreover, these findings run counter to the predictions of the 
minority threat perspective, which hypothesizes that increases in percent Black should 
increase the likelihood that police officers employ force against Blacks individuals. 
Chapter 6 contextualizes this finding using the benign neglect hypothesis, which shares 
similarities with the minority threat perspective. Also, it should be noted that significant 
cross-level interactions were only significant for Blacks in the non-weapon force model.  
Figure 2 illustrates the interactive effect between Black individuals and percent Black on 
the odds that police officers use force. 
 
Figure 2. Black by %Black Interaction 
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Table 10.  
 
Final Model: Non-weapon force vs. No force 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio T-Ratio 
Independent Variables     
Precinct Level (N = 75)    
Intercept -3.399 0.033*** -10.868 
Percent Black 0.002 1.002 0.437 
Percent Hispanic 0.009 1.009 1.568 
Concentrated Disadvantage -0.041 0.959 -0.297 
Residential Instability -0.101 0.904 -1.454 
Violent Crime Rate -0.000 1.000 -0.762 
Captain -0.600 0.549** -3.502 
Deputy Inspector -0.358 0.699 -1.896 
Cross-Level Interaction    
Black x 0.053 1.054 1.180 
Percent Black -0.003 0.997* -2.355 
Hispanic x 0.120 1.127** 3.540 
Percent Hispanic 0.002 1.002* 2.239 
Individual Level (N = 519,948)    
Asian 0.027 1.027 0.524 
Other 0.017 1.017 0.329 
Sex 0.034 1.035 0.909 
Age 0.003 1.003 0.834 
Age
2 
-0.000 1.000 -1.259 
Height -0.001 0.999 -0.265 
Weight 0.000 1.000 1.257 
High Crime Area -0.049 0.952 -1.395 
Proximity to Offense 0.120 1.127* 2.399 
Radio Run 0.094 1.098 1.670 
Arrested 0.287 1.333*** 4.552 
Frisked 2.476 11.893*** 36.210 
Searched 0.491 1.634*** 8.344 
Contraband Found -0.038 0.962 -0.550 
Weapon Found -0.112 0.894* -2.010 
S: Fits Description 0.150 1.162*** 4.164 
S: Engaged in Violence 0.148 1.159** 2.893 
F: Suspected Weapon -0.046 0.955 -0.943 
F: Suspected Violent Crime 0.042 1.042 0.868 
F: Noncompliance 0.148 1.160* 2.504 
F: Verbal Threats -0.307 0.736* -2.507 
References: Inspector, white, male, & R: not listed 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
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Contrary to Blacks, Hispanics not only had higher log odds of having non-weapon force 
used against them than Whites, but this effect was compounded as percent Hispanic 
increased in a precinct. For instance, a one unit increase in percent Hispanic increased the 
log odds of police use of non-weapon force by 0.002 for Hispanics compared to Whites 
(see Table 11). Furthermore, percent Hispanic also increased the log odds that Hispanics 
had weapon force used against them compared to their White counterparts. As Figure 3 
illustrates, the odds of Hispanics having weapon force used against nearly doubles 
compared to Whites as percent Hispanic increases from 1% to 74%. These findings 
reinforce the predictions of the minority threat hypothesis in a more nuanced manner. 
 
 
Figure 3. Hispanic by %Hispanic Interaction 
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Table 11.  
 
Final Model: Weapon force vs. No force 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio T-Ratio 
Independent Variables     
Precinct Level (N = 75)    
Intercept -8.020 0.001*** -14.400 
Percent Black 0.003 1.003 0.568 
Percent Hispanic -0.006 0.994 -0.802 
Concentrated Disadvantage 0.159 1.172 0.866 
Residential Instability -0.200 0.820** -2.913 
Violent Crime Rate -0.001 0.999 -1.933 
Captain -0.525 0.591 -1.679 
Deputy Inspector -0.310 0.733 -1.005 
Cross-Level Interaction    
Black x 0.109 1.115 0.487 
Percent Black 0.000 1.000 0.004 
Hispanic x 0.295 1.343 1.398 
Percent Hispanic 0.011 1.011* 2.360 
Individual Level (N = 519,948)    
Asian 0.247 1.281 0.954 
Other -0.113 0.893 -0.305 
Sex 0.257 1.292 1.278 
Age -0.003 0.997 -0.123 
Age
2 
0.000 1.000 0.272 
Height 0.028 1.028 1.740 
Weight 0.004 1.004** 2.603 
High Crime Area -0.684 0.505*** -6.605 
Proximity to Offense 0.437 1.548** 3.432 
Radio Run 0.819 2.268*** 5.649 
Arrested -0.281 0.754 -1.751 
Frisked 0.639 1.895*** 4.628 
Searched 0.806 2.239*** 4.922 
Contraband Found -0.328 0.720 -1.065 
Weapon Found 0.351 1.420 1.446 
S: Fits Description 0.642 1.900*** 4.922 
S: Engaged in Violence 0.289 1.335 1.906 
F: Suspected Weapon 0.661 1.937*** 3.682 
F: Suspected Violent Crime 0.913 2.492*** 8.848 
F: Noncompliance 0.859 2.360*** 6.318 
F: Verbal Threats -1.121 0.326 -1.815 
References: Inspector, white, male, & R: not listed 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION  
An African-American woman in New Orleans was admitted into the 
hospital for a pregnancy termination. Two weeks later she received a 
check for $5,000. She phoned the hospital to ask who it was from. The 
hospital said, ‘Crimestoppers.’ (Department of Justice, 2015, p. 72) 
 
In a recent investigation prompted by the death of Michael Brown, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) uncovered that racial biases toward the African-American community was 
omnipresent in the Ferguson Police Department. The quote above is one of many taken 
from the email exchanges between fellow officers within the department. The 
permissibility of such implicit and explicit racial biases within the Ferguson Police 
Department not only facilitated a “brotherhood” of prejudice and discrimination behind 
closed doors, but it also permeated policing tactics in the community, which eventually 
led to disintegrating police-community relations, diminishing police legitimacy, and 
rioting throughout the city of Ferguson, Missouri. 
   Although this dissertation does not pertain to the recent events that unfolded in 
Missouri, the Ferguson Police Department serves as a hyperbolic example of what could 
happen in New York City if the NYPD continues to police in a manner that the Federal 
District Court Judge deemed to predominately target Black and Latino New Yorkers. 
Judge Shira Scheindlin’s ruling was not based on a mere subjective hunch or predisposed 
disdain for the NYPD, but rather, eight years of stop-question-frisk data that indicated the 
majority of SQFs were primarily located in communities of color and involved Blacks 
and Latinos. Similar to prior research and Jeff Fagan’s expert testimony, this dissertation 
sought to examine racial and ethnic disparities that may exist during SQF practices 
  111 
amongst the NYPD. Instead of focusing on racial and ethnic disproportionality in the rate 
of stops, however, this dissertation considered the events that transpire during SQFs, 
specifically the prevalence and nature of use of force. 
Using the minority threat hypothesis as a framework, along with prior research on 
police use of force, several research questions were devised with an emphasis on racial 
and ethnic disparities in police use of force. First, which factors predict use of force 
across suspect, situational, departmental, and ecological levels of analysis? Given the 
array of research findings from chapter 5, the first research question focuses on the effect 
of race and ethnicity at the individual level. Second, after controlling for the appropriate 
micro- and macro-level variables, do police officers use force more often in 
predominately minority neighborhoods? Lastly, does an individual’s race/ethnicity 
interact with the racial/ethnic composition of a police precinct to produce disparities in 
police use of force? Considering the results reported in chapter 5 and the far-reaching 
consequences associated with police use of force, the following sections discuss the 
theoretical, social, legal, and departmental implications of this research. 
Theoretical Implications 
 
Couched in the broader literature on the minority threat perspective, the primary 
focus of this dissertation was to determine whether crime control efforts in the form of 
police use of force varied by the racial/ethnic composition of precincts, and if so, whether 
some were targeted more than others. Specifically, police officers may use race/ethnicity 
as a way to describe, identify, and control a typical offender or offender population in 
order to preserve the status quo for the political elite (Harris, 2002). The NYPD’s use of 
force in the context of SQFs, therefore, may be a mechanism through which the historical 
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majority group in New York City (i.e., Whites) maintains their power and privilege over 
racial and ethnic minorities. 
The current study framed and analyzed police use of force using the minority 
threat perspective. With regard to the second research question, the findings revealed that 
the minority threat perspective did not provide an explanatory framework for 
understanding police use of force in general. In other words, percent Black and percent 
Hispanic were not significant predictors for non-weapon or weapon force, as indicated in 
Tables 8 and 9. These findings suggest that the NYPD does not use force on the basis of a 
precinct’s racial and ethnic composition when encountering all individuals during SQFs.  
The findings from the cross-level interaction, however, do offer partial support for the 
minority threat perspective and help answer the third research question. Whereas Black 
individuals were nominally less likely to have non-weapon force used against them in 
predominately Black precincts compared to Whites, Latinos were more likely to have 
non-weapon force and weapon force employed against them in primarily Latino precincts 
compared to their White counterparts. These findings indicate that the racial and ethnic 
composition of a precinct does matter but differently for Black and Hispanic individuals 
who were stopped. Put simply, the NYPD may use percent Black and percent Hispanic as 
an ecological cue to determine whether they should or should not use force against 
Blacks and Hispanics at the individual level.    
 
 
Explaining the Null Findings  
  113 
Given that percent Black and percent Hispanic did not predict police use of force, 
several questions must be answered with regard to the second research question. 
Specifically, why did the minority threat hypothesis fail to provide a general explanation 
of police use of force amongst individual’s in New York City? There are a number of 
possible explanations. First, percent Black and percent Hispanic may have revealed null 
associations with police use of force simply because they do not matter. This 
interpretation is likely incorrect, however, given the statistically significant cross-level 
interaction between individual-level race/ethnicity and precinct-level racial/ethnic 
composition. Second, the unit of analysis for percent Black and percent Hispanic may be 
too large at the precinct level to detect a minority-threat effect. In short, the racial and 
ethnic makeup of a precinct may be driven by the concentration of ethnic minorities 
within smaller units of analysis. If there were a number of census tracts with a high 
concentration of Blacks and Latinos, for example, and they were aggregated to a larger 
unit of analysis, a minority-threat effect may be deflated at the precinct level. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that police presence is uniform throughout a precinct. The 
NYPD likely deploys more resources to smaller geographic areas that are deemed 
problem places. Hence, a smaller unit of analysis such as street segment (Curman, 
Andresen, & Brantingham, 2014; Telep, Mitchell, & Weisburd, 2014; Weisburd, Groff, 
& Yang, 2012; Weisburd et al., 2006) or U.S. Census tract (Kane et al., 2013) may be 
more meaningful for identifying racial and ethnic disparities in police use of force, 
despite the emphasis placed on precincts in prior research (Kane, 2002; Kane, 2005).  
Lastly, the negligible effects may be due to the operationalization of the minority 
threat perspective. Traditionally, prior research has operationalized minority by racial and 
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ethnic percentages (Holmes, 2000; Holmes et al., 2008; Jackson & Carroll, 1981; 
Jackson, 1985, 1986; Kane, 2002, 2005; but see Stults & Baumer, 2007). Considering 
that the minority threat perspective predicts that a growing minority population will incite 
fear in the majority group (resulting in increases in formal social control), it is important 
to account for the majority group’s representation in the population of interest. As Kane 
and colleagues (2013) state, research should test “how racial/ethnic change relative to the 
initial white population size might behave as a threat trigger, as Blalock’s (1967) model 
suggests” (p. 962). Although Kane and colleagues (2013) research relied on longitudinal 
data, similar measures that account for the majority’s representation in the population 
could be constructed using cross-sectional data through ratios. An alternative 
operationalization of minority threat might be Black-to-White and Latino-to-White ratios 
(see Kane et al., 2013). Take, for instance, a precinct that is 40 percent Black. There is no 
way to discern whether 40 percent Black represents the minority or the majority. The 
racial/ethnic breakdown could be 40 percent Black, 40 percent Latino, and 20 percent 
White. Conversely, it could be 40 percent Black and 60 percent White. By constructing a 
ratio, the measures of minority threat would be relative to the White population. 
Other Ecological Factors. Neither concentrated disadvantage nor violent crime 
rates predicted non-weapon or weapon force. These ecological factors may not be 
significant because of sample selection bias. As Winship and Mare (1992) state,  
Sample selection is a generic problem in social research that arises when an 
investigator does not observe a random sample of a population of interest. 
Specifically, when observations are selected so that they are not independent of 
the outcome variables in the study, this sample selection leads to biased 
inferences about social processes. (p. 328; see also Berk, 1983; Bushway, 
Johnson, & Slocum, 2007) 
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In the current study, this means that the final sample only reflects the individuals who 
were stopped and had force used against them. Such an approach excludes cases in which 
a person was stopped but not documented on a UF-250 form, or had force used against 
him or her but was not documented. Because some individuals are not included as part of 
the final sample, variation in police use of force is lost. More importantly, as Zatz and 
Fagan (1985) state, “decisions at each of these selection points can affect later outcomes” 
(p. 105). In short, concentrated disadvantage and violent crime rate may have been 
insignificant because individuals comprising the final sample were qualitatively different 
from the full sample of people stopped by the NYPD. The final sample may have only 
represented the most suspicious people at the individual level, leaving ecological 
characteristics as weak predictors. Unfortunately, HLM does not have the capabilities to 
correct for sample selection bias. 
Explaining the Significant Findings 
 The second major question of interest pertains to the disparate findings for Blacks 
and Latinos in terms of the third research question. Why were Black individuals 
nominally less likely to have non-weapon force used against them in predominately 
Black precincts compared to Whites, whereas Latinos were more likely to have non-
weapon force and weapon force employed against them in primarily Latino precincts 
compared to their White counterparts? Although the finding for Black individuals runs 
contrary to the predictions proposed by the minority threat hypothesis, the benign neglect 
hypothesis may provide some insight into this outcome (Liska & Chamlin, 1984).  
Benign neglect hypothesis. The benign neglect hypothesis suggests that as 
Blacks become more prominent in the population (e.g., precincts), a shift occurs in the 
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racial composition of crimes. Specifically, “intraracial crimes become more prevalent and 
interracial crimes [become] less prevalent” (Ousey & Lee, 2008, p. 328). In other words, 
crimes that involve a Black perpetrator and a White victim are replaced by those that 
involve a Black perpetrator and a Black victim because the Black population is increasing 
in a certain area. With regard to the minority threat perspective, the Black population 
(i.e., the minority group) no longer poses a threat to the White population (i.e., the 
majority group). Furthermore, “the racial make-up of offenders and victims reduces the 
severity of criminal sanctions imposed on blacks because the state views crimes 
perpetrated against blacks as less deserving of official action” (Eitle et al., 2002, p. 560). 
Research supporting the benign neglect hypothesis indicates that higher percentages of 
Black individuals are associated with lower Black arrest rates (Chamlin & Liska, 1992; 
Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Parker et al., 2005). In line with this research, Blacks may be 
less likely to have non-weapon force used against them in predominantly Black precincts 
compared to Whites because they are viewed as an ecologically contained threat that does 
not pose a problem to the White majority (Kane, 2002): thus, there is no need for formal 
social control. 
Race out of place. The interpretation of the results also suggests that Whites were 
nominally more likely to have non-weapon force used against them compared to Blacks 
in predominately Black precincts. Although this finding runs contrary to the minority 
threat literature, research examining race and place may provide a basis for such results. 
As prior literature suggests, police officers develop conceptions of place and the people 
who occupy these areas (Bittner, 1970; Brown, 1981; Sherman, 1989), whereby a race-
place nexus is created that defines the moral characters of those comprising certain 
  117 
localities (Klinger, 1997). Consequently, police officers expand their understanding of 
place to include jurisdictional notions of acceptable and unacceptable behavior for certain 
individuals. Because officers develop “typifications” of vehicles, persons, and spaces 
using their experience in conjunction with “commonsense geography” (Meehan & 
Ponder, 2002, p. 402), they may become suspicious of individuals who do not fit their 
race-place profiles. As Skolnick (1994) states, “knowledge of what is ‘normal’ and 
expected within a community is a key ingredient in the formation of police suspicion” (p. 
44). 
Research examining the race-out-of-place hypothesis documents that both Blacks 
and Whites may be differentially policed depending on the ecological context (Carroll & 
Gonzalez, 2014; Ingram, 2007; Novak & Chamlin, 2012; Petrocelli, Piquero & Smith, 
2003; Renauer, 2012; Rojek, Rosenfeld, & Decker, 2012). Meehan and Ponder (2002), 
for instance, found that police officers’ use of in-car computers to gather information 
about suspects (i.e., an electronic trail of officers’ query behavior) varied according to 
race and place. Specifically, they found that surveillance of Black drivers significantly 
increased as they left predominately Black communities and entered White 
neighborhoods. Police officers, however, do not only formulate “out-of-place” biases 
with regard to Blacks. Research has similarly documented that the rate at which White 
drivers are stopped, searched, and cited increases as the percentage of Blacks increase in 
a police beat (Novak & Chamlin, 2008). In the same study, Black drivers had lower rates 
of being stopped, searched, and cited in predominately Black police beats. Carroll and 
Gonzalez (2014) also found that after the initial vehicle stop, police officers were more 
likely to frisk White and Black drivers if they were viewed “out-of-place.” The disparity 
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in frisks was contingent upon the racial composition of an area, with Blacks being frisked 
more often in predominately White areas and Whites being frisked more often in 
predominately Black areas. Ultimately, as Meehan and Ponder (2002) conclude, “racial 
profiling is inextricable tied not only to race, but to officers’ conceptions of place, of 
what should typically occur in an area and who belongs as well as where they belong” (p. 
402). Returning to the findings in this dissertation, police officers may be more likely to 
use non-weapon force against White individuals in predominately Black precincts 
because they do not align with the cognitive schemas that officers develop regarding race 
and place.          
 Latinos: The “new” threat. The finding that Latinos were more likely to have 
non-weapon force and weapon force employed against them in primarily Latino precincts 
compared to their White counterparts parallels the expectation of the minority threat 
hypothesis and prior research. The fact that Latinos were significantly related to both 
forms of force may suggest that the majority group views Latinos as the “new threat.” 
Census data and prior research help inform the new-threat persona of Latinos. According 
to Census data (2000), Latinos not only outnumber Blacks in the United States (Grieco & 
Cassidy, 2001), but by 2050, they will comprise 50 percent of the population (Frey, 
1999), a figure that will eventually exceed Whites in the population. Moreover, public 
opinion polls indicate that Whites view Latino immigration as a primary social issue, 
which includes fear of immigrant crime (Cooper, 2000; Lane & Meeker, 2000). Fear of 
Latinos is not only limited to crime. A growing minority group may be perceived by the 
majority group as politically and economically threatening: “minority group size serves 
as an indicator of minority group power in which, in democratic society, larger relative 
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numbers translate into greater social and political influence” (Johnson, Stewart, Pickett, 
& Gertz, 2011, p. 408). 
Eitle and Taylor (2008) found that the Latino population was a significant 
contextual-level predictor of fear of crime whereas the Black population was not. 
Similarly, Kane (2002) found that increases in the Latino population predicted increases 
in police misconduct, a finding that did not hold true of increases in the Black population. 
As Kane (2002) suggests, these contrasting outcomes may be due to the changing 
racial/ethnic composition of New York City: “The census data for 1970, 1980, and 1990 
showed that while the black population in New York City became highly concentrated 
into a smaller number of precincts…, the Latino population increased its overall 
representation across precincts over time” (p. 887). Recent estimates from the 
Department of City Planning (2010) indicate that the number of Latinos continues to 
grow in New York City. From 2000 through 2010, the Latino population has increased by 
eight percent or 175,522 individuals. In the context of census data and prior research, 
Latinos may be more likely to have both forms of force employed against them than 
White because they are viewed as the “up-and-coming” threat to the White majority’s 
hegemony.  
Implicit Bias. The differential treat of individuals on the basis of their race, 
ethnicity, and/or location may be the result of implicit bias. As social psychologists 
indicate, biases have changed over time from the explicit (e.g., racism) to the implicit, 
leading some to conclude that “modern prejudice is not your grandparents’ prejudice” 
(Fiske, 2010, p. 8). Implicit bias refers to the stereotypes or attitudes that impact human 
cognition, action, and decisions in an unconscious manner. In other words, the activation 
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of such biases are without an individual’s awareness and are “not consciously accessible 
through introspection” (Kang et al., 2012, p. 1132). The formation of implicit bias is 
multifaceted in nature. Although there is some research to suggest that genetics matter 
(Mahajan et al., 2011), most studies support the nurture argument when discussing 
implicit bias. Rudman (2004) indicates that early experiences with certain social groups 
and cultures may underlie implicit attitudes, along with the media (Dixon & Linz, 2000; 
Oliver, 2003; Weisbuch, Pauker, & Ambady, 2009). Each of these sources may expose 
individuals to direct and indirect messages about different social groups. 
 Implicit biases are so pervasive and robust that everyone is influenced by them. 
This is a particularly salient issue for police officers as they employ force on the basis of 
their perceived level of threat in an encounter. If police officers have implicit biases of 
certain social groups, it may cause them to view certain people as being a greater threat 
or more hostile. Research, for example, has documented that an implicit association 
exists between Blacks and aggression/crime (Correll et al., 2007a, 2007b; Eberhardt, et 
al., 2004; Peruche & Plant, 2006). Using a computer program, Correll and colleagues 
(2002) asked participants to either push the “shoot” button if the suspect was armed or 
push the “don’t shoot” button if the suspect held something neutral. They found that 
participants were not only quicker to shoot the suspect if he was Black rather than White, 
but that the most common errors were shooting an unarmed Black man and not shooting 
an armed White man. To the extent that police officers have such implicit biases, there 
may be disparities in police use of force and SQFs. In fact, several teams of researchers 
have conducted studies on implicit bias using law enforcement personnel. Plant and 
Peruche (2005), Peruche and Plant (2006), and Correll et al. (2007a, 2007b) all 
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implemented versions of shoot-don’t shoot research and found evidence of race-based 
implicit biases in police officers. 
 In addition to race-based biases, police officers may also hold place-based 
implicit biases. As Lum (2011) states, “Place-based cues, especially those most 
noticeable to an officer (e.g., socioeconomic status, poverty, racial and ethnic makeup, 
disorder, crime, pedestrian and traffic density, and land use), may significantly affect an 
officer’s worldview and thereby his or her discretion” (p. 632). Notions of place-based 
implicit biases are consistent with the process of ecological contamination, whereby 
individuals assume greater moral liability for living in “bad” neighborhoods (Werthman 
& Piliavin, 1967). In other words, stereotypes associated with particular neighborhoods 
become attached to the individuals that reside in them. Like race-based biases, place-
based implicit biases may influence cognition, action, and decisions in an unconscious 
manner. Such race- and place-based implicit biases may be one explanation for why 
police officers were more likely to use non-weapon force against Blacks and Hispanics 
compared to Whites, along with accounting for variations in police use of force on the 
basis of ecological characteristics (e.g., the cross-level interaction between Hispanic at 
the individual level and percent Hispanic). 
The Fair and Impartial Policing (FIP) program is currently one effort to alleviate 
implicit bias. Developed by Dr. Lorie Fridell, the FIP programs seeks to reduce and/or 
eliminate implicit bias through “(a) recruitment/hiring; (b) agency policy; (c) training; (d) 
leadership supervision and accountability; (e) assessing institutional practices and 
policies; (f) outreach to diverse communities; and (g) measurement” (Fair and Impartial 
Policing, 2015, para. 3). The comprehensive programs informs police officers of implicit 
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bias and helps them identify and undo or counteract implicit bias that make be 
influencing their behavioral responses. The training is provided to command-level 
personnel (i.e., command personnel and community leaders), recruits/patrol officers, 
first-line supervisors, law enforcement trainers, and Captains in mid-management 
positions. Although the FIP program is grounded in research in social psychology, the 
program has not been evaluated on various measures of effectiveness related to 
departmental reductions in implicit bias. 
Social Implications 
 
Over the past few decades, it has become apparent that traditional policing 
strategies predicated on the threat of arrest and punishment are not effective at controlling 
crime. Such strategies had a tendency to alienate police from the citizens they serve, 
which hindered public support for their efforts (Reiss, 1992; Moore, 1992).  Considering 
the ineffective nature of traditional policing strategies and the lack of public support, 
police departments around the country shifted their crime control approach to mend “the 
relationship between the police and public while at the same time improving crime 
control” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2002, p. 521; see also President’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing, 2015). Consequently, crime control became a shared goal between police and 
the community, whereby crime reduction depended on a strong relationship between the 
two (Friedman, 1992). In an effort to strengthen community-police relations, police 
departments’ developed community oriented initiatives that increased police contact with 
citizens, such as implementing more foot patrols and holding police/community meetings 
(Skogan & Hartnett, 1997;).  
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 Although community oriented policing is a widely adopted strategy among police 
departments, its effectiveness rests on resident support and the quality of police-citizen 
interactions—rather than the police contact alone (e.g., saturation strategies)—because it 
affects citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy (Carter & Radelet, 1999; Cordner, 1997; 
Goldstein, 1987; Greene & Pelfrey, 1997; Skogan, 1998; Williams, 1998). Research 
examining the impact of police-citizen encounters on legitimacy indicates that procedural 
justice or the manner in which police treat citizens is crucial to fighting crime.  
As Eck and Rosenbaum (1994) state, police-citizen cooperation and perceptions of 
legitimacy requires a “high level of trust between police and citizens” (p. 18). 
Furthermore, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) recently stated 
that “[t]rust between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect is essential in 
a democracy” (p.1). To foster trust and legitimacy, police officers must be impartial and 
consistent in their decisions, treat all people with dignity and respect, and act out of 
benevolence to engender trustworthiness within the community. By building a 
trustworthy relationship with the community and treating them fairly, a high level of 
legitimacy ensues whereby the police are able to effectively combat crime because 
citizens are more likely to comply during police encounters, obey the law, and cooperate 
as victims (Tyler, 1990, 2004). 
 Taking into consideration the centrality of procedural justice in determining levels 
of police legitimacy, the NYPD may be constraining their levels of legitimacy through 
racial and ethnic disparities in police use of force. Again, the results in chapter 5 
indicated that (1) Blacks and Hispanics were more likely to have non-weapon force used 
against them than Whites, and (2) Hispanics were more likely to have non-weapon and 
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weapon force used against them if they lived in predominately Hispanic precincts. If the 
NYPD continues to use force in a similar fashion, there may be short- and/or long-term 
unintended negative consequences such as disintegrating police-community relations, 
diminishing police legitimacy, and rioting (e.g. Ferguson Police Department). The 
salience of such negative effects may be compounded in minority communities, where 
police officers are viewed unfavorably due to adverse interactions. Recently, Weitzer and 
Tuch (2006) found in their national survey that approximately 40 percent of Black 
respondents claimed they were unfairly treated by the police compared to only 2 percent 
of Whites. Moreover, only 22 percent of Blacks respondents were very satisfied with the 
police whereas 50 percent of Whites indicated being very satisfied. Similar to recent 
suggestions by Braga and Weisburd (2010), the manner in which the NYPD carries out 
SQFs must done with an emphasis on procedural justice and concerns about police 
legitimacy. Unfortunately, as Weisburd and colleagues (2014) state, “There is no 
evidence that the NYPD has emphasized procedural justice and legitimacy evaluations” 
(p. 147). 
The progression of procedural justice and police legitimacy within the NYPD 
may be best accomplished through policy and training. Police officers are often placed in 
circumstances where legal factors are murky and overly broad protocols provide little 
guidance on the streets (Hemmens & Levin, 2000; Roberts, 1999). In these situations 
where vague protocols and/or policies lead to uncertainty, “police may turn to suspect 
characteristics or the sociostructural environment for help in deciding the best course of 
action” (Gau & Brunson, 2010, p. 258). The literature indicating that ambivalence is a 
source of arbitrary decision making may provide an explanation for the individual-level 
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effects of race and ethnicity. Specifically, Blacks and Hispanics were significantly more 
likely to have non-weapon force used against them than Whites; these findings, however, 
were not true for weapon force. The disparities that exist in non-weapon-force 
circumstances may suggest that police officers are uncertain about a “right” way to 
proceed because these are the situations where departmental policy is unclear. 
Consequently, police officers may rely on nonbehavioral cues such as race and ethnicity 
to make a final decision about employing non-weapon force. Conversely, when officers 
employ weapon force, there are rigid guidelines that provide officers with a clear course 
of action. By implementing policies that help govern situations where police officers use 
non-weapon force, the NYPD may prevent racial and ethnic disparities that undermine 
procedural justice and police legitimacy through the equitable distribution of justice. 
Research supports the fact that policy is an effective solution (Fyfe, 1979, 1988; Gain, 
1971; Geller & Scott, 1992; Walker, 1993; White, 2001). Coupled with in-house training, 
the policies should be effective at restraining decision making premised on an 
individual’s race and/or ethnicity. 
Police Commissioner Bratton has begun making a number of changes within the 
NYPD so that police officers can engage with community members on a more personal 
level and rebuild police-community relations. First, Bratton is changing the way rookies 
make their transition from the academy to the streets of New York City. Rather than 
immediately placing them on the street by themselves or with other rookie officers, 
Bratton is having rookies work in teams with veteran officers. These more experienced 
officers are supposed to provide rookies with wisdom and knowledge of not only their 
profession but also the community that they come into contact with on a daily basis 
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(Cullen, 2015). Second, Bratton is instating a new patrol model that reduces the number 
of specialty units and increases the number of patrol officers. Returning to the beat-cop 
paradigm, these officers will be assigned to smaller areas within precincts and expected 
to communicate with the community in order to identify individuals who are causing 
problems. Third, Bratton will give all police officers in the NYPD a smartphone, along 
with equipping all patrol cars with tablets (e.g., iPads). His logical for these devices is 
that they will free police officers from their radio calls and allow them to complete 
paperwork in the field, both of which will increase involvement with the communities 
they patrol. Together, Bratton believes that these changes will incite positive police-
community relations and reduce the NYPD’s over reliance on SQFs. Although there has 
not been an assessment of these new changes yet, the reliance on SQFs has decreased 
from 700,000 in 2011 to 45,000 in 2014.  
Legal Implications 
 
 The results in chapter 5 reinforce the ruling of the Federal District Court judge 
that the NYPD was targeting Black and Latino New Yorkers. Indeed, the results 
presented in chapter 5 indicate that (1) Blacks and Hispanics were more likely to have 
non-weapon force used against them than Whites, and (2) Hispanics were more likely to 
have non-weapon and weapon force used against them if they lived in predominately 
Hispanic precincts. These findings indicate that the NYPD may be engaging in racially 
and ethnically bias policing practices when using force during SQFs. Such disparities are 
in clear violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 
These findings also bring into question whether Terry v. Ohio and other U.S. Supreme 
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Court cases in its progeny (e.g., Sibron v. New York, 1968) may have underestimated 
whether the benefits of the SQF offset the potential costs.  
 In Dunaway v. New York (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court explained its view of 
what Terry had accomplished in legal terms: 
Terry for the first time recognized an exception to the requirement that Fourth 
Amendment seizures of persons must be based on probable cause. . . .  Terry 
departed from traditional Fourth Amendment analysis in two respects. First, it 
defined a special category of Fourth Amendment “seizures” so substantially less 
intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make 
Fourth Amendment “seizures” reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test. 
Second, the application of this balancing test led the Court to approve this 
narrowly defined less intrusive seizure on grounds less rigorous than probable 
cause, but only for the purpose of a pat-down for weapons. (Dunaway, 1979, pp. 
208–210) 
 
Consequently, Terry’s legal impact expanded law enforcement authority to engage in 
stop, question, and frisk practices on less then probable cause.  And cases decided since 
Terry have expanded the range of police actions that may be taken based on the 
reasonable suspicion standard.  For example, the Court has upheld “protective sweeps” of 
houses based on reasonable suspicion “that the area to be swept harbored an individual 
posing a danger to the officer or others.” (Maryland v. Buie, 1990, p. 327; see also 
Messing, 2010).   
The impact of Terry in practical terms is more debatable.  On one hand, the 
constitutional authority for police to engage in SQF has been credited for contributing to 
the significant reductions of violent crime in the United States since the early 1990s 
(Blumstein & Wallman, 2006; Rosenthal, 2010; cf. Fagan, Davis, & Holland, 2006; 
Johnson, Golub, & Dunlap, 2006; Kelling & Souza, 2001; but see, for an alternative 
explanation, Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006). On the other hand, abundant evidence 
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demonstrates that police use SQF against racial and ethnic minorities at much higher 
rates than they do against Whites (see Gelman, Fagan, & Kiss 2007; Goel, Rao, & Shroff, 
Harris, 2015; Thompson, 1999).  Many scholars posit that Terry’s reasonable suspicion 
standard invites racial profiling (see, e.g., Alexander, 2010; Capers, 2011; Katz, 2004).  
Indeed, data suggest that “[m]inority group members can be not only stopped, but 
subjected to a frisk without any evidence that they are armed or dangerous, just because . 
. . [of] the neighborhoods in which they work or live” (Harris, 1994b, p. 44; see also 
Tonry, 2011).  The results presenting in chapter 5 of this dissertation support the position 
taken by these scholars that stop-question-frisk practices may be motivated, in large part, 
on the basis of racial profiling.  This finding is troubling, especially in light of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United States (1996). 
Whren held that pretextual stops were not unconstitutional; so long as a stop is 
supported by a legitimate reason, no matter how minor—such failure to signal, driving 
with a nonfunctioning taillight, exceeding the speed limit by a mile or two per hour, and 
so on—then the stop is permissible under the Fourth Amendment.  But it is commonplace 
for police to pull-over a car for a routine traffic offense “as a pretext for investigating 
other crimes, particularly drug offenses … and Blacks and Hispanics are 
disproportionately targeted by the practice” (McAffee, 2012, p. 618; see also Cole, 1999).  
Thus, Whren has eroded Terry by allowing police to stop and question people without 
reasonable suspicion for a particular criminal offense, but rather for any pretextual 
reasons. In other words, under Whren, the fact that police may have used such a minor 
infraction as a means of investigating other criminal activity for which a stop would not 
have been authorized (on account of a want of reasonable suspicion) is simply irrelevant.   
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The Court in Whren rejected the notion that racial profiling might underlie a 
pretextual stop as being of consequence to the law of search and seizure. “[T]he 
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the 
Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary . . . Fourth Amendment analysis.” (p. 813; see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 2001).  
Thus, 
Whren creates a reality in which it is possible to separate a police officer’s 
racial bias from his or her observations and account of alleged criminality, 
thereby making it possible for the reviewing judge at a suppression 
hearing to uphold the officer's actions as resting upon neutral facts 
untainted by racial bias. (Thompson, 1999, p. 982). 
 
But the assumptions in Whren do not appear to be empirically supported.  Police 
officers likely use the race and ethnicity as part of their frameworks for assessing 
suspicion and danger, even if unconsciously (see Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 
2004). Consider, for example, that social disadvantage and “high-crime areas” are 
perceptually and statistically associated with ethnic minorities (Alpert et al., 2005; Fagan, 
2008; Ferguson & Bernache, 2008; Loury, 2002).  This, in turn, may lead police to have 
elevated levels of suspiciousness in minority neighborhoods (Fagan et al., 2010). To the 
extent that the police have elevated levels of suspicion in these neighborhoods, it may 
exacerbate and reinforce racial/ethnic inequalities in the practice of law enforcement, or 
as the minority threat perspective highlights, the subjugation of ethnic minorities (cf., 
e.g., Brandl, Chamlin, & Frank, 1995; Chamlin, 1990; Greenberg et al., 1985; Kane, 
2002; Liska, Lawrence, & Benson, 1981; Nalla, Lynch, & Leiber, 1997). 
Quillan and Pager (2001) found that the prevalence of young Black men affected 
urban residents’ perceptions of crime in their neighborhood, even after controlling for 
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neighborhood characteristics and crime rates. Extrapolating on Quillan and Pager’s 
(2001) research, police may have distorted perceptions of ethnic minorities in 
neighborhoods where they are heavily concentrated. Consequently, police officers likely 
develop a perceptual shorthand that associates certain races and ethnicities with specific 
kinds of people that are perceived as “symbolic assailants” (Skolnick, 1966; see also 
Hunt, 1985; Kappeler, et al., 1998; Van Maanen, 1978).  Such a framework can 
contribute to racial and ethnic disparities in police use of force because these symbolic 
assailants are viewed as the enemy (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Van Maanen, 1978). 
Although the ruling in Terry v. Ohio (1968) gives police officers the ability to 
perform brief, investigatory stops and if needed frisks, it does not give the NYPD the 
right to use race and ethnicity as a proxy for reasonable, articulable suspicion during 
SQFs. The ruling in Terry, however, invites the potential for racial and ethnic biases to 
permeate stop and frisk practices and any subsequent use of force outcomes. For that 
reason, steps should be taken to require a higher constitutional standard, such as probable 
cause, when police officers conduct a SQF. As Justice Douglas dissented in Terry v. Ohio 
(1968),  
The infringement on personal liberty of any "seizure" of a person can only be 
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment if we require the police to possess 
"probable cause" before they seize him. Only that line draws a meaningful 
distinction between an officer's mere inkling and the presence of facts within the 
officer's personal knowledge which would convince a reasonable man that the 
person seized has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a particular 
crime… To give the police greater power [( i.e., reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
SQF)] than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path. (Terry v. 
Ohio, 1968, p. 39)  
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A more restrictive constitutional standard (i.e., something closer to probable cause) may 
reduce an officer’s implicit and explicit biases through limiting their actions on the basis 
of “mere inklings.” 
 Another important finding of the present study concerns the potential need for 
improved police training with regard to Terry’s standard for conducting frisks.  Terry was 
clear when a frisk is permissible:  
When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious 
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the 
officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer 
the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is, in fact, 
carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.  (Terry v. Ohio, 
1968, pp. 23-4) 
Yet, police officers indicated that they frisked individual for noncompliance with a 
directive. Furthermore, individuals that were frisked for noncompliance had greater log 
odds of having both non-weapon and weapon force used against them. Specifically, 
individuals that were frisked for noncompliance had 1.160 higher log odds for non-
weapon force and 2.357 higher log odds for weapon force in comparison to their 
counterparts. The results with regard to this particular finding suggest that two distinct 
constitutional violations are at issue in the New York City SQF cases analyzed in this 
dissertation. The first violation was addressed in Floyd, concerning the lack of reasonable 
suspicion for stops tinged by racially-motivated factors.  But after the initial stops occur, 
it appears a second constitutional violation occurs.  The Fourth Amendment, as 
interpreted in Terry, bars a pat-down without reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed 
and potentially dangerous.  But in approximately 8% or 41,453 of the cases, police 
reported on the UF-250 forms that the reason they conducted a frisk was noncompliance 
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with a directive.  But noncompliance with a directive is not a legally-sanctioned reason 
for frisking a suspect.  
Departmental Implications 
 
   The use of stop and frisk tactics in New York City has been a crime-fighting 
centerpiece for the NYPD since the mid-1990s. Despite the recent ruling in Floyd v. City 
of New York (2008), it is unlikely that the NYPD will discontinue the use of SQFs. Police 
Commissioner Bratton has even stated that “any police department in America that tries 
to function without some form of ‘stop-question-frisk,’ or whatever the terminology they 
use, is doomed to failure. It’s that simple” (as quoted in Harris, 2014, p. 863). Given that 
the NYPD will continue to exercise their right to employ SQFs on the streets of New 
York City, they must move forward in a manner that promotes democratic policing. As 
Hickman (2010) succinctly states, democratic policing is premised upon “the 
fundamental expectation of equal treatment under law regardless of one’s race or 
ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other extralegal factors” (p. 489). Such 
expectations should not be taken lightly by the NYPD as they are the largest police 
departments in the United States and often serve as a paragon for other police 
departments across the country and world. To ensure the equitable treatment of all New 
Yorkers in the context of SQFs and reduce disparities related to police use of force, the 
NYPD must proactively maintain its adherence to the concept of democratic policing 
through accountability, transparency, and fairness. 
 Discussion about democratic policing revolves around the principles of 
accountability, transparency, and fairness. The degree to which a department is 
accountable is not measured by its effectiveness as a crime control agent but rather its 
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ability to adhere to the rule of law. Under the principle of accountability, there is an 
emphasis on legally prescribed means of accomplishing an objective, whereby “Dirty 
Harry” means are never a justifiable solution (Klockars, 1980). Moreover, while police 
officers follow a chain of command and report to their police chief, they must be 
accountable to the public, identifying any kind of police behavior that is perceived as a 
transgression against the public and then, correcting the problem (Hickman, 2010).  
 The second principle that encourages democratic policing is transparency, or the 
notion that police activities should be open to public scrutiny. The focus on transparency 
does not mean that every aspect of police operations should be made public. Clearly, the 
police must maintain some level of secrecy in order to effectively combat the criminal 
population, and/or preserve the integrity of a criminal case from a story-hungry media 
frenzy. If such secrecy is irrelevant to the goals of the police, however, there are added 
benefits for police departments to be transparent. In line with the idea that “the police are 
the people and the people are the police” (National Advisory Commission, 1973, p. 330), 
transparency promotes a higher level of mutual trust between the police and the public 
because the public is more aware of police affairs. Furthermore, having police 
information open to the public creates a social control mechanism that will deter illegal or 
immoral activities of officers, such as the disparate treatment of individuals on the basis 
of their race and/or ethnicity.  
 The last principle of democratic policing is fairness, which is directly related to 
equality of justice. As Hickman (2010) states, “In its broadest sense, fairness refers to the 
protection of basic human rights, but as one starts to focus the concept, the discussion 
turns to ideas about nondiscrimination, nonpartisanship, and equal treatment” (p. 491). 
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Hickman’s definition of fairness aligns well with Tyler’s (1990) notion of police 
legitimacy. The extent to which the public views the police as a legitimate law 
enforcement agency depends on whether they are treated with dignity, politeness, and 
respect (i.e., procedural justice). Such treatment can only be accomplished when police 
officers are objective, unbiased, and consistent in their application of law. Without 
fairness in justice, democratic policing ceases to exist. 
Internal Control Mechanisms: Promoting Democratic Policing 
 The prevention of racial and ethnic disparities in police use of force among the 
NYPD rests on the promotion of democratic policing. The principles of democratic 
policing must be maintained to mitigate the possibility that the NYPD continues to use 
force against citizens on the basis of their race or ethnicity. Such actions are (1) a 
violation the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, (2) considered 
a form of police misconduct, and (3) costly to the police department in multiple ways, 
such as “civil litigation and large monetary settlements, poor police-community relations, 
criminal prosecutions for civil rights violations, and federal interventions” (White, 2010, 
p. 469). Given the wide range of negative effects associated with racially and ethnically 
biased policing, the NYPD has a social, moral, and fiscal imperative to be accountable 
for the actions of their officers, thereby allowing democratic policing and police-
community relations to flourish. Considering that the results indicate that the NYPD is 
using force in a racially and ethnically discriminatory manner, it is unlikely that 
democratic policing and police-community relations are progressing in New York City. 
For that reason, the NYPD must implement a number of changes at the departmental 
level to transform not only how police officers view racial and ethnic minorities, but also 
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how they interact with them in the context of SQFs. Below is a comprehensive 
accountability package that the NYPD may employ to combat racially and ethnically 
biased policing practices in the form of force.    
Recruitment. One of the first points of contact with any new police officers is the 
recruitment stage. At the recruitment stage, police departments have the ability screen out 
racially and ethnically biased officers, although it is not always possible to detect such 
prejudices as most police cadets are on their best behavior. Ineffective screening of new 
hires may result in subsequent police misconduct cases, such as racial and ethnic 
disparities in police use of force. From 1980 to 1984, for example, a hiring process in 
New York City resulted in the employment of 12,000 new police officers. Due to the 
influx of so many police officers, the NYPD was unable to complete thorough and 
complete background checks on many officers, which would eventually resulted in 
numerous misconduct scandals. That being said, the NYPD must thoroughly screen 
individuals during the recruitment stage to eliminate those with prejudicial attitudes and 
discriminatory past behaviors (White, 2010).  
 Similar to many employers, police departments seek out individuals that they 
believe will be a “good fit” within their department. Considering that there are a number 
of general and specific qualifications that police departments look for when identifying 
the right candidate, the NYPD must employ a recruitment strategy that reaches a large 
applicant pool so that the department can be more selective in their hiring decisions. 
Theoretically, such hiring processes should weed out not only incompetent candidates but 
also those who hold racial and ethnic prejudices. There are a number of recruitment 
strategies to reach a large and diverse applicant pool. First, the NYPD could reach a 
  136 
larger audience of potential candidates by sending recruiters to high school and college 
career days, posting job opportunities on major online employment websites, and 
contacting criminology and criminal justice departments to name a few methods.  
Second, the NYPD may want to increase efforts to attract more minority and 
female applications. As White (2010) indicates, diversity in police departments can 
“improve police-community relations, diffuse racial tension, and may even reduce the 
likelihood of police misconduct” (p. 470). Similar recommendations for diversity are also 
advocated by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies 
(CALEA). The NYPD, in fact, is almost as racially and ethnically diverse as New York 
City. The racial and ethnic breakdown of the NYPD is 54 percent White, 16 percent 
Black, 24 percent Hispanic, and 4 percent Asian, whereas the city’s racial and ethnic 
composition is 33 percent White, 23 percent Black, 28 percent Hispanic, and 13 percent 
Asian (Cohen & Fredericks, 2014). Although the NYPD is quite diverse in terms of race 
and ethnicity, it does need improvement in its representation of female police officers. 
According to the Workforce Profile Report (2013) of New York City, female officers 
only comprised 34 percent of the NYPD taskforce, whereas they comprise 52 percent of 
New York City. Ultimately, a representative police department may be more 
understanding and empathetic of the community.   
 Lastly, the way in which the NYPD solicits for applicants should be done in a 
manner that communicates the advantages of being a police officer while portraying an 
accurate and realistic picture of real police work. Similar to various branches of the 
military that aggrandize their service to the U.S., police recruits often emphasize and 
exaggerate the excitement and danger of being a police officer. Despite the focus on 
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policing folklore that revolves around excitement and danger, most police work contains 
neither of these two characteristics. Consequently, when there exists a disjunction 
between expectations and the realization that real police work involves downtime and 
paperwork, there may be greater turnover, poorer job performance, and a higher 
likelihood that they engage in misconduct such as racially and ethnically biased actions 
(Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; White, 2010). Furthermore, if recruiters promulgate the exciting 
and dangerous aspects of being a police officer, it may influence how new police officers 
conduct themselves. As Muir (1977) highlighted in his qualitative typology study, the 
degree to which police officers believed using high levels of coercion was acceptable was 
associated with the concomitance to their role as an “enforcers” or crime-fighters. 
Supporting Muir’s (1977) observation, Terrill et al. (2003) found that police coercion is 
the result of differences in police officer attitudes. Specifically, officers that embraced the 
traditional police culture (i.e., the crime-fighter mentality) were more likely to use 
coercion than those with nontraditional cultural attitudes. In short, the NYPD must give 
potential candidates a realistic account of police work to avoid increases in employment 
turnover, poor job performance, and forms of misconduct related to racially and 
ethnically biased policing, which may include disparities in police use of force. 
Selection and training. Once there is a sizeable applicant pool, the police 
department must make sure that the potential candidates meet basic employment 
requirements, including minimum age, U.S. citizenship status, and at least a high school 
degree. If the applicant meets these basic criterions, they are given a physical agility test, 
written exam, oral interview, medical exam, and psychological exam. During the 
screening phase, police departments also conduct a thorough background investigation 
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that may include a criminal history check and interviews with family members, 
neighbors, and previous employers. This is an opportune moment for departments to 
elicit information that may help them screen out candidates that hold racially and 
ethnically prejudicial attitudes that may manifest itself as discrimination on the job. By 
conducting such an extensive background check, police departments increase their 
probability of selecting a candidate with the fundamental qualities of an ideal police 
officer.  Because the screening-out process is not 100 percent effective at identifying 
unsuitable candidates for the police profession (Grant & Grant, 1995; Kane & White, 
2009; Mollen Commission, 1994), police departments may want to couple the screening-
out process with a screening-in process. The idea being that potential candidates should 
be identified during the application process on the basis of characteristics believed to best 
exemplify the ideal police officer. The NYPD should strive to screen in candidates with 
the following attributes: “an ability to demonstrate good judgment, maintain an even 
temperament, respect and appreciate diversity, show creativity and problem-solving 
skills, think on one’s feet, handle pressure, and show leadership skills” (White, 2010, p. 
471). The summation of these characteristics will be candidates that pose minimal risk to 
the community and strive for excellence in terms of police-community relations. 
Moreover, potential candidates possessing the attributes of respect and appreciation for 
diversity will undoubtedly treat the individuals they encounter in the context of SQFs 
with fairness and dignity regardless of their race or ethnicity.  
 After candidates are selected from the applicant pool and pass their background 
checks, they enter the police academy and then are assigned to a veteran officer for field 
training. While going through the police academy, cadets must receive the message that 
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racially and ethnically biased policing is illegal, a form of misconduct, and will not be 
tolerated within the department. The way in which the NYPD conveys it’s intolerance for 
prejudicial attitudes, discrimination, and bigotry must be facilitated through the 
convergence of traditional lecture-based instruction with scenario-based training (Bayley 
& Bittner, 1984; Birzer, 2003). In the classroom, the instructor must define 
discrimination and identify various forms of it, demonstrate its negative effects on police-
community relations, and illustrate how it dismantles police legitimacy and reduces the 
effectiveness of the police, which are all associated with social, political, and fiscal costs. 
Such class-based instruction must be met with real world scenario-based training. For the 
NYPD, this means that scenario-based training must include a variety of SQF situations 
that force cadets to apply their classroom knowledge and expose them near real world 
challenges they may face in the field. Furthermore, such training exercises could also 
integrate New York City community members. These individuals could discuss their 
experiences interacting with the NYPD, which may include SQF encounters, to give 
cadets a well-rounded perspective of policing from the viewpoint of community 
members. Importantly, Black and Latino New Yorkers should participate in such training 
exercises to discuss their experiences with the NYPD, especially if it involved racially 
and ethnically biased policing practices. As a result, this training may help prevent 
officers from developing the “us-verse-them” mentality, whereby Blacks and Latinos are 
viewed as the enemy and more deserving of police use of force.  
The police academy could also serve as the first point in which the NYPD 
identifies racial and ethnic animus amongst it cadets.  Similar to “integrity tests,” 
instructors would create scenarios that engage cadets in a manner that subtly tries to 
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evoke discriminatory responses and/or behaviors. If discrimination is the response, the 
instructor must address such behavior, making sure that he or she knows that it is 
unacceptable. Such a program could also be mechanism for screening-in and/or 
screening-out cadets. A successful scenario-based program, however, must be carefully 
constructed to avoid discrimination entrapment, whereby junior officers feel it is 
necessary to engage in discrimination because their job depends on it. Regardless, such a 
program would produce police officers with a high sense of moral integrity, and it may 
serve as the earliest form of an early warning system in terms of racially and ethnically 
biased police officers.   
 Following their successful matriculation through the police academy, junior 
officers are typically assigned to a veteran officer for a period of field training. It is 
during this phase of training that junior officers are often exposed to sayings such as 
“forget everything you learned at the academy, now you’ll find out how police work is 
really done” (Perez, 2010, p. 238). Such colloquial sayings are meant to impress upon 
junior officers that a major gap exists between the academy (i.e., theory) and practice 
(i.e., field work). The responsibility of field training officers (FTO), therefore, is to 
“bridge the gap between the classroom environment of the academy and the ‘real world’ 
of policing on the street” (White, 2010, p. 471). Thus, the NYPD must judiciously select 
FTOs from the highest echelon to ensure that these individuals contain the characteristics 
and integrity of an ideal officer. Importantly, these FTOs must also be able to impart the 
directive that racially and ethnically biased policing will not be tolerated, through both 
their words and their actions. Without FTOs of the highest caliber, the NYPD may be 
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training officers to engage in racially and/or ethnically biased policing strategies that 
profile certain individuals.  
Supervision. A police officer’s job is not only slow at times, but it comes with a 
tremendous amount of solitude and autonomy. In some localities, especially rural areas, it 
is common for police officers to have limited contact with their supervisor. Despite the 
independence many officers are granted on the job, supervision plays an essential role in 
maintaining officer accountability (Walker & Katz, 2013). In fact, one study found that 
approximately 90 percent of police officers believed that competent supervisors 
prevented misconduct (Weisburd et al., 2000). For police officers working a beat or a 
particular area, frontline supervision usually comes from their sergeant. In short, 
sergeants are responsible for the individuals they directly supervise and must keep them 
accountable for their behaviors through disciplinary action. Likewise, the nexus between 
chain of command and accountability must pervade all hierarchical levels of a police 
organization (e.g., lieutenants are responsible for sergeants; captains are responsible for 
lieutenants; etc.). Overall, effective supervision is one solution to prevent and/or combat 
racially and ethnically biased policing in the NYPD. 
 Considering the robustness of police supervision, the NYPD should take steps to 
maximize the effectiveness of individuals in supervisory roles. First, sergeants who have 
an unmanageable “span of control” may find that racially and ethnically biased policing 
is more pervasive amongst their officers. Given that the NYPD is the largest police 
department in the world and relies on its line officers to carry out SQFs, it is likely that 
some sergeants may find it difficult to oversee all of their subordinates, which may lead 
to disparities in how line officers use force. By restricting the number of police officers 
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managed by a sergeant, therefore, the NYPD may reduce the racial and ethnic disparities 
that exist both in the initial SQF and the likelihood that police officers use force. 
Research has found that the optimal number of subordinates is eight to twelve for a 
sergeant (Walker & Katz, 2013).  
Second, NYPD sergeants should not only punish or discipline their officers, but 
also reward first-rate policing through incentives (Kappler et al., 1998). The differential 
reinforcement of police behaviors will help foster a police culture that is devoid of 
various forms of prejudicial attitudes and discrimination. In terms of SQF and police use 
of force, incentives should be devised to encourage police officers to identify colleagues 
that may be engaging in racial or ethnic profiling. Third, it is imperative that NYPD 
sergeants receive adequate training of their duties and responsibilities. If not, sergeants 
may condone various behaviors because they are ill equipped to devise appropriate 
solutions. Fourth, NYPD sergeants should not be responsible for supervising peers in 
which they use to share equal rank. It may be difficult to supervise such peers because 
“officers do not respect their authority, they resent that the sergeant got the promotion 
and they did not, or because the officers may be aware of the sergeant’s own past 
misdeeds” (White, 2010, p. 473; see also Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). For that reason, the 
NYPD may want to relocate sergeants within a department so that their subordinates take 
them seriously and respect their orders.    
 The last crux underlying effective supervision is a police chief that is committed 
to accountability. As Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) highlight, police department reflect the 
philosophy or tone set by the police chief. The actions and/or inactions of a police chief 
may operate to reinforce racially and ethnically biased policing strategies and undermine 
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administrative policies meant to curb such behaviors. Examples from Darryl Gates in Los 
Angeles, Frank Rizzo in Philadelphia, and Harold Breier in Milwaukee all illustrate the 
far-reaching consequences of a police chief’s philosophy (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). In 
the NYPD, racial and ethnic disparities in SQFs and police use of force may have been 
the result of Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s and Commissioner Ray Kelly’s unquestioning 
support of SQF practices. 
 The role of former Police Chief Murphy exemplifies how effective supervision 
can positively change philosophical tones set in police department. While the NYPD 
police chief, Murphy instituted a system that held supervisors and administrators 
accountable for the conduct of their personnel. Those who identified crooked or corrupt 
cops were rewarded, whereas police officers that kept silent about their peers engaging in 
misconduct were punished. Moreover, Murphy made it his objective to replace 
incompetent police officers above the rank of captain with promising young commanders. 
The environment engineered by Murphy was one that vehemently ostracized those who 
engaged in or tolerated police misconduct (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Similar provisions 
should be taken in NYPD to eliminate any racially and ethnically biased perceptions that 
may exist among officers. 
Formal guidelines. Although police officers are granted a tremendous amount of 
freedom to carry out their occupational mandate, research suggests that police behavior is 
influenced by formal/administrative guidelines (Fyfe, 1979; (Fyfe, 1988; Gain, 1971; 
Geller & Scott, 1992; Walker 1993; White, 2001). The implementation of administrative 
guidance in the form of policies, rules, and procedures serves to provide police officers 
with a framework for making better decisions, especially when presented with 
  144 
uncertainties (Kappler et al., 1998). The NYPD should make several administrative 
changes to reduce racial and ethnic disparities involving SQFs. First, departmental policy 
must be more restrictive about the kinds of suspicious behaviors that govern SQFs. 
Administrative policy should require officers to undergo yearly training to bring them up-
to-date with the legal precedence dictating Terry stops. Without mandatory training, the 
NYPD may maintain it’s over reliance on SQFs, resulting in stops that are not justifiable 
under the Fourth Amendment. As Fagan (2012) found with regard to the NYPD, 
“[n]early 150,000, or 6.71% of all discretionary stops lack legal justification. An 
additional 544,252, or 24.37% of all discretionary stops lack sufficiently detailed 
documentation to assess their legality” (pp. 3-4). Considering that frisks and arrests in the 
context of SQF are positively associated with non-weapon and weapon force, and Blacks 
and Latino are more likely to be frisked and arrested, the NYPD must restrict their Terry 
stops to those incidents where uncertainty does not exist in the initial reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of a suspect.  
Second, the NYPD should develop a clear and direct policy that forbids officers 
from using race and ethnicity as a precursor for initiating a SQF or using force. Fridell 
and colleagues’ (2001) model policy should serve as a starting point for the NYPD. 
Officers may take into account the reported race or ethnicity of a specific suspect 
or suspects based on trustworthy, locally relevant information that links a person 
or persons of a specific race/ethnicity to a particular unlawful incident(s). 
Race/ethnicity can never be used as the sole basis for probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion. (p. 52). 
 
Additionally, the NYPD must enforce this policy through leadership, disciplinary actions, 
and incentives. If successfully implemented, such policy will likely reduce racial and 
ethnic disparities in SQF practices and police use of force among the NYPD. 
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Early warning systems. The first Early Warning (EW) systems were first 
implemented by the Miami and Miami-Dade police departments in the late 1970s 
(Walker & Alpert, 2002). Eventually, they were endorsed by the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights in 1981 and then by the U.S. Justice Department during a 
conference on police integrity in 1996 (Walker, Alpert, & Kenney, 2000). The reason for 
having EW systems is to identify problem police officers on the basis of past behavior in 
an effort to mitigate the possibility that bad behavior intensifies into a form of 
misconduct. By collecting and analyzing data on problem behaviors (e.g., 
discrimination), EW systems are able to identify officers who pose greater risks to the 
department and the community. Although EW systems are not overly prevalent in police 
departments, their utility is becoming more common. In fact, by 1999, approximately 
27% of police departments serving populations over fifty thousand people had an EW 
system, with other departments in the planning phase (Walker et al., 2000). 
 EW systems are premised on the notion that a small portion of police officers 
produce the majority of a department’s complaints about problem behavior. Such cases 
have been documented throughout the United States (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
1981; Toch et al., 1975). In most of the documented incidents of misconduct, there was a 
trend of bad behavior for certain officers. The problem, however, was that “police 
managers ignored patterns of repeated involvement in critical incidents and failed to take 
any kind of supervisory attention to the officers with the worst records” (Walker et al., 
2000, p. 201). EW systems circumvent this ineptitude by documenting all incidents 
related to an officer’s bad behavior.  
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Most EW systems are comprised of three components: the selection criteria, the 
intervention, and the post-intervention monitoring (Walker & Alpert, 2002; White, 2010). 
Although the selection criteria may vary by police department, these are the indicators or 
“red flags” deemed to place an officer as being “at risk” (e.g., citizen complaints, use-of-
force incidents, etc.). If an officer is selected as a risk on the basis of multiple “red flags,” 
it becomes the department’s obligation to address the issue. Many police departments 
initiate the process with an informal meeting between the officer and his or her 
supervisor. As Walker and Archbold (2014) note, the review and intervention process 
should be conducted by “a commander or committee of supervisors [rather] than an 
officer’s immediate supervisor” (p. 71). Subsequently, if it is deemed necessary, there 
may be a formal intervention such as training and/or counseling (rather than punishment) 
to change the officer’s behavior (Walker & Alpert, 2002). Finally, the department 
engages in post-intervention monitoring of the at-risk officer in order to make sure that 
problem behaviors are no longer an occurring.  
Considering the ruling of the Federal District Court judge and the findings 
reported in chapter 5, the NYPD may want to implement an EW system in order to 
identify officers who are not only excessively stopping Black and Latino New Yorkers, 
but also using force against them at a disparate rate compared to Whites. Although EW 
systems are expensive, complex, and difficult to maintain, they can be instrumental in the 
reduction of citizen complaints, use of force, and other problem behavior. The Pittsburgh 
Police Department, for example, has an EW system in place that reviews officers on a 
quarterly basis. The system searches for accounts of racial bias and then produces an 
activity report. With this data, the department is able to identify at-risk officers and 
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intervene if necessary. The Vera Institute (2002) concluded that “the early warning 
system is the centerpiece of the [Pittsburgh] Police Bureau’s reforms in response to the 
consent decree” (p. 37). The NYPD may have similar success with an EW system. 
Internal affairs. Even with the aforementioned internal control mechanisms, 
there is still the possibility that the NYPD continues engaging in racially and ethnically 
biased forms of policing. In such circumstances, it remains the responsibility of Internal 
Affairs to conduct an investigation based on information that may have come from a 
citizen complaint, official report, or another police officer. Despite the traditional reactive 
nature of Internal Affairs, some police departments are using more proactive approaches 
to identifying problem officers. For example, “integrity tests” are becoming more 
common amongst police departments as a tool for pinpointing misconduct-prone police 
officers. These tests are designed such that there are ample opportunities for police 
officers to potentially succumb to misconduct. Unbeknownst to the officer under 
investigation, however, is that he or she is simultaneously being monitored for their 
response by Internal Affairs (Walker & Katz, 2013; White, 2010). In an effort to amplify 
the benefits of “integrity tests,” police departments should consider using them on police 
officers deemed problematic by early warning systems.  
  The efficacy of Internal Affairs to investigate allegations of racially and/or 
ethnically biased forms of policing is contingent upon a number of factors. First, Internal 
Affairs must have complete support from the police chief (Walker & Katz, 2013). 
Without the support of the police chief, there is a clear message sent to officers in the 
department that such allegations of misconduct are insignificant. Furthermore, police 
chiefs should also demonstrate their support for Internal Affairs by communicating 
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directly with the investigative unit (Kappler et al., 1998). Second, Internal Affairs must 
be given adequate resources and be properly trained. The number of officers comprising 
an Internal Affairs unit should be relative to the size of the department. Although there is 
not a definitive answer for an optimal investigator-to-officer ratio, former police 
commission Patrick Murphy had some success within the NYPD when the ratio was 
reduce from 1:533 to 1:64 (Sherman, 1974). Third, police leadership must engender a 
departmental culture whereby working in Internal Affairs is viewed as a prestigious 
position rather than a badge of betrayal (Klockars et al., 2000). Lastly, police departments 
must have rigorous selection criteria for officers in the Internal Affairs unit. These 
officers should have few, if any, problems in their past to ensure they have integrity in 
their work and are not view as hypocrites by their fellow officers. 
 External Auditors. According to Walker and Archbold (2014), external auditors 
are the most promising mechanism for reform and police accountability. The model they 
propose involves a team of individuals constructed by local or state law. Of these 
individuals, at least one of them is an expert in law and/or policing. They serve in a range 
of functions, auditing complaints, policies, and police-community outreach programs. 
Walker and Archbold (2014) believe that external auditors will foster organizational 
change because they contain two special characteristics:  
First, as full-time government officials they have the authority to probe deeply 
into departmental policies and procedures with an eye toward correcting them and 
reducing future misconduct…Second, as permanent agencies they can follow up 
on issues and determine whether or not prior recommendations for change have 
been implemented. (p. 179) 
 
The effectiveness of such external policing auditors is demonstrated by a number of 
agencies, including the San Jose Independent Police Auditor, the Denver Office of the 
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Independent Monitor, the Special Counsel to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, and 
the Boise Ombudsman. 
 In New York City, strides are being made to include external auditors as a way to 
keep the NYPD accountable for their actions. The Civilian Complaint Review Board 
(CCRB) reviews and investigates citizen complaints against NYPD officers. The CCRB, 
for example, has made a number of recommendations to the NYPD involving the use of 
chokeholds and training deficiencies. Unfortunately, those recommendations were being 
rejected by the Police Commissioner. Only recently, with the remedial actions stemming 
from Floyd v. City of New York (2008), has the NYPD been taking such 
recommendations seriously. At the outcome of Floyd, the New York City Council passed 
Local Law 70, creating the Office of Inspector General (OIG). The OIG is now 
responsible for external oversight of the NYPD, which is more consistent with type of 
external auditors outlined by Walker and Archbold (2014). They are working closely 
with the NYPD to ensure reforms are implemented to reduce racial and ethnic disparities 
related to SQFs. 
 Body Worn Cameras and In-Service Training. Resolutions to racial and ethnic 
disparities in police use of force may be combated through the use of body worn cameras 
(BWCs). BCWs are small devices worn by officers, typically on their placket. The BWC 
captures and records activity, creating a permanent digital video recording of police 
encounters with citizens. Although research on BWCs is still developing, the perceived 
benefits of BWCs include increased transparency and police legitimacy, improved 
behavior among both police officers and citizens, reduced citizen complaints and police 
use of force, and enhanced evidentiary value that leads to higher rates of arrest and 
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prosecution. To date, a handful of studies have shown promising results for the future of 
BWCs in American policing. The deployment of BCWs in Phoenix, Arizona, resulted in 
a 17 percent increase in arrests and a 23 percent reduction in complaints (White, 2013). 
Furthermore, those police officers who wore a BWC and received a complaint were 
significantly more likely to have the complaint dismissed and as a result, were less likely 
to be disciplined. Similarly, research examining the police department in Rialto, 
California found that after deploying BWCs, there was an 88 percent reduction in citizen 
complaints against officers and a 58.3 percent reduction in police use of force (Ariel, 
Farrar, & Sutherland, 2014). 
 The use of BCWs may also provide opportunities for police training in both the 
academy and as part of performance evaluations, especially for incidents involving police 
use of force (Harris, 2010). The anecdotal evidence that exists suggests that BWCs 
enable officer to assess their behavior and modify it accordingly (Goodall, 2007). The 
review of video footage may help police departments identify implicit biases that their 
officers hold towards racial and ethnic minorities. The salience of BCWs to enhance 
training cannot be understated. The motivation to break implicit bias stems from two 
sources.  
First, people must be aware of their biases and, second, they must be concerned 
about the consequences of their biases before they will be motivated to exert 
effort to eliminate them. Furthermore, people need to know when biased 
responses are likely to occur and how to replace those biased responses with 
responses more consistent with their goals. (Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 
2012, p. 1268)  
 
The use of BCWs has the potential to make officers aware of their biases. Once aware of 
such biases through BCWs, supervisors must convey the consequences of implicit biases 
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so that the police officer is motivated to change their behavior. Importantly, research has 
found that awareness of implicit bias motivates and enables individuals to control their 
behavior (Devine et al., 2012; Lane, Kang, & Banaji, 2007). To date, there are few police 
department that use BWCs for training and evaluation (White, 2014).   
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
The limitations of this study not only constrain the generalizability of the findings 
but also provide researchers with future avenues of inquiry. First, reporting biases may 
exist because police officers are supposed to fill out a UF-250 form after each SQF 
encounters. Police officers may ameliorate the level of force employed on these forms, or 
they may not document the incident at all (Rosenfeld & Fornango, 2012; Weisburd et al., 
2014). Systematic social observation or citizen interviews may provide a more complete 
understanding of police use of force in the context of SQFs. Second, this study was 
unable to control for the rank of the officer. Concerns about rank are a limitation because 
rookies may be more likely to employ force due to their inexperience. Moreover, junior 
officers may be the ones assigned to high-crime areas, which are predominately 
composed of ethnic minorities. Coupled with their inexperience, rookies may be hastier 
to employ various forms of force when they have a “hunch” about danger because they 
lack the tactical knowledge of a particular location and the people that reside in it. If 
available, future research should control for officer rank, especially in the context of 
SQFs and police use of force. Third, the minority threat perspective was measured 
indirectly through percent Black and percent Latino. A more direct measure of the 
minority threat perspective would ask Whites how threatened they feel by increases in the 
Black and Latino populations. Fourth, the current study used static measures for percent 
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Black and percent Hispanic. In line with Kane and colleagues (2013), future research 
should use a dynamic measure of percent Black and percent Hispanic to capture how the 
racial and ethnic compositions of precincts changed over time. Fifth, the unit of analysis 
for percent Black and percent Hispanic may be too large at the precinct level to detect a 
minority-threat effect. Future research should examine smaller units of analysis or pit 
various levels of analysis against one another using a cross-classified model. Lastly, this 
study relied on one year of data, which rules out discussion about causality. Furthermore, 
the findings from 2012 may not be generalizable to more recent years because there have 
been drastic changes to the implementation of SQFs since Bratton became Police 
Commissioner of the NYPD. By including multiple years of data, future research can 
mitigate methodological issues related to causality and generalizability. 
Conclusion 
 Framed within prior research and the minority threat perspective, the results from 
chapter 5 reveal several noteworthy findings that have clear theoretical, social, legal, and 
departmental implications, which are stated above in the discussion section. These 
findings indicate that (1) Blacks and Latinos are more likely to have non-weapon force 
used against them in New York City compared to Whites, (2) Blacks are less likely to 
have non-weapon force used against them compared to Whites if they are located in 
primarily Black precincts, and (3) Latinos are more likely to have non-weapon and 
weapon force used against them compared to Whites if they are located in predominately 
Latino precincts. Although weapon force only occurred in a fraction of SQF encounters, 
they represent a very important percentage because there are far-reaching consequences 
associated with higher levels of police use of force. The deaths of Eric Garner in New 
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York City, Michael Brown in Ferguson, and Freddie Gray in Baltimore all illustrate this 
point.  Coupled with the findings, the implications of this research underscore the need 
for the NYPD to modify the manner in which they use force in the context of SQFs. As 
of 2012, the evidence suggests that the NYPD was using force in a racially and ethnically 
discriminatory manner.  
 Since 2012, the use of SQFs has dropped precipitously from 532,912 to 45,000 in 
2014. The reduction in SQF is largely due to the joint efforts of Mayor de Blasio and 
Police Commissioner Bratton, who put SQFs at the forefront of their agendas. Such 
drastic decreases have left some commentators optimistic about the future of SQF in 
NYC. It may be too soon, however, to hold such positive outlooks on SQFs in NYC. 
Specifically, the reduction in SQFs does not necessarily reflect changes in the quality of 
these stops. Police officers, for example, may continue using reasonable, articulable 
suspicion in a manner that disparately impacts the lives of racial and ethnic minorities 
and lacks the cornerstones of procedural justice—fairness, respect, and impartiality. The 
death of Eric Garner in the summer of 2014 highlights this point. For that reason, 
research must continue examining the progression SQF and police use of force among the 
NYPD as they continue implementing the remedial actions outlined in Floyd v. City of 
New York (2008).   
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APPENDIX B  
TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
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Variable Coding Scheme Description 
Dependent Variables   
Use of Force Outcome   
No Force 1 = Yes Dummy variable indicating that the police 
officer did not use force. 
Non-Weapon Force 1 = Yes Dummy variable indicating that the police 
officer used non-weapon force (i.e., incidents 
involving hands, suspect on ground, suspect 
against wall, and handcuffs) 
Weapon Force 1 = Yes Dummy variable indicating that the police 
officer used weapon force. (i.e., weapon 
drawn, weapon pointed, baton, pepper spray, 
and other) 
Independent Variables   
Precinct Level    
Percent Black Continuous The racial composition of each precinct for 
blacks 
Percent Hispanic Continuous The ethnic composition of each precinct for 
Hispanics 
Concentrated 
Disadvantage 
Continuous Index composed of percent persons in poverty, 
percent households receiving public assistance, 
percent adult unemployment, percent young 
men (18-25), percent under eighteen, and 
percent of female-headed households with 
dependents 
Residential Instability Continuous Index composed of percent individuals residing 
in same household for one year, percent 
foreign born, and percent vacant houses 
Violent Crime Rate Continuous Reflects NYPD reported homicide, robbery, 
aggravated assaults and forcible rape per 
100,000 citizens 
Commanding Officer 3 Dummy Variables Dummy variable for the commanding officer’s 
rank. 
Individual Level   
Race/Ethnicity 6 Dummy Variables Dummy variable for suspects race/ethnicity, 
with white being the reference group 
Sex 1 = Female Dummy category for sex 
Age Continuous  Suspect’s age at time of stop 
Suspect’s Height Continuous  Suspect’s height measured in inches  
Suspect’s Weight Continuous  Suspect’s weight measured in pounds  
High Crime Area 1 = Yes Dummy variable for high crime area 
Proximity to Offense 1 = Yes Suspect’s proximity to offense 
Radio Run 1 = Yes SQF prefaced by dispatch 
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Variable Coding Scheme Description 
Independent Variables   
Individual Level   
Arrest made 1 = Yes Dummy variable indicating if an arrest was 
made 
Frisked Suspect 1 = Yes Dummy variable indicating if suspect was 
frisked 
Searched Suspect 1 = Yes Dummy variable indicating if suspect was 
searched 
Contraband Found 1 = Yes Dummy variable indicating if the suspect was 
carrying contraband (i.e., drugs) 
Weapon on Found 1 = Yes Dummy variable indicating if the suspect had a 
weapon 
Stopped: Fits 
Description 
1 = Yes Stop initiated because suspect fit a relevant 
description 
Stopped: Engaged in 
Violence 
1 = Yes Stop initiated because suspect’s actions were 
indicative of engaging in a violent crime. 
Frisked: Suspected 
Weapon 
1 = Yes Frisk initiated because weapon was suspected 
Frisked: Suspected 
Violent Crime 
1 = Yes Frisk initiated because violent crime was 
suspected 
Frisked: 
Noncompliance 
1 = Yes Frisk initiated because suspect refused to 
comply with officer’s directions 
Frisked: Verbal 
Threats 
1 = Yes Frisk initiated because suspect was verbally 
threatening 
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APPENDIX C 
TABLE 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
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Dependent Variables  Min Max Mean SD 
Force Outcome (N = 519,948)     
No Force 0 1 .858 .349 
Non-Weapon Force 0 1 .141 .348 
Weapon Force 0 1 .001 .034 
Independent Variables      
Precinct Level (N = 75)     
Percent Black .748 88.237 31.523 25.796 
Percent Hispanic 6.028 74.292 32.175 21.028 
Concentrated 
Disadvantage 
-2.291 1.875 -.003 .999 
Residential Instability -3.159 1.646 .000 1.001 
Violent Crime Rate 96.835 1679.409 716.569 376.717 
Captain 0 1 .294 .456 
Deputy Inspector 0 1 .618 .486 
Inspector 0 1 .088 .283 
Individual Level (N = 519,948)     
White 0 1 .095 .294 
Black 0 1 .538 .499 
Hispanic 0 1 .312 .463 
Asian 0 1 .032 .177 
Other 0 1 .015 .122 
Sex 0 1 .072 .259 
Age 10 98 28.080 11.765 
Height 36 95 68.602 3.166 
Weight 50 600 168.746 29.776 
High Crime Area 0 1 .601 .490 
Proximity to Offense 0 1 .225 .418 
Radio Run 0 1 .241 .427 
Arrested 0 1 .061 .239 
Frisked 0 1 .559 .496 
Searched 0 1 .083 .276 
Contraband Found 0 1 .017 .131 
Weapon Found 0 1 .012 .110 
S: Fits Description 0 1 .165 .371 
S: Engaged in Violence 0 1 .110 .313 
F: Suspected Weapon 0 1 .034 .180 
F: Suspected Violent 
Crime 
0 1 .130 .336 
F: Noncompliance 0 1 .079 .270 
F: Verbal Threats 0 1 .006 .078 
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APPENDIX D 
TABLE 12: SQF AND POLICE USE OF FORCE BY PRECINCT 
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Precinct Non-Weapon Force Weapon Force No Force Total Number of Stops 
1 609 4 2,384 2,997 
5 509 3 2,172 2,684 
6 807 8 2,644 3,459 
7 448 6 2,976 3,430 
9 833 5 4,256 5,094 
10 449 2 1,863 2,314 
13 584 9 3,141 3,734 
14 1,073 13 7,665 8,751 
17 171 2 1,088 1,261 
18 317 6 2,617 2,940 
19 467 7 4,052 4,526 
20 297 5 2,940 3,242 
23 524 3 10,338 10,865 
24 561 7 3,578 4,146 
25 1,140 2 5,043 6,185 
26 674 8 4,597 5,279 
28 584 8 5,923 6,515 
30 705 8 5,286 5,999 
32 3,153 16 7,267 10,436 
33 388 5 3,186 3,579 
34 1,361 5 7,826 9,192 
40 4,911 18 13,062 17,991 
41 1,429 3 6,666 8,098 
42 1,502 5 5,855 7,362 
43 1,314 12 9,109 10,435 
44 5,455 12 9,636 15,103 
45 549 6 3,346 3,901 
46 1,846 13 3,704 5,563 
47 1,658 7 7,042 8,707 
48 1,159 15 3,831 5,005 
49 629 5 5,098 5,732 
50 373 6 1,420 1,799 
52 2,052 5 7,573 9,630 
60 1,210 11 6,389 7,610 
61 462 4 6,207 6,673 
62 340 3 4,109 4,452 
63 518 8 3,128 3,654 
66 279 3 3,056 3,338 
192 
 
67 669 10 9,992 10,671 
68 187 4 2,352 2,543 
69 1,593 2 3,742 5,337 
70 1,358 11 9,170 10,539 
71 299 20 4,318 4,637 
72 588 10 4,567 5,165 
73 959 14 20,578 21,551 
75 2,162 31 21,529 23,722 
76 451 12 4,009 4,472 
77 774 12 9,030 9,816 
78 136 0 3,023 3,159 
79 988 11 13,917 14,916 
81 754 14 8,773 9,541 
83 1,007 13 10,087 11,107 
84 544 5 3,221 3,770 
88 314 3 5,489 5,806 
90 320 14 9,317 9,651 
94 108 0 1,975 2,083 
100 561 9 3,552 4,122 
101 1,615 27 8,052 9,694 
102 1,272 7 5,390 6,669 
103 1,945 5 10,833 12,783 
104 474 3 4,339 4,816 
105 515 12 7,609 8,136 
106 467 11 4,505 4,983 
107 976 13 3,288 4,277 
108 161 6 3,866 4,033 
109 1,812 5 7,800 9,617 
110 2,050 5 6,942 8,997 
111 98 2 3,645 3,745 
112 376 1 2,268 2,645 
113 951 13 7,683 8,647 
114 1,041 10 7,119 8,170 
115 2,508 7 5,354 7,869 
120 1,439 8 10,834 12,281 
122 535 6 5,822 6,363 
123 69 0 1,865 1,934 
     
Total 73,416 604 445,928 519,948 
 
